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ABSTRACT
Ritchey, Philip Carson Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. Synthetic Steganogra-
phy: Methods for Generating and Detecting Covert Channels in Generated Media.
Major Professor: Vernon J. Rego.
Issues of privacy in communication are becoming increasingly important. For
many people and businesses, the use of strong cryptographic protocols is sufficient to
protect their communications. However, the overt use of strong cryptography may
be prohibited or individual entities may be prohibited from communicating directly.
In these cases, a secure alternative to the overt use of strong cryptography is re-
quired. One promising alternative is to hide the use of cryptography by transforming
ciphertext into innocuous-seeming messages to be transmitted in the clear.
In this dissertation, we consider the problem of synthetic steganography: generat-
ing and detecting covert channels in generated media. We start by demonstrating how
to generate synthetic time series data that not only mimic an authentic source of the
data, but also hide data at any of several different locations in the reversible genera-
tion process. We then design a steganographic context-sensitive tiling system capable
of hiding secret data in a variety of procedurally-generated multimedia objects. Next,
we show how to securely hide data in the structure of a Huffman tree without affecting
the length of the codes. Next, we present a method for hiding data in Sudoku puzzles,
both in the solved board and the clue configuration. Finally, we present a general
framework for exploiting steganographic capacity in structured interactions like on-
line multiplayer games, network protocols, auctions, and negotiations. Recognizing
that structured interactions represent a vast field of novel media for steganography,
we also design and implement an open-source extensible software testbed for analyz-
xi
ing steganographic interactions and use it to measure the steganographic capacity of
several classic games.
We analyze the steganographic capacity and security of each method that we
present and show that existing steganalysis techniques cannot accurately detect the
usage of the covert channels. We develop targeted steganalysis techniques which
improve detection accuracy and then use the insights gained from those methods to
improve the security of the steganographic systems. We find that secure synthetic
steganography, and accurate steganalysis thereof, depends on having access to an
accurate model of the cover media.
1
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a major concern in today’s world. Cryptography has been, and remains,
the standard solution for obtaining most forms of privacy. However, the use of strong
cryptography is sometimes prohibited. Furthermore, suspicious and paranoid ob-
servers may take the usage of cryptography as evidence that the sender has a secret
to hide. In the interest of preserving and promoting freedom of information, freedom
of thought, and freedom of expression, people must be able to use secure communi-
cation channels safely, especially when such usage is under attack. One solution to
the problem of communicating securely without the overt use of cryptography is to
hide the ciphertext using techniques from the field of information hiding. Information
hiding protocols, such as steganography, can hide the existence of the secure commu-
nication channel to protect the endpoints as well as the information in the channel,
allowing the use of cryptography without revealing that it is being used.
1.1 Information Hiding
Information hiding is a field of information security which deals with privacy con-
cerns. It can be thought of as part of the general and broad field of cryptography , the
practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adver-
saries [1]. However, unlike the core techniques of cryptography which are concerned
with keeping secret what secret information Alice communicates to Bob, information
hiding is concerned with keeping secret if and when Alice and Bob are communi-
cating secret information. While encryption obfuscates the content of a message in
order to make it unreadable, information hiding techniques disguise the message in
order to make it undetectable or untraceable. Two sub-fields of information hiding,
steganography and anonymity, respectively deal with those two goals.
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The field of anonymity is comprised of methods for keeping secret the source and
destination of information. Anonymity techniques rely heavily on strong cryptogra-
phy. If an adversary can break the encryption which protects the routing information
in an onion routing network, for example, then they can trace the communication
much more easily and violate the privacy of the users. Fortunately, strong cryptogra-
phy is called “strong” for a reason: it is extremely difficult to break. But sometimes
strong cryptography is prohibited, rendering ineffective any anonymizing network
which relies solely on strong cryptography. This is where the field of steganography
comes to the front.
Steganography is the art and science of hiding secrets in such a way that the
existence of the secret is undetectable to a third party adversary or observer. There is
evidence that steganography has been in use for over 2000 years [2] with two examples
found in the Histories of Herodotus [3]. The first recorded usage of the term occurs in
Trithemius’ Steganographia, a book written circa 1499 CE which is ostensibly about
magic but which is, in fact, a treatise on cryptography and steganography [4]. Before
computers and the digital age, steganography was limited to physical techniques, e.g.
Histiaeus tattooing a slave’s shaved head and waiting until the hair grows back to
send the slave to deliver the message, or Mary Queen of Scots’ letters smuggled in and
out of her confinement in barrels of beer [5]. However, the complexity and enormous
resources offered by computers and high speed communication networks have proved
to be very fertile ground for the science of steganography to grow into the vast and
varied field that it is today.
The field of steganography is comprised of methods which disguise information
as innocuous channel usages. Channel usage includes the objects which are sent
over the channel as well as how the channel is used, such as timing. The field is
relatively young and very active. Cover-objects can be any digital object and are not
limited to traditional media such as images, audio and text. Cover-objects can also be
compound objects, encompassing more than single object, or complex objects spread
out over multiple dimensions in time or space. Taking this broad view of cover-media
3
allows us to include within the field of steganography a discipline which often tries to
distance itself from the field to which it so clearly belongs: covert channels.
Covert channels were originally defined by Lampson as channels that are “not
intended for information transfer at all” [6]. However, even channels intended for
information transfer can be viewed as being covert channels themselves, e.g. covert
channels in the TCP/IP protocols [7]. We may now define a covert channel as any
channel between two processes that are not supposed to share information. A covert
channel is created in a legitimate channel when a process uses the channel in such
a way as to signal secret information, creating a timing channel or sends an object
containing secret information through the channel, creating a storage channel. If
process A can modify a resource that process B can access or measure (e.g. packet
arrival times, file locks, system temperature, etc.), then A can send information to B
through a covert channel using the shared resource [8]. Some covert channels violate
the security policy of a system and many techniques, such as capacity reduction
and auditing, have been developed for identifying and mitigating covert channels [9].
Channels such as those between processes that are not prohibited from communicating
(because, for example, they have the same security level and no covert channels exist
between either of them and any process with a different security level), but which are
not intended for communication are also considered covert channels. Typically, only
those covert channels which violate the security policy of the system are of concern,
the rest can be safely ignored.
Until very recently, research on covert channels only focused on methods for iden-
tifying them and limiting or eliminating their capacity once identified. It is well
known, since Lampson [6], that completely eliminating all covert channels in a real
system is impossible. If we consider the Internet and look for covert channels there,
we find that there are so many potential covert channels that just counting them all
would be almost impossible, not to mention deploying countermeasures to eliminate
or constrain them. Thus, another popular approach to handling covert channels, after
4
they have been identified and had their capacity reduced as much as possible, is to
audit the covert channel to know when and whether it is being used.
Covert channels are not, themselves, typically thought of as being secure. They
undermine security and we try to eradicate and constrain them as best we can to
limit their damage. But, what would a secure covert channel look like, if we needed
to design a covert channel to safely and securely transmit secrets? Covert channel
security is not fundamentally different from steganographic security. Steganographic
security is based on the computational or statistical indistinguishability of stego-
objects from cover-objects [10–14]. The harder it is to tell stego-objects from cover-
objects, the more secure is the stego-system. Similarly, covert channel security is
based on the statistical or computational indistinguishability of covert channel usage
from normal channel activity. The harder is it to tell when the channel is being used,
the more secure is the covert channel.
A secure covert channel is one whose capacity cannot be eliminated and whose
covert usages are indistinguishable from it’s overt, authentic usages. That is, auditing
of the channel will not give the observer any clues as to when or whether the channel
is being used to pass secret information instead of being used for a legitimate purpose.
In this sense, covert channel security is the same notion as steganographic security:
a passive observer must decide whether or not an object is being used for covert
communication. The object could be a singular multimedia object which has been
modified or generated in such a way as to encode the hidden data, or it could be a set
of objects whose relative ordering or statistical and computational properties encode
the hidden data. Therefore, we can consider covert channels to be a special case of
steganography: covert channels are steganographic objects which encode the secret
information as signals which one process can create in a shared resource that another
process can measure. These stego-objects are modifications of normal behavior for
the processes which modify and measure the shared resource.
One important difference between steganography and covert channels is that
covert channels require some amount of covert communication to take place before
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the usage is detectable, but steganographic objects can be held and analyzed be-
fore being forwarded. This means that an adversary can use detection to eliminate
steganographic channel capacity, but cannot always do so for covert channels.
1.2 Secure Covert Channels in Structured Interactions
It is well-known that many types of digital media can be used to hide information.
One might be willing to even go so far as to say that it is possible to use any digital
medium to hide information. A simple argument for this claim is given by Hopper,
VonAhn, and Langford [13, 14], who show that it is theoretically possible to encode
data using any digital medium by mapping each channel object to a bit (or string of
bits) and drawing objects at random from the channel distribution. In their system,
channel objects are not modified to encode data, but rather the channel usage itself
is modified.
Structured interactions are protocols between one or more agents which follow a
set of rules and therefore allow for only finite variation at each step of the interaction.
A familiar instance of a structured interaction is a game, such as Tic-tac-toe or
Chess. At each step, the set of possible next steps is finite, relatively small, and
easily enumerable. Structured interactions provide an attractive domain in which
to operate a covert channel. The limited space of legal next actions dramatically
decreases the complexity of picking a reasonable one at random and the context of
the interaction provides a plausible explanation for why that particular action was
chosen.
Following from the definition of steganographic security given above, a secure
covert channel for a structured interaction is one in which the steganographic inter-
actions are statistically and computationally indistinguishable from the authentic,
legitimate interactions. This means that whatever is being modified or generated to
encode the secret data must conform to the properties of authentic interactions. As
an example, in order to be secure, a stego-system which hides data in gameplay must
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generate gameplay which very closely resembles the gameplay of authentic players.
Playing randomly or making moves uncharacteristic of a human player are signs that
the play is not authentic, and therefore may be transmitting hidden data. However,
the ability to detect the signs of synthetic gameplay requires a model of authentic
gameplaying behavior which is more accurate than the model used to generate the
synthetic gameplay. Other examples of structured interactions which have been used
to host covert channels include network protocols and financial transactions. Again,
the security of the covert channel depends on the relative quality of the generative
model used for steganography compared to the descriptive model used for steganal-
ysis. Structured interactions represent a vast field of novel media for steganography.
Methods for generating and detecting covert channels in structured interactions, es-
pecially in games, is an active and exciting field of study.
1.3 Contribution
We consider the problem of generating and detecting covert channels in generated
media. We develop a relatively sophisticated and practical secret-key stego-system
for generating time series such as those seen in financial markets. Our stego-system
provides layers of complexity which enable information-hiding in an arbitrary series
of values with control over the information density of the embedding and well as the
location and size of the perturbations required to embed the secret data. We develop
and analyze a novel image-steganographic scheme based on context-sensitive tilings
which generates synthetic stego-objects with high levels of robustness to tampering
and security against steganalytic attacks. The images are generated so that the
structural content of the image is in itself the payload. The images generated by
the stego-system can be said to have both structure and semantics. We develop and
analyze a novel information hiding scheme which uses the structure of Huffman trees
to encode secret data. This approach is in contrast to previous methods which hid
data in the content of the tree. Under the right circumstances, the stego-tree is
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indistinguishable from a clean tree for the same content. We develop and analyze a
stego-system which hides data in generated Sudoku boards and puzzles. Our system
is a significant improvement over previous work on hiding data in Sudoku puzzles
as it is both more secure and able to hide five times as many bits in each puzzle.
We investigate covert channels in games by implementing a general framework for
hiding data in games and applying it to the game of Tic-tac-toe. We show that the
capacity of the covert channel in Tic-tac-toe and other combinatorial games cannot
be eliminated by enforcing any particular strategy, including that of optimal play.
We follow this up by developing three steganalysis techniques for detecting covert
channels in games using data collected from human players. We show that a warden
with access to human gameplay data can distinguish between gameplay generated
by humans and gamplay generated by rules-based software agents with a high level
of accuracy. We also show that the warden’s accuracy increases with the number
of games observed before a decision is made, revealing a trade-off between time to
detection and number of bits allowed to be transmitted. Finally, we designed and
developed a software testbed for analyzing steganographic interactions. The testbed
provides a framework for implementing and analyzing steganographic systems that
exploit structured interactions for covert communication. We used the testbed to
provide the first measurements of the capacity of covert channels in several games,
including Tic-tac-toe, Chess, and Go. Our work has theoretic, empirical, and heuristic
components with serious implications for the world of practical secure communication.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The literature review
in Section 2 describes the previous work related to our study of covert channels
in generated media, with a particular emphasis on games and human gameplaying
behavior. Section 3 presents some our work on synthetic steganography in timeseries
data. Section 4 presents and analyzes a context-sensitive tiling system for generating
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steganographic images. Section 5 presents and analyzes a method for hiding data in
the structure of Huffman trees which prioritizes security over capacity. In Section 6
we present and analyze StegoDoku, a stego-system which hides data in Sudoku boards
and puzzles. Section 7 presents the Tic-Tac-Stego system, a general framework for
exploiting covert channels in games, and applies it to several games. In Section
8, three steganalysis techniques for detecting active covert channels in games are
developed and used to analyze the security of the Tic-Tac-Stego system. The security
analysis utilizes gameplay data collected from humans. Section 9 presents the design
and implementation of a software testbed for analyzing steganographic interactions.




There are many ways to do steganography. A standard example of steganography in
the digital age exploits image files [15–17]. In a bitmap image, the least significant bits
are below the human visual system’s sensory threshold. As such, changes to the bits in
those positions are undetectable to humans. Therefore, a steganographer can replace
the low order bits of an image with the bits of a secret message to embed that message
into the image. This is known as least significant bit (LSB) steganography. A similar
approach can be taken to hiding data in audio files as well [18, 19]. While a human
cannot accurately detect such changes, computational analysis can be highly accurate
at detecting this kind of modification of an image. More sophisticated methods have
pushed the embedding locale from the temporal and spatial domains, where LSB
steganography lives, to the frequency domain using DCT and wavelet transforms.
Modifications made in this way are still undetectable by humans, but are also more
resistant to computational and statistical analysis. The modifications are still made
the same way they were using LSB, only now the changes are in the frequency domain
and so the embedded bits get spread throughout the image or audio file when it is
transformed back into the time or space domain.
Methods which modify an existing object account for the vast majority of stegano-
graphic methods currently being developed and studied. Johnson and Katzenbeisser
[15] have grouped steganographic methods into five categories according to the man-
ner in which they modify the cover-object to hide the secret information: substitu-
tion systems, transform domain techniques, spread spectrum techniques, statistical
methods, and distortion techniques. However, one alternative to modification-based
methods, which are susceptible to simple comparison against other versions of the
same object, is to generate a cover-object so that the modified version is the only
version ever released, or generating objects such that the construction of the object
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itself encodes the information. Johnson and Katzenbeisser identify a sixth category
for such methods. These so-called cover generation methods avoid the issue of com-
parison between versions, but the problem of automatically generating cover-objects
that can pass convincingly as authentic cover-objects now looms large, especially in
the case of media such as images, audio, and text.
2.1 Cover Generation Methods
The category of cover generation methods is for those techniques which hide infor-
mation in generated cover-objects, often in the structure of the object. In contrast to
other types of steganographic techniques, cover generation methods do not augment
an already existing object in order to hide bits of information. The generation of novel
objects is not restricted to the field of information hiding, however. Techniques in the
field of computer graphics for procedurally generated media are also concerned with
generating novel content which mimics some target object, such as trees and cities.
When applied to information hiding, the goal is similar: to generate objects which
closely resemble the target object. However, cover generation methods for steganog-
raphy have a requirement that procedurally generated media do not generally have,
which is reversibility. The generated objects must be able to be deconstructed in
order to recover the hidden bits of information. There is a compromise which can be
made to mitigate the difficulty of satisfying this requirement in practice: use a target
for which the generation process is fully observable and therefore able to be recorded.
In this way, even if the end product is not reversible when taken by itself, the fact
that there exists a transcript which recorded the steps taken by the process means
that deconstruction is either unnecessary, or made possible when given the transcript.
We now consider a number of existing steganographic methods which belong to the
category of cover generation methods.
In their work on hiding information in pseudo-random images [20], Blundo and
Galdi present a method for hiding information in image mosaics. First, a database of
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small images is maintained, and these are classified, according to their visual prop-
erties, for use in the image mosaic formation process. Next, the images are then
arbitrarily separated into classes representing the binary digits one and zero. In this
way it is possible to produce an image mosaic which approximates some input image
and which hides secret information in the choices of sub-images that form the mosaic.
In his work on model-based steganography, Sallee approaches the generation of
stego-objects from a compression point of view [21]. With access to a perfect model
of some cover media, a perfect compressor can be constructed. Instances of the cover
media can be given as input to the perfect compressor and it would return “perfectly
compressed, truly random bit sequences”. Thus, since access to a perfect compressor
implies access to the corresponding decompressor, feeding any random bit sequence to
the decompressor would produce a sensible instance of the cover media. This property
can be used to convert a secret payload into an instance of the cover media by first
processing the payload to turn it into some random bit sequence and then feeding
that bit sequence to the decompressor. Alice can send the resulting stego-object to
Bob without raising much, if any, suspicion. To recover the message, Bob compresses
the object using the perfect compressor and reverses Alice’s processing of the result.
Perfect models are very hard to come by, even for simple objects. However, this
method provides perfect security against any adversary with a model which is less
perfect than the one used in the compression system.
Radhakrishnan, Kharrazi and Memon use a technique called data masking to
process the entire secret message to make it appear statistically similar to some type
of multimedia object [22]. According to their results, when linear and SVM classifiers
were trained to detect stego in data masked images, it was found that the detectors
achieved detection rates above 97%, with a false alarm rate less than 13%. Despite
the weak security performance of the steganographic scheme based on data masking,
the approach still seems a step in the right direction: from augmentation of existing
images towards generation of novel images.
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In [23] and [24], Sung, Tadiparthi, Mukkamala and Sueyoshi present techniques
for hiding secret data in animations. A context free grammar is used to generate
an animation wherein certain sequences of frames signify a 1 and other sequences of
frames signify 0. The secret data is encoded as an animation by selecting a sequence
of frames which corresponds to the next bit(s) of data to hide. It is shown that the
system is secure against a passive warden.
In [25], we present a technique for hiding information in stochastic settings via
data-synthesizing schemes based on transform-expand-sample (tes) processes. The
technique is applicable in any setting where a process or application generates data
that exhibits random but structured behavior and data trajectories have viable al-
ternatives that are very difficult or impossible to verify. In such cases, a synthesizing
procedure generates novel data that replaces application or process data. When in-
formation can be hidden in such data during the generation process, typical message-
neutralizing attacks will fail. If synthetic process data cannot be accurately distin-
guished from authentic process data, then secure steganographic transmissions can
be conducted.
2.2 Covert Channels in Games
One domain where the difficulty of generating convincing cover-objects does not
appear to loom so large is in games. It has been known, at least since World War II,
that games can harbor covert channels. During the second world war, the Office of
Censorship of the United States banned international chess games by mail because
the games could be used to encode secret information [2, p. 515]. With the advent
of the home computer and the Internet, games can now be played by users sitting on
opposite sides of the planet with the same celerity as if the players were sitting across
the table from one another. Even in the age of massive multi-player online games,
games like Chess and Go still enjoy great popularity online. Using online games for
covert communication is a natural extension of the ability to do so on paper, but with
13
the benefit of having the aide of a computer for embedding and extracting hidden
bits.
Some of the techniques for hiding data in chess games have been recently redis-
covered, and extended to cover modern advances in chess technology. Lange, in [26],
and Desoky and Younis, in [27], present methods for hiding data in chess using the
popular and common PGN notation. Lange identifies several locales, one in the game
and one in the notation, where data hiding could take place. In the game itself, data
can be encoded as sequences of legal moves. In the notation, data can be hidden
in the commentary using techniques such as whitespace manipulation and linguistic
steganography (c.f. [28–31]). Desoky and Younis further camouflage the chess covers
by surrounding them with commentary (which could also be hiding data) and link-
ing multiple chess covers together using themes (such as games played by a specific
player). In both works, the stego-object, which consists of a chess game in PGN
notation and associated commentary, encodes the entire message that Alice wants to
send to Bob.
In the last 30 years, only a few covert channels in games have been discussed in
the open literature. In [32], a covert channel in the card game Bridge is discussed
which allows two partners to covertly communicate information about the contents
of their hand in an environment where such communication is forbidden. The covert
communication takes place during the bidding round, which proceeds in turns until
one player has won the bid. However, the channel is only useful for passing information
about one’s hand.
Some single-player games can also be used to transmit hidden data. Niwayama,
in [33], and Lee, Lee and Chen, in [34] and [35], present methods for hiding data
in mazes. Their methodologies use the secret data to generate an image of a maze.
In [36], Shirali-Shahreza presents a method for hiding data in Sudoku puzzles by
encoding the secret data as a permutation of the numbers 1 through 9 and then
building a Sudoku puzzle around this permutation (used as a column or row). Farn
and Chen present methods for hiding data in jigsaw [37] and jig-swap puzzles [38].
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In the jigsaw puzzle system, the data is encoded in the orientation of the connection
between two adjacent pieces. In the jig-swap puzzle system, the data is encoded in
the permutation of the pieces when they are first presented to the player. In both
systems, the player must solve the puzzle before being able to extract the data.
Ou and Chen present a system for hiding data in the game of Tetris [39]. Tetris
is normally a single player game, where the computer randomly selects the next
tetromino to present to the player. However, 2-player versions of the game do exist
and Ou and Chen’s method is well suited to information hiding in such versions.
Consider, for example, a modified game of Tetris where one player selects the next
tetromino to give to the other player to stack. The game is won by the first player
(the selector) if the second player fails to place the given tetromino on within the
boundaries of the board within a certain period of time, as in the standard single
player Tetris game. The second player (the stacker) wins if she is able to successfully
stack a certain number of pieces received from the selector, a variation on the standard
version of Tetris. In this version of Tetris, the selector can signal information to the
stacker using the sequence of tetrominos he selects. Since there are 7 tetrominos in
a standard game of Tetris, the selector can send, at most, an average of 2.8 bits per
tetromino.
When two-player games are used for data hiding, they can be used in a bidirec-
tional manner, allowing Alice and Bob to communicate with each other through the
covert channel as the game is being played. In [40], Murdoch and Zielinski demon-
strated a covert channel in the game of Connect Four, which they used for authen-
tication during a tournament in order to collude and win. Hernandez-Castro et al.
present a general methodology for using the move-choice covert channel in games with
perfect information and apply it to the game of Go [41]. Their methodology points
out that, whenever Alice has a choice of which move to make next, she can encode
some bits of secret data in that choice. As long as Bob knows the set of moves from
which Alice chose her move, he can extract the hidden data from the move. For each
board state, Alice has a set of strategies which tell her which moves she can make
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and how good each move is. She can use a threshold value to decrease the size of the
candidate move list, which will decrease the number of bits the move will encode but
also keep her play close to optimal.
In [42], Diehl points out that it is not necessary for a steganographic player to
be play optimally or to play an equilibrium strategy. In fact, it is not even desirable
that a steganographic player be optimal, since the security of the channel relies on
the steganographic play being difficult to distinguish from authentic human play and
humans seldom play optimally. Diehl provides an information-theoretic analysis of the
information hiding capacity of games with perfect information such that the security
constraint that stego-play be indistinguishable from human play is not violated. In
the paper, Diehl examines a covert channel in the game of Kuhn Poker, which is
a simplified two-person variant of the card game Poker [43]. The paper discusses
mimicking human players by learning their strategy, but does not actually use human
data. Diehl assumes a human player would play various strategies according to a
stationary distribution on strategies. In the experimental results, it was shown that
the stego-player required several hundred games before the stego-player’s strategy
distribution closely matched that of the optimal player it was trying to mimic.
Covert channels in online multiplayer games have also been discussed in the liter-
ature. In such an environment, the covert channel is a broadcast channel, since any
player who can observe the sender can record the transmission, although only the in-
tended receiver will know what to do with it. In [44] and [45], Zander, Armitage, and
Branch present a method for hiding data in online multiplayer first-person shooter
games. They apply their system, called RFPSCC for Reliable First Person Shooter
Covert Channel (the first version was just FPSCC), to a modified version of the game
Quake III Arena. The covert channel is implemented using slight but continuous vari-
ations in a player’s movements (specifically, changes in the angle of the character’s
head), which are broadcast to the other players in sight of the broadcasting player by
the central game server. Experimental results show that distribution of angle changes
for a player using the covert channel is very similar to the distribution of angle changes
16
for player not using the covert channel, which suggests that the channel would have
a high degree of security.
In [46], Zander discusses countermeasures and detection schemes for the covert
channel in first person shooter games. FPSCC and, by extension, RFPSCC cannot
be eliminated because player movement is intrinsic to the game. Further, Alice can
overpower any noise Wendy adds to the channel since Wendy must keep her noise low
enough that innocent players do not detect her tampering. While RFPSCC traffic
looks very similar to normal game traffic, experimental results show that Wendy can
detect the usage of RFPSCC, with an accuracy greater than 95% by observing Alice
for at least 45-65 seconds. This is due in part to the structure RFPSCC must impose
on the bits sent in order to provide synchronization for reliable transfer. RFPSCC
also requires that both players use the covert channel even if only one is transmitting,
which also contributes to Wendy’s ability to detect the channel’s usage.
2.3 Modeling Human Gameplaying Behavior
A secure covert channel in a game involves being able to mimic authentic behavior
in that game. Understanding, i.e. predicting and explaining, human behavior is the
holy grail of psychology. Which is to say that it is not our intention in this dissertation
to solve the problem of modeling human game playing. However, models of human
game playing can be used to build the foundation of a stego-system for games which
generates gameplay which is statistically and computationally indistinguishable from
gameplay generated by actual humans. This is possible because accurately distin-
guishing between authentic human gameplay and gameplay generated by a computer
model requires the classifier to have access to a more accurate model of human game-
playing than the model to which the generator has access. If some model of human
game playing can be said to be the best, that is, the model is one which generates the
most human-like gameplay or is amongst a set of several models which are all equally
good, then that model can be used to build a stego-system which is undetectable. If
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an adversary wants to gain an advantage over the stego-system, they can only do so
by developing a better model, one which generates more realistic gameplay and can
therefore be used to distinguish between authentic gameplay and model-generated
gameplay. Thus, in order to succeed, each side must, in essence, advance the science
of modeling human gameplaying. In a very real sense, promoting covert channels in
games may help to motivate research into modeling human gameplaying behavior,
which in turn will advance our understanding of the human mind and how humans
solve problems.
Game theory is often used to predict or explain the behaviors of two agents inter-
acting in situations which can be cast as games [47]. However, game-theoretic models
have not been very successful in predicting human behavior [48]. Psychological testing
indicates that humans lack the two necessary abilities required to play in the manner
described by game theory: the ability to compute the optimal probabilities for each
move and the ability to select moves at random according to these probabilities [49].
The field of cognitive modeling offers many alternative theories for predicting and
explaining human game playing behavior.
One class of theories from the field of cognitive modeling is that of cognitive ar-
chitectures, which were proposed by Newell [50]. Cognitive architectures are theories
about how human cognition works. They specify the mechanisms underlying cogni-
tion, often in considerable computational detail [49]. One of the more widely used
cognitive frameworks is Anderson and Lebiere’s ACT-R [51, 52], which stands for
Adaptive Control of Thought - Rational.
In [53], Lebiere and West model human Rock-Paper-Scissors gameplay using ACT-
R. Their model predicts the opponent’s next move based on the most active sequence
of previous moves. The model is based on psychological limitations and inclinations
instead of the ideal strategies prescribed by game theory. In the experimental results,
the model was found to closely account for human behavior in Rock-Paper-Scissors
gameplay.
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West and Lebiere showed in [54] that humans play Rock-Paper-Scissors like lag-2
neural networks which are punished for ties. While game theory predicts that a human
player should tie with both a lag-2 network that was not punished for ties and a lag-1
network that was punished for ties, the network model predicts that a human player
would beat both. West and Lebiere’s experimental results showed that humans were
able to reliably beat the two networks, a fact for which the game-theoretic solution
could not account.
In [49], West, Lebiere, and Bothell argue that humans play maximally, not opti-
mally. Whereas an optimal player conforms to game theoretic expectations that the
player move according to fixed probabilities which specify an optimal approach to the
game, a maximal player attempts to adjust it’s responses to exploit perceived weak-
nesses in their opponent’s play. One way of characterizing the two types of agents is
to say that optimal agents try not to lose, while maximal agents try to win by as much
as possible at the risk of losing. The authors find that standard game-theoretic mod-
els do not describe human game playing well, since humans try to exploit sequential
dependencies (maximizing behavior) instead of trying to play optimally. The ACT-R
cognitive architecture is able to account for this behavior and their model can play
many games without modifying the basic strategy (one only needs to tell the model
the rules). The authors entered their model in a Rock-Paper-Scissors tournament
and found that the ACT-R model of human gameplay competes well against agents
created specifically to play the game, as evidenced by the high ranking their model
achieved in the tournament.
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3 SYNTHETIC STEGANOGRAPHY IN TIME SERIES
In this chapter, we detail a methodology that enables an agent Alice to embed secret
messages in public data that is sent or broadcast to a receiving agent Bob. While we
have applied the method successfully in various settings, including patterns, textures
and games, we focus here on random series because they (a) yield a powerful class
of applications, and (b) require a special treatment. Thus, to begin, we focus on
a (random) time series that Alice sends to Bob, and we study a number of steps
involving data generation, message hiding, and message retrieval. For completeness,
we demonstrate the process through experimentation with real data.
The first question to ask is: where does this time series come from? In a typi-
cal setting, Alice works in an application space where complex operations, perhaps
involving groups of people or multiple transactions, proceed in sequence to generate
unpredictable time-series values. To drive home this point, consider that Alice is a
market-maker or specialist at a financial exchange where she is in control of a rela-
tively illiquid stock. In such situations it is well-accepted that Alice or accomplices
of Alice can exhibit control of price (or rearrange group activity) for periods of time
that are sufficiently long to embed secret messages of nontrivial length in given price
sequences. The second question to ask is: would it not be readily apparent to data
viewers that the “controlled” data generated by Alice is suspect? The answer is no,
because Alice can call upon a virtually unlimited history of prior data, under similar
environmental conditions, to generate on-the-fly synthetic data that is impossible to
distinguish from true data which is necessarily absent because synthetic data operates
in its place.
For brevity, we will thus accept that Alice can generate synthetic data at will.
We will equip her with a strong methodology to do so. Because we have motivated
the financial specialist setting in prior work in great detail, we will simply focus on
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how Alice generates on-the-fly data that cannot be distinguished from real data that
would exist otherwise, and on how she embeds secret information for recipient Bob
in this data. Observe that in the case of stock data, Alice generates a steganographic
price series that is broadcast to the entire world via public market services. The
methodology will make clear how Bob recovers hidden messages from synthetic data.
This chapter is laid out as follows: Section 3.1 presents a simple steganographic
system for hiding information in an arbitrary series of values. Section 3.2 reviews
methods for modeling time series data with various distributions. Section 3.3 applies
the steganographic system of Section 3.1 to the time series generated by the methods
of Section 3.2. Section 3.4 reviews the TES (transform-expand-sample) method of
modeling time series with arbitrary distributions. Section 3.5 applies the stegano-
graphic system of Section 3.1 to the time series generated by TES. The contents of
this chapter were accepted for publication in 2014 as an article in IEEE Latin America
Transactions [55].
3.1 A Simple Steganographic System
We present a systematic method for hiding information in an arbitrary series of val-
ues. A secret key stego-system [56] is defined as a quintuple S = 〈C,M,K,DK, EK〉,
where C is the set of possible cover objects, M the set of secret messages with
|C| ≥ |M |, K the set of secret keys, EK : C ×M ×K → C and DK : C ×K → M ,
with the property that DK(EK(c,m, k), k) = m for all m ∈M , c ∈ C and k ∈ K.
To specify a stego-system, one must define the sets C, M , K and the functions
EK and DK . The function EK is the embedding function which takes as input the
cover-object c ∈ C and the message m ∈ M to be hidden in c as well as any additional
(key) parameters k ∈ K required to hide the information. It returns a stego-object
containing the hidden information. The function DK is an extracting function which
takes as input a stego-object c′ and key k and outputs the message m which is hidden
in the stego-object.
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For the purposes of this chapter, we define the set C to be the set of positive
real numbers R+, and set M to be the set of binary strings of arbitrary length, i.e.,
M = {0, 1}n for n ≥ 0. In the remainder of this section we will develop our definitions
of the embedding and extracting functions, EK and DK , by starting with a simple
function and adding layers of complexity to create a more general function.
3.1.1 Embedding Function
A family of embedding methods emerges from a simple example of embedding.
To hide a binary string — a representation of some secret information — in time
series data, we divide the real number line into cells based on some set of parameters
and label these cells alternately as 0 and 1, beginning by labeling the first cell 0.
The information is embedded by allowing the label sequence of the data to match
message bits. To do this, align the first bit of the message with the first value of the
cover-object and compare each bit of the message with the label of the corresponding
data value. If the data label matches the message bit, the data is left unperturbed.
If the data label differs from the message bit, however, the data value is minimally
augmented so that the label changes. A simple policy for this would be to bump 0s
up to 1 and 1s down to 0 by adding ±1 cell-width to the data value.
This stego scheme can have several layers of complexity based on the key (set of
parameters) used. We assume the key is exchanged securely prior to stego transmis-
sion.




S ′(i) = S(i) + w (M(i)−m(S(i), w)) (3.1)





(mod 2). The key for the layer-0 stego-system is k = {α}.
Layer 1: In the next layer of complexity we may allow an offset value equal to some
constant δ0, so that the embedding can begin at any point in the coverdata, not just
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at the very beginning. This allows us to control the location of the information within
the covertext. The embedding function is:
S ′(i) = S(i) + I{i>δ0}w (zi(δ0)−m(S(i), w)) (3.2)
where zi(j) = M(i − j) and I{cond} is 1 if and only if cond is true and 0 otherwise.
The key for this system is k = {α, δ0}.
Layer 2: Once we have the machinery to handle a constant message offset, we
can easily handle using only certain values to hide message bits. To do so, we use
a monotonically increasing function as a variable offset. It must be monotonically
increasing or else the function will try to embed two message bits in the same value,
which would cause the first message bit to be lost. We choose whether or not to use
the current data value to embed a message bit by tossing a coin that lands heads
up with probability p. If this event occurs, we embed the value, and otherwise skip
it. Embedding a message bit in the current value does not increase the offset. But,
skipping a value does. So, we need to keep track of our offset as we go. We do this with
the δ(i) function defined in Equation 3.4. This additional layer of complexity allows
us to control the distribution of the message within the covertext. The embedding
function is now
S ′(i) = S(i) + I{i>δ(i)}w (zi(δ(i))−m(S(i), w)) (3.3)
where
δ(i) = δ(i− 1) + I{r1(i)>p}, δ(0) = ⌊r1(0) + 0.5⌋ (3.4)
The key for this system is k = {α, p, R1}, where R1 is a random number generator
which generates r1(i).
Layer 3: An additional (and, for now, final) layer of complexity can be had by
allowing cell widths to vary. We accomplish this by using the function w(i) = 1/r2(i).
The embedding function is now:
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S ′(i) = S(i) + I{i>δ(i)}w(i) (zi(δ(i))−m(S(i), w(i))) (3.5)
The key for this system is k = {p, R1, R2}, where R2 is a random number generator
to generate r2(i), which replaces the previously used α.
The above becomes our embedding function EK , which allows us to specify through
the key k: the granularity of the embedding (through the specification of R2) and the
spread of the information through the cover-object (via the specification of R1 and
value of p). This function completely captures the behavior of each of its predecessor
layers. To implement Layer-0, let R2 be a stream with constant value α, set p = 1
and let R1 be any stream who’s first value is 0.
3.1.2 Extracting Function
To extract a hidden message from a data series we need to know the key k. Once
we know k, we split the data range into cells based on the parameters used and label
them as before, alternating between 0 and 1. The message is the bit string obtained
by simply reading off the labels of the data values. Thus, the extracting function is
simply a labeling function.
Unlike the case of the embedding function, where each new layer of complexity
further complicates embedding, the extracting function’s form stays very much the
same even despite the complexity layers. The extracting functions are listed below in


























3.1.3 Good Cell Widths
Through the random number generator R2, we have control over the range of our
cell widths. Cell widths which are too large will result in large data perturbations
which may be easily detectable. However, the embedding is fairly tolerant of external
augmentation since a large perturbation is needed to bump data values out of their
actual labels. Conversely, cell widths which are too small will result in small pertur-
bations which succumb to external augmentation very easily. But here, however, the
embedding is difficult to detect since data values exhibit negligible change, and the
underlying structure of the original data is preserved.
A good cell width, then, is one which balances two requirements: (1) minimizes
the evidence of embedding and (2) maximizes the tolerance of the embedding to
external perturbations. If we know the maximum amount by which data values may
be perturbed, we can calculate the minimum cell width we are required to have so
that the probability that a value survives the perturbation is at least some value q.





where q ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that a value survives the maximum perturbation
pmax.
Using this fact along with w(i) = 1/r2(i) from above, we can compute an upper
and a lower bound for good random variates from R2, shown in Equation 3.11 where








3.2 Methods For Modeling Time Series
To illustrate the above ideas, we focus on time series embeddings. There are
two main classes of methods used to model time series data: autoregressive (AR)
and moving average (MA) models. The choice of model is based on the properties
of the data one is trying to model. Autoregressive models are useful in modeling
stationary data, while moving average models are better equipped to handle non-
stationarity. It is possible to model non-stationary data with an autoregressive model
by using differencing. In this section we briefly present the first order autoregressive
model and how to use it to model data with various distributions. While many time
series can be modeled by a Gaussian process, many naturally occurring time series,
however, are non-Gaussian. For this reason, several different methods for generating
non-Gaussian time series have been constructed [57]. These include models which
utilize exponential [58, 59], Laplace [60] and gamma [61] marginals.
3.2.1 Autoregressive Model
The first order autoregressive model is given by Equation 3.12, where φ is the
parameter, c is a constant (often c = 0 for simplicity) and ǫt is the noise term. Note
that ǫt can also be considered an error or innovation term.
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + ǫt (3.12)
Gaussian Autoregressive Model. If the noise term ǫt is a Gaussian process,
then Xt is also a Gaussian process. The resulting model is the first order Gaussian
autoregressive model GAR(1).






L w.p. 1− φ2
(3.13)
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GAR(1) for IBM Price Series
















Figure 3.1. Synthesized GAR(1) for IBM.
where L is a Laplace distributed random variable, the sequence Xt is a stationary
time series with Laplace marginal distribution for all t [60].
Exponential Autoregressive Model. The conventional exponential first-order
autoregressive model EAR(1) [58] has the form





Et w.p. 1− φ
, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · (3.14)
where 0 ≤ φ < 1 is a parameter and the Et, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , are independent exponen-
tial variables with parameter λ > 0. This model generates paths in which large values
are followed by runs having geometrically distributed lengths of falling values [59].
3.3 Steganography with AR Models
We are now ready to present steganographic methods based on synthetic data and,
in particular, data generated via the methods of Section 3.2. For ease of explanation
we will use the GAR(1) model as our example. Fig. 3.1 shows an example synthetic
data series generated to model an IBM stock price trajectory where prices are reported
at end-of-day. The methods apply to any time scale, including tick, minutes, days,
weeks and months.
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3.3.1 Embedding and Extracting
Embedding in data generated via an AR model such as GAR(1) can be done in at
least two ways, which is to say that the message can be hidden in at least two places
in the model: the innovations and the final time series. The choice of where to embed
decides which information is necessary in the key in order to extract the message.
Embedding in the innovations requires the key to contain φ whereas embedding in
the final time series does not require φ to be known.
Extracting is accomplished by isolating the portion of the model which was used to
hide the message and applying the extracting function in order to extract the hidden
information.
3.4 Modeling Time Series With TES
The TES (transform-expand-sample) [62,63] methodology is a versatile method for
generating a class of stochastic stationary time series which exhibit general marginal
distributions and a broad range of dependence structures. TES is designed to gen-
erate sequences which satisfy the following three goodness-of-fit requirements [62], in
descending order of rigor:
1. The marginal distribution of the sequence should match its empirical counter-
part.
2. The autocorrelation of the sequence should approximate its empirical counter-
part well.
3. The trajectory of the sequence should “resemble” that of the empirical data.
3.4.1 TES Methodology Outline
In [62], the TES methodology is enabled through execution of the follow steps:
1. Construct histogram H of the base data
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2. Using H , construct the CDF of the base data
3. Using the CDF, invert H to obtain H−1
4. Construct the density fV of innovation sequence V
5. Choose the sign of the TES class (TES+ or TES–)
6. Generate initial random variate U0 ∈ (0, 1)
7. Using U0 and V , generate U
8. Choose stitching parameter ξ
9. Compute background process Yi = Sξ(Ui)
10. Compute foreground process Xi = H
−1(Yi)
11. Compare the distribution and autocorrelation of X with those of the base data.
If the two are similar to their empirical counterparts, compare the appearance
of X with that of the base data. If X is unacceptable, repeat the above from
any previous step; otherwise select X as the final TES process.
In this work, we have used a similar set of steps to implement the TES methodol-
ogy. Instead of constructing a histogram off the base data, we directly construct the
empirical CDF. Also, we only use the TES+ class, though nothing in our methodol-
ogy precludes the use of the TES– class. The choice to use TES+ was made based on
the data we are trying to model. Instead of an innovation density fV , we use an inno-
vation CDF FV . Having the innovation CDF is equivalent to having the innovation
density and enables a more precise path. While initial parameter values can be set
arbitrarily, in this work we have chosen to precompute suitable values — a process
that is explained later. Our modified TES methodology is as follows:
1. Construct the empirical CDF F of the base data
2. Choose stitching parameter ξ
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3. Construct the empirical CDF FV of innovations
4. Generate innovation sequence V
5. Compute unstitched background sequence U
6. Compute stitched background process Y = Sξ(U)
7. Compute foreground process X = F−1(Y )
8. Compare the distribution and autocorrelation of X with those of the base data.
If the two are similar to their empirical counterparts, compare the appearance
of X with that of the base data. If X is unacceptable, repeat the above from
any previous step; otherwise select X as the final TES process.
In the remainder of this section we discuss our implementation of the TES proce-
dure in more detail.
3.4.2 Empirical CDF
The empirical CDF is a 2-dimensional vector which tells us what proportion of
the data is less than a given value. The first dimension of the vector is the X-axis and
covers the range of the data values. The second dimension contains the proportion







where I{cond} = 1 iff cond is true and 0 otherwise.
The empirical CDF can be smoothed through the use of interpolation. Since our
CDF is a vector, obtaining its inversion is simple. The inverse CDF is the distortion
used to transform the background process Y into the foreground process X , i.e.,
Y = F (X) and X = F−1(Y ).
30
When X is a foreground process, such as the base data, evaluating the CDF at
each of the points in X recovers the stitched background process Y . We use this fact
later when constructing a good innovation density.
3.4.3 Stitching Transformations
The purpose of the stitching transformation Sξ is to smooth the generated time
series while preserving uniformity. The necessity of such a function is apparent when
we consider the sequence of values comprising U . Each Un is the sum of the previous
value Un−1 and an innovation value Vn taken modulo 1. We may regard U as a random
walk around the unit circle. When we cross over the zero-one boundary of the circle,
the value drops from a large fraction to a small fraction or vice versa, depending on
the direction we cross the boundary. Left as it is, this large jump would result in
an even larger jump in the foreground process, say from near the minimum value
to near the maximum. In certain cases, this may be acceptable, but in general it is
undesirable.
A stitching transformation Sξ maps the interval [0, 1) to itself and is determined
by a stitching parameter ξ ∈ (0, 1). For a given ξ, the stitching transformation is









, 0 ≤ y ≤ ξ
1− y
1− ξ
, ξ ≤ y < 1
(3.16)
While it is possible to invert a stitching transformation, doing so requires additional
information beyond the stitched value. Due to the piecewise definition of the stitching
transformation, the direction the original value was stitched is required in order to
invert it. Therefore, we must record this direction if we wish to invert the stitching
transformation in such a way as to obtain the true original value.




ξx, dξ(y) = 1
1− (1− ξ)x, dξ(y) = 0
(3.17)
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1, 0 ≤ y ≤ ξ
0, ξ ≤ y < 1
(3.18)
If the stitching directions are unknown, one of several approaches can be taken: 1)
randomly choose the direction, 2) choose a string of directions and repeat it over the
length of the data, or 3) choose the direction which results in the smallest difference
(mod 1) from the previous unstitched value.
3.4.4 Innovation Sequence
The innovation sequence V is a sequence of random numbers drawn from the
innovation density fV . The innovation sequence tries to approximate the underlying
pseudo-random process occurring in the original data. The values in the innovation
sequence, called innovations, are transition values, i.e., amounts by which a next
value in the sequence differs from a previous value. The innovation sequence is used
to generate the background process which is then transformed into the foreground
process which becomes a candidate for the final TES series.
3.4.5 Innovation Density
In [62, 63], the innovation density fV consists of K > 0 non-overlapping regions,
called steps, whose positive heights sum to 1. Each step k is therefore represented by
a 3-tuple (Lk, Rk, Pk), where Lk and Rk are the left and right endpoints of the step,








, x ∈ [−0.5, 0.5) (3.19)
where αk = Rk − Lk is the width of step k. The innovation density is essentially
the desired histogram for the innovation sequence. To generate innovations from the
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density as defined above, with probability Pk we generate a uniform random number
between Lk and Rk.
Since the innovation density is one of two parameters we can use to find the best
foreground process, it is important to choose a good one. Our method for finding a
good innovation density gives us the empirical CDF of the innovation sequence, which
is equivalent to having the density fV .
3.4.6 Background Process
Given the explanation of stitching above, we make a distinction between the
stitched background process Y and the unstitched background process U . The TES
methodology divides unstitched background processes into two classes, TES+ and









, n > 0
(3.20)





U+n , n even
1− U+n , n odd
(3.21)
The choice of whether to use TES+ or TES– depends on the autoregression of the
original data. An oscillatory autoregression is modeled more easily by TES-.
The stitched background process Y is obtained by applying a stitching transfor-
mation to U , Y = Sξ(U).
3.4.7 Foreground Process
The final product of the TES methodology is the foreground process X , which
should have the same marginal distribution and autocorrelation as the base data
and should also “resemble” the base data in its path. The foreground process is
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generated by applying a distortion to the background process. Conceptually, while
this distortion could be any monotonic function, TES uses the inverse CDF of the base
data. Since the CDF is a monotonically increasing function, it is always invertible.
The equation for obtaining X from the background process Y is X = F−1(Y ).
Searching for Good Parameter Values
We compute good initial model parameters (FV and ξ) by viewing the base data as
a TES foreground process and reversing the TES methodology to find the innovation
sequence. We then use the empirical CDF of the innovation sequence as the CDF of
our future innovation sequences. In order to do this, we must know ξ, and so we find
a suitable ξ along the way. The process works as follows:
1. Evaluate F at each of the points in the base data, obtaining Y ′
2. For each of several candidate values of ξ,
(a) Unstitch Y ′, obtaining U ′
(b) Difference U ′, obtaining V ′
(c) Construct the empirical CDF of V ′, FV,ξ
(d) Generate an innovation sequence Vξ
(e) Generate an unstitched background sequence Uξ
(f) Stitch Uξ, obtaining Yξ
(g) Evaluate the empirical inverse CDF at each of the points in Yξ, obtaining
Xξ
(h) Construct the empirical CDF Fξ of Xξ
3. Let ξ̂ be the ξ which minimizes
∑
|F − Fξ|
4. FV = FV,ξ̂
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We use the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the empirical
CDF of the base data and that of a foreground process Xξ generated with stitching
parameter ξ as a goodness test for the candidate values of the stitching parameter.
Once we know a good ξ, we can compute the empirical CDF of the innovation se-
quence obtained by differencing the unstitched background process. Other measures
of goodness may also used, such as, for example, similarity of autocorrelations and
visual resemblance.
When unstitching the background process, since we do not know the original
direction the values were stitched (we cannot know because they were not actually
stitched), we must make a guess as to what the correct directions to unstitch the
values are. There are several ways to do this and we have chosen to unstitch in the
direction which results in the smallest difference (mod 1) from the previous unstitched
value. This approach keeps the innovation sequence values small and results in a more
precise innovation density.
When differencing the unstitched background process, due to the modulo-1 arith-
metic used, sometimes this difference will exceed the innovation boundaries, in which
case the innovation simply needs to be in the other direction. That is, you need to
cross over the zero/one boundary to get to the next value using a valid innovation











Un − Un−1, −0.5 < Un − Un−1 < 0.5
Un − Un−1 + 1, Un − Un−1 < −0.5
Un − Un−1 − 1, Un − Un−1 > 0.5
(3.22)
3.5 Steganography with TES
We are now ready to discuss how the TES methodology can be used for a stego-
system based on financial series (i.e., stock market) data.
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3.5.1 Data-hiding locales
TES allows us to embed a message in several places. However, the choice of where
to embed mainly affects the complexity of the key needed to recover the message.
The effect on the final foreground process is negligible.
Innovation Sequence
If Alice hides the message in the innovation sequence, the stego-V (see Fig.s 3.6
through 3.9 for the different possible arrangements) is used to make the BP (back-
ground process) which is then stitched and finally transformed into the FP (foreground
process). To recover the message, Bob (the receiving accomplice) must take the FP,
transform it back into the stitched BP, unstitch the BP and then find the innovation
sequence, which contains the message. To do all this, he must know the transforma-
tion from BP to FP, the stitching directions, the initial random variate (only really
needed for very first bit; but if first bit is agreed to always be garbage, then it isn’t
actually required by the receiver) and the key to the secret key stego-system.
BP prior to stitching
If Alice hides the message in the BP prior to stitching, the stego-BP gets stitched
then transformed into the foreground process. Bob must then know the transforma-
tion to obtain the stitched BP. Then, he must also have the stitching directions in
order to unstitch the BP. Once unstitched, extracting the message using the stego-
system key is simple.
BP after stitching
If Alice hides the message in the BP after it has been stitched, the stego-BP is
just transformed into the FP. Bob must then know the transformation to obtain the
36





















IBM Price Series (June 1979 − June 1982)
Figure 3.2. IBM price series data.
stitched BP, which contains the hidden message. Again, extracting is simple using
the stego-system key.
FP
If Alice simply hides the message in the FP, our accomplice just extracts it directly
from there and so he/she only needs to know the stego-system key. As should be clear
from the prior explanation, TES is only used synthesize the data.
3.6 Experimental Results
We demonstrate the steganography methodology through use of an actual IBM
stock price trajectory (see Fig. 3.2) for the period of June 1979 through June 1982.
This series becomes our base dataset.
TES is able to match the distribution and autocorrelation of the base data closely,
and also produces a trajectory that shows a good visual resemblance to the base data.
This is borne out by the close agreement of the CDF curves in Fig. 3.3, and the
virtually identical autocorrelations in Fig. 3.4.
37




















Figure 3.3. TES foreground process and base data empirical CDFs.

























Figure 3.4. TES foreground process and base data autocorrelations.
In general, our experiments show that Alice is able to generate a suitable synthetic
data series very rapidly, through either an automatic selection procedure or through
visual selection. In Fig. 3.5, for example, the foreground process that TES offers Alice
yields identical second order properties and close visual resemblance to patterns in
the base data, which is what Alice wants. Information can be hidden in several places
during the TES procedure. The embedding location chosen has a negligible effect on
the foreground process.
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Figure 3.5. TES foreground process with good autocorrelation match.









Result of Using Stego−V
















Figure 3.6. TES foreground process using stego-V.









Result of Using Stego−U
















Figure 3.7. TES foreground process using stego-U.
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Result of Using Stego−Y
















Figure 3.8. TES foreground process using stego-Y.









Result of Using Stego−X
















Figure 3.9. TES foreground process using stego-X.
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3.7 Conclusion
Our experiments have shown that we can develop relatively sophisticated and
practical secret-key stego-systems in a variety of applications including the kinds
seen in financial markets. Layers of complexity enable information-hiding in an ar-
bitrary series of values with control over information density, location and size of
perturbation. We presented the TES methodology for modeling time series, with our
implementation of the procedure, outlining the differences between our methods and
ones laid out by Melamed [62, 63]. By piggy-backing the proposed stego-system on
TES, we are able to embed information in price series at various stages of the TES
procedure. Our experience is that hiding effects on the final foreground process are
negligible, and the main effect of the choice of where to do the embedding shows up
in the complexity of the key required to recover the hidden information.
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4 A CONTEXT SENSITIVE TILING SYSTEM FOR INFORMATION HIDING
In this chapter, we explore the merits of a new type of image-steganographic scheme
based on context-sensitive tilings. The goal is to drive payload embedding into the
high level structure of an image in order to produce stego-objects with higher levels
of robustness to tampering and security against steganalytic attacks. The class of
images thus produced can be said to have both structure and semantics. The images
are procedurally generated with the help of the secret payload and a set of rules,
so that the structural content of the generated image is in itself the payload. Such
a payload is easily recovered by reversing the embedding process. Here, we must
emphasize that the secret information is not being hidden in an image. Instead, the
secret payload is actually made to define an image which is unique to both payload
and key. The contents of this chapter were published in 2012 as an article in the
Journal of Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing [64].
4.1 A Context Sensitive Tiling System
In this section, we define a system for tiling a rectangular grid with uniformly-
sized tiles in such a way that each tile depends, to some extent, on it’s neighbors.
We require uniformly-sized rectangular tiles so that any R × C grid consisting of R
rows and C columns of tiles will be rectangular. The basis of our context sensitive
tiling system is a 2-Dimensional Context Sensitive Grammar (2D-CSG). A 2D-CSG
is a generalization of a Context Sensitive Grammar (CSG) wherein the context for
each production rule includes the strings above and below as well as to left and the
right of the non-terminal being replaced [65].
Definition 4.1.1 (Context-Sensitive Tiling System) A Context-Sensitive Tiling
System T is a 4-tuple T = (V,Σ, R, S) where V is a finite set of non-terminal symbols,
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Σ is a finite set of terminal symbols disjoint with V , R is a finite set of production








where A ∈ V , αi ∈ (V ∪Σ) and γ ∈ (V ∪Σ), and S ∈ V is the initial non-terminal.
A tiling system is just a 2D-CSG with a modified production rule set which lim-
its production rules in two ways. First, only the 8 individual symbols surrounding
the non-terminal under consideration may be used. Second, the non-terminal under
consideration may be replaced only by a single symbol.
4.2 Steganography
A tiling system generates a grid of tiles using the set R of production rules. Be-
cause choice implies variety, and variety offers a potential for discernment, every situ-
ation that offers a rule choice simultaneously offers an opportunity to hide something
meant only for a discerning receiver. With n candidate production rules, the choice
can embed any combination of ⌊log2 n⌋ bits. A natural order can be imposed on the
production rule set by, for example, sorting them lexicographically by the right hand
side. Thus, in choosing between at least 8 applicable rules, the choice of which rule
to use can encode at least 3 bits, i.e., the embedding lies in the choice. The unused or
excess rules can function as null generators, placing symbols to be ignored during the
decoding/extracting process. Or, the would-be unused rules can be shuffled in over
the course of the embedding process using a shared random number generator so that
every rule is equally likely to be used (conditioned on the neighbors). The shuffling
of the rules corresponds to encrypting the message using a one-time pad generated
from a shared random number generator. Equivalently, we can consider choices of
symbols or tiles, instead of rules, as the engine of the embedding.
Algorithm 1 presents a method for generating a stego-object using a context-
sensitive tiling system and a pseudo-random number generator. Alice starts in the
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Algorithm 1: Stego-Object Creation.
Input: Input: Bit-String mssg, Tiling System TS, PRNG R
Output: Grid G
G = RHS of TS’s initial production rule S




d = mssg[0 : n− 1]
mssg = mssg[n : end]
T2 = RandomPermute(T ,R)
dn = BinaryToInteger(d)
G[loc] = T2[dn]
loc = next position
until |mssg| == 0;




T2 = RandomPermute(T ,R)
dn = BinaryToInteger(d)
G[loc] = T2[dn]
loc = next position
end
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top-left corner of the object and constructs the candidate tile set, which is the set
of symbols which occur on the right-hand side of the production rules in R which
are applicable to the current location. Alice then determines the number of secret
message bits the location can encode, which is at most the logarithm of the size
of the candidate tile set, and extracts that number of bits from the message. She
then randomly permutes the candidate tile set and chooses the tile which ends up in
the position indexed by the integer value of the secret message bits before moving
on to the next location. This process is repeated until the message is consumed.
Any remaining tiling is completed by generating random bits to use in place of the
message, which is equivalent to selecting tiles at random from the candidate tile sets,
until the object is completely tiled.
Algorithm 2: Stego-Object Decoding.
Input: Grid G, Tiling System TS, PRNG R
Output: Bit-String mssg




T2 = RandomPermute(T ,R)
dn = index of G[loc] in T2
d = n-bit binary representation of dn
mssg = Concatenate(mssg,d)
loc = next position
until loc not in G;
Algorithm 2 presents the method for decoding the stego-objects generated by
Algorithm 1. Starting in the same place that Alice started, Bob also constructs the
candidate tile set, determines the number of bits that could have been encoded in
this location and randomly permutes the candidate tile set (Alice and Bob share the
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same PRNG and seed so that they will both generate the same random permutation).
Bob then determines which element of the permuted set Alice chose and records the
binary value of this index as the secret message bits before moving on to the next
location. Bob repeats this process until the entire object has been decoded.
4.2.1 An Example of the Proposed Scheme
Suppose Alice wishes to send a message to Bob using the above proposed scheme
using the tile set shown in Figure 4.3 and Rule Set 1 (shown in Equation 4.5). Let the
message she wishes to send be m = 88888888, a decimal number having eight eights.
The decimal number 88888888 is expressed in binary as 1010100110001010110001110
00, which has 27 bits. Alice will send this 27 bit sequence preceded by an 8-bit content-
length field that will tell Bob how many bits to read after the first 8. Thus, the
full data payload that Alice will send is: 00011011101010011000101011000111000,
which has length 35 bits. Alice knows from Table 4.1 that Rule Set 1 encodes at least
2 bits per tile and so knows that her 35-bit message will require no more than 18 tiles.
Alice rounds up to the nearest square and decides her tiling will be 5× 5 = 25 tiles.
By convention, and to simplify this example, Alice and Bob use blank initial state
tiles. The will also mirror their images horizontally and vertically. Mirroring this
way makes the image more visually appealing and has the effect of making the tiling
immune to rotations and reflections as well as more robust to other tampering from
Wendy. Alice and Bob will use a shared key with value 12345, which is used as the
seed r0 for their pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). For this example, Alice









To begin, Alice sets out a 6 × 6 grid of nonterminal open symbols, which will be
replaced with terminal tiles as the tiling is constructed. She replaces the top row and
the first column of open symbols with blank tiles, per her shared convention with Bob.
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Then, she begins with the first open symbol in the top right corner and considers which
candidate tiles she can place at this location given the three neighbors to the North,
Northwest and West. Under Rule Set 1, given three blank neighbors, the candidate
tile set contains the tiles {0,3,5,6,7}, which means Alice can hide 2 bits of secret in
her choice of tile for this location. She removes these 2 bits from the message (these
first 2 bits are 00) and converts the bitstring to a decimal number, in this case 0. She
rolls her PRNG once and uses the result to generate a permutation of the candidate
tile set, in case she obtains {0,6,3,5,7}. She selects the 0th tile from this permuted
set (because the data segment she is hiding has decimal value 0) and replaces the
open symbol at the current location with the selected tile. The next location is the
grid cell directly adjacent to the east of the current location. Alice again considers
the neighbors (all blank tiles) to obtain the candidate tile set ({0,3,5,6,7}), extracts
2 more bits of secret (bitstring is 01), uses the PRNG once to randomly permute the
candidate tile set ({7,0,5,3,6}), selects the permuted candidate tile whose index is
the decimal value of the secret bitstring (another 0 tile) and finally she moves to the
next location. At this location, the neighbors are all 0 tiles still, the secret bitstring
is 10, the permuted candidate tile set is {0,3,5,7,6} and so the tile Alice selects at
this step is the 5 tile. At the next location, the neighbors are the tiles {0,0,5}, the
secret bitstring is 11, the permuted candidate tile set is {15,12,9,14,13,10,11} and so
the tile that Alice selects at this step is the 14 tile. She will repeat this process until
she runs out of secret message to send, at which point she will start hiding random
bits. The state of the tiling after each iteration is shown in Figure 4.1. Once she has
set the last tile, she trims the initial state tiles from the edges and mirrors the image
twice, once horizontally and once vertically, before sending the final image, shown in
Figure 4.2, to Bob.
When Bob receives the image, he can easily reverse the last steps that Alice took
before sending the image. He undoes the mirroring (or uses it to undo any tampering
by Wendy) and adds back in the initial state tiles around the edges (he knows these
because he and Alice have a prior agreement on what they are or how to generate
47
Figure 4.1. Snapshot of the example tiled image after each tiling
iteration. The ’O’ symbols, which are the nonterminal open symbols,
and the border are shown for illustration purposes only.
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them) to obtain an image from which he can extract the secret data. Bob starts
in the same location that Alice started, but instead of an open symbol Bob sees a
tile in the first location. Nonetheless, Bob uses the three neighbors to construct the
candidate tile set, uses the size of the set to determine how many bits to expect,
uses his PRNG and the key he shares with Alice to randomly permute the candidate
tile set and then finds the index in the permuted set of the tile which he finds in
the current location. In this case, the permuted tile set is {0,6,3,5,7}, the tile in
the current location is 0, which is in index 0, and the number of bits to expect is 2.
Therefore, Bob records the first 2 bits of the secret as 00. In the next location, the
permuted tile set is {7,0,5,3,6}, the tile in the current location is 0, which is in index
1, and the number of bits to expect is 2, so Bob records the next bits of the secret
as 01. Likewise, for the third location, the permuted tile set is {0,3,5,7,6}, the tile in
the current location is 5, which is in index 2, and the number of bits to expect is 2,
so Bob records the next bits of the secret as 10. At the fourth location, Bob will find
that the permuted tile set is {15,12,9,14,13,10,11}, the tile in the current location is
14, which is in index 3, and the number of bits to expect is 2, and so Bob will record
the 7th and 8th bits of the secret as 11. Bob has 8 bits now and so he can find out
how many more bits to expect. The bits Bob has are 00011011, which is the number
27 and the correct number of bits to expect to extract from the rest of the tiling. Bob
will repeat the procedure to extract bits from the tiling until he has extracted the
expected number of bits and then will translate the bitstring of data he has extracted
to something meaningful. In this case, Bob will find out that the next 27 bits are
101010011000101011000111000, which translates to 88888888 in decimal.
4.3 Steganalysis
Numerous image steganalysis tools are freely available on the Internet, including
StegSecret [66], Virtual Steganographic Laboratory (VSL) [67] and Digital Invisible
Ink Toolkit (DIIT) [68]. All three tools implement the RS Steganalysis technique [69],
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Figure 4.2. Finished line drawing encoding decimal number 88888888.
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which classifies images based on a smoothness metric. The tools also implement
other methods in addition to RS Steganalyis. StegSecret implements the Chi-Square
Attack [70] and a technique the author of the tool created based on the ideas in [70]
called Visual Attacks. The VSL tool implements a steganalysis method based on
the Binary Similarity Metric [71]. And, the DIIT tool implements Laplace Graph
Analysis [56].
However, when these methods are tested against objects generated by a tiling
system, their accuracy is no better than guesswork. Clearly, one reason for this
is that objects generated by tiling systems are a different type of image than these
steganalysis methods are expecting. For this reason, successful detection of the stego-
objects generated by a tiling system requires an approach that draws on methods
from other domains, such as linguistic steganalysis. Two steganalysis techniques
specifically designed to distinguish between clean tilings and steganographic tilings
are presented here.
4.3.1 Markov Chain Equivalence Test
The first directed steganalysis method treats each tiled image as a sequence of
steps drawn from a third order Markov chain. The neighboring tiles are the previous
states and the tile under consideration is the state to which the process moved. The
empirical transition matrix is constructed for each tiled image being tested. Using
a method adapted from [72], the score for the image is computed as the Manhattan
distance of the empirical transition matrix T from the model transition matrix for




|Tcx,y,z,w − Tx,y,z,w|. (4.2)
The clean model is built by averaging the transition matrix over 1000 examples of
clean tiled images made using a given production rule set. Allowing Wendy to know
the rule set that Alice and Bob are using is not required by Kerckhoffs’s law [73]
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and it does make Wendy’s job easier. However, if Wendy watches Alice and Bob’s
communication long enough, she could learn the production rule set they were using.
Thus, we can assume that Wendy knows the rule set from the beginning.
4.3.2 Chi-Square Test
The other directed steganalysis technique counts the occurrences of each tile in
the tiled images being tested and compares those values to the model counts for a
clean image using a Chi-square test with a Laplace correction. The score for each








where Ot is the number of t tiles observed in T and Et is the expected number of
t tiles from the model of a clean image Tc.
As before, the clean model Tc is obtained by averaging the tile counts over 1000
examples of clean tiled images. Likewise, Wendy is again assumed to know the pro-
duction rule set being used.
4.4 Experimental Results
Capacity, robustness and security are three key properties of covert channels. The
channel capacity is the number of bits that can be sent per transmission, typically
measured in bits per object or bits per symbol. The robustness of the channel is the
types and the amounts of noise or tampering that the channel can endure without
preventing covert communication. The steganographic security of the channel is a
measure of the indistinguishability of the steganographic usages of the channel (the
stego-objects) from the non-steganographic usages (the cover objects).
Experimental results on capacity, robustness and security were obtained for an
example tiling system using square tiles composed of lines connecting the center of
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the tile to zero or more of the corners. Four production rule sets were devised to
investigate the effect of context sensitivity (the constraints placed on candidate tile
sets by the production rules) on capacity, robustness and security. The example
tile set is shown in Figure 4.3 and examples of tiled images generated using each
production rules set are shown in Figure 4.4.
Definition 4.4.1 (Experimental Line Drawing Rule Sets) Let bx(α) be 1 if the
tile α has a line connecting the center of the tile to the corner indexed by x and 0
otherwise. Then, let the notation be abused so that b{X}({A}) counts the number of
lines which connect each of the centers of the specified tiles αi ∈ A to the specified





Then, the four rule sets used for this experiment can be written as follows, where
corners are numbered from 1 to 4 in clockwise order from the top-left corner and the












{0, 3, 5, 6, 7} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3) = 0
{9 : 15} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3) = 1



















{0 : 15} α1 = α2 = α3 = 0
{0 : 7} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3) = 0
{8 : 15} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3)) = 1
{0 : 15} otherwise
(4.6)
Rule set 3:
γ ∈ {0 : 15} (4.7)
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Figure 4.3. Example tile set for N = M = 4 as diagonal crosses.
(a) Rule Set 1 (b) Rule Set 2 (c) Rule Set 3 (d) Rule Set 4

















{0 : 15} α1 = α2 = α3 = 0
{8 : 15} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3) = 0
{0 : 7} b3,4,2(α1, α2, α3) = 1
{0 : 15} otherwise
(4.8)
4.4.1 Capacity
To measure the covert channel capacity of the tiling system, a square tiling of 400
tiles was generated 1000 times for each of the 4 experimental rule sets and 2 different
embedding modes using random hidden messages. The two embedding modes are
fixed-length embedding (FLE) and variable-length embedding (VLE). In the FLE
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mode, each tile choice encodes the same number of bits, equal to the minimum ca-
pacity guaranteed by the production rule set, shown in Equation 4.9.
NF = min
{x,y,z}∈LHS(R)
{⌊log2(|T ({x, y, z})|)⌋} , (4.9)
T ({x, y, z}) is the candidate tile set for a grid location with neighbors {x, y, z}.
In the VLE mode, each tile choice encodes a variable number of hidden message
bits as shown in Equation 4.10. In this mode, the embedding capacity of each tile
choice is just the logarithm of the size of the candidate tile set for the given location.
NV (r, c) = ⌊log2(|T ({x, y, z})|)⌋ , (4.10)
where {x, y, z} = {G(r− 1, c− 1), G(r− 1, c), G(r, c− 1)} are the neighbors of G(r, c)
and T ({x, y, z}) is the candidate tile set for a grid location with neighbors {x, y, z}.
The 95% confidence intervals about the means for the capacity experiments are
reported in Table 4.1. The results show that the VLE mode encodes fractionally more
bits per tile than the FLE mode for rule sets 1, 2 and 4, about half a bit per tile.
Rule set 3 is the same for both modes because it does not constrain tile choices, and
thus the FLE capacity is identical to the VLE capacity in that case. Because rule
set 3 puts no constraints on the relationship between neighbors, it yields the highest
capacity of the 4 rule sets tested. Rule set 1 is the most constrained rule set and
so has the lowest expected capacity. Rule set 2 relaxes the constraints of rule set 1
and, being less constrained than rule set 1 and more constrained than rule set 3, it’s
expected capacity is between those of rule set 1 and rule set 3. Rule set 4 has nearly
identical capacity to that of rule set 2 because the two are constrained by the same
amount.
4.4.2 Robustness
The robustness of a stego-object is a measure of the degree of tampering it can tol-
erate without corruption of the hidden data. Because stego-objects can be subjected
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Table 4.1.
Embedding capacity of the tiling systems
Encoding Method
Rule Set FLE (bits/tile) VLE (bits/tile)
1 2.0000 ± 0.0000 2.5601 ± 0.0014
2 3.0000 ± 0.0000 3.4588 ± 0.0015
3 4.0000 ± 0.0000 4.0000 ± 0.0000
4 3.0000 ± 0.0000 3.4603 ± 0.0015
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to various forms of tampering, it is important to be clear on precisely which forms of
tampering a stego-object can withstand. In general, most tampering processes seek
to augment the object with specific kinds of noise.
A popular method of tampering is the addition of white noise to a stego-object.
The addition of such noise to an image or audio file can obliterate LSB steganography
without noticeable degradation in the quality of the object. If our stego-objects are
represented as binary images, we can assume that the addition of white noise is not a
viable tampering technique as it would result in clearly noticeable object degradation.
On the other hand, if we represent our stego-objects as grayscale images, then the
addition of white noise will be noticeable, but will not affect the secret payload.
If we subject ourselves to Kerckhoffs’s law so that Wendy knows the stego-system
but not the key, it is reasonable to assume that Wendy may add a specific kind of noise
to the image by swapping tiles with grammatically valid alternatives. To measure the
robustness of objects under this operation, we allow Wendy to change as many tiles
as she wants, with the constraint that she can change a specific tile location no more
than a fixed number of times in total. Under this condition, we then measure the
direct impact on the secret payload in number of errors in payload after each change.
To measure the robustness of the generated stego-objects, we ran one test for each
of three embedding modes (variable-, fixed-, and unit-length), and one for both fixed-
length and unit-length (i.e., 1 bit/tile) embeddings with redundancy. We can add
redundancy by enlarging the secret message through (redundant) repetition k times.
In our tests of robustness with redundancy, the payload was an ASCII encoded
version of a secret message repeated k = 3 times. A simple majority vote is used to
decide on the final value of decoded bits.
The results of the robustness experiments are shown in Figure 4.5. In the figure,
the x-axis is the number of tile changes relative to the original object and the y-
axis is the bit-error rate. It is clear from the figures that fixed length embeddings
exhibit a performance that is superior to that of variable length embeddings, in terms
of robustness. At a tampering rate of 25%, i.e. 25% of tiles changed by Wendy,
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(a) Rule set 1. (b) Rule set 2.
(c) Rule set 3. (d) Rule set 4.
Figure 4.5. Robustness of the tiling systems.
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variable-length embeddings have a bit-error rate of close to 50%, while both fixed-
and unit-length embeddings have error rates less than 20%. We also observe that
redundancy increases robustness to tampering: with 25% tiles changed, fixed-length
embedding with redundancy achieves a bit-error rate of less than 10% and that of
unit-length is less than 5%.
Variable length embeddings perform poorly because tiles that previously encoded
n bits under Alice’s direction can be subjected to a neighbor change (by Wendy)
that causes Bob’s decoding algorithm to find the same tile now embedding m 6= n
bits, effectively shifting the rest of the message and causing numerous and simulta-
neous errors. The effect of such tampering could be mitigated by having a human
in the decoding loop. In the case of ascii encoding, for example, the point at which
such an error is encountered will be clear because the payload prior to that point
is semi-readable (possibly due to Wendy’s partially successful tampering), while the
subsequent payload is unreadable. It is possible for Bob to fix the message by adding
or removing bits, continuing the recovery scheme until the next point is met for
which too many or too few bits are decoded. Further, we believe it may be possible
to automate this recovery process.
4.4.3 Security
To measure the steganographic security of the tiling system, the output of the
system is tested against both directed steganalysis techniques presented above. The
steganalysis testing process consists of two steps: a learning step and a testing step.
During the learning step, Wendy computes the score of each tiled image in the training
set and then finds the decision threshold which yields the equal error rate, the value
at which the type I error rate is equal to the type II error rate. Then, this decision
threshold is used in the testing step to obtain the values necessary to compute the
accuracy, which is then recorded. Wendy is given a training set of 200 images, 100
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clean and 100 containing hidden information, and 200 test images, again 100 clean
and 100 containing hidden information.
4.4.4 Markov Chain Equivalence Test
The steganalysis test was executed for all 72 possible combinations of parameters:
use of seed, choice of rule set, message format, and embedding format. The results
of the tests are shown in Figure 4.6. The data is shown sorted in decreasing order
by accuracy, holding one parameter constant. From the results, we can see that
if Alice and Bob do not use a seed, Wendy can achieve nearly perfect accuracy of
detection for approximately half of the parameter combinations. However, when a
seed is used, Wendy does not achieve any significant advantage in detection over pure
guesswork. The difference in Wendy’s accuracy between when Alice and Bob use a
seed and when they do not is statistically significant. There is no significant difference
between rule sets, in terms of Wendy’s detection accuracy, nor is there a significant
difference between message encoding types or between embedding types. Overall,
Wendy’s detection accuracy with the Markov chain equivalence test method averages
0.67 with a standard deviation of 0.23.
4.4.5 Chi-Square Test
The steganalysis test was again executed for all 72 possible combinations of param-
eters and the results are shown in Figure 4.7. The data is shown sorted in decreasing
order by accuracy, holding one parameter constant. We again see from the results
that when Alice and Bob do not use a seed, Wendy achieves perfect accuracy of
detection. However, now she can do it for nearly all configurations of the other pa-
rameters. When a seed is used, Wendy’s accuracy is identical to pure guesswork, with
an average accuracy of 0.50. As with the Markov chain equivalence test method, this
difference in Wendy’s accuracy is statistically significant. We find again that there
is no significant difference between rule sets in terms of Wendy’s detection accuracy,
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(a) Conditioned on Use of Seed (b) Conditioned on Rule Set
(c) Conditioned on Message Type (d) Conditioned on Embedding Type
Figure 4.6. Detection accuracy of the Markov Chain Equivalence Test.
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(a) Conditioned on Use of Seed (b) Conditioned on Rule Set
(c) Conditioned on Embedding Type (d) Conditioned on Embedding Type
Figure 4.7. Detection accuracy results of the Chi-Square Test.
nor is there a significant difference between message encoding types or between em-
bedding types. Overall, Wendy’s detection accuracy with the Chi-square test method
averages 0.72 with a standard deviation of 0.25.
62
4.4.6 Analysis of Security Results
Taking into account only the 36 parameter combinations that yield the worst
results for Wendy (which is roughly the set for which Alice and Bob are using a seed),
her detection accuracy using the Markov chain equivalence test method has a mean
of 0.47 with a standard deviation of 0.06. For the Chi-square test method, Wendy’s
detection accuracy has a mean of 0.49 with a standard deviation of 0.05. Thus, we
can conclude that neither method performs any better than random chance when
Alice and Bob choose one of the “better” parameter combinations, such as {useSeed
= TRUE, RS = 1, ASCII printable character encoding, fixed-length embedding} for
which Wendy achieves accuracy of 0.58 for the Markov chain equivalence test method
and an accuracy of 0.51 for the Chi-square test method or {useSeed = TRUE, RS
= 4, pseudo-random bit string encoding, 1-bit embedding} for which Wendy achieves
accuracies of 0.51 and 0.43 using the respective test methods.
From the results obtained for the Markov chain equivalence test method and
the Chi-square test method, it is found that the two methods yield quite similar
results. The results also indicate that the usage of a seed significantly reduces Wendy’s
accuracy using these two methods. However, there is no significant difference in
detection accuracy between rule sets, message encoding or embedding types.
Alice and Bob can still make Wendy’s detection task even more difficult by spread-
ing the message across several images in a series, so that only part of an image encodes
information and only some of the images which are sent contain any hidden informa-
tion at all. This reduction in Alice and Bob’s covert channel usage directly translates
into an increase in the security of their channel, in terms of Wendy’s detection ac-
curacy. Further, the additional images add to the robustness of the channel so that
Wendy must do more work (change more tiles) in order to cause enough damage to
destroy to hidden information.
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4.5 Conclusion
We have presented a stego-system which generates stego-objects using context
sensitive tiling. We have analyzed the embedding capacity and the robustness of this
system under four example production rule sets and found that variable-length em-
beddings offer greater capacity, but that fixed-length embeddings are far more robust
to tampering. To further increase the robustness to tampering, we found that repeat-
ing the message can be very effective. The security of the system was experimentally
tested against several existing image steganalysis techniques and it was found that
these techniques completely failed at the task of distinguishing steganographic objects
from cover objects. To attempt to circumvent this problem, two directed steganalysis
techniques meant specifically for tiling systems were developed and investigated. The
results show that the steganalysis methods are only accurate when no seed is used.
In every other case, the directed steganalysis methods performed similarly to random
chance.
This work has led us to make some useful conclusions. In general, tampering can
cause severe complications at the decoding end, but it is possible to enhance robust-
ness through choice of embedding-type and redundancy. Second, in combination with
a shared random number generator for symbol rotation, it can be shown that such
synthetic steganography is virtually undetectable. Finally, the tiling framework can
be generalized to many other settings. The system is not limited to creating images
and can be used to create text, audio and physical compositions just as easily. It
is also possible to generalize the existing stego-system implementation by including
support for user-defined tiling systems.
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5 HIDING SECRET MESSAGES IN HUFFMAN TREES
Huffman codes are optimal prefix-free codes for a given distribution and can be con-
structed according to a simple algorithm developed by Huffman [74]. The codes are
optimal in that they produce the shortest expected codeword length. Huffman coding
is used as a back-end to multimedia file formats, such as MP3 for audio and JPEG
for images, but can also be used on text and for general purpose compression [75].
A Huffman code can be represented graphically by a tree, referred to as a Huffman
tree, and the codebook and tree are interchangeable. An example of a Huffman tree
and the corresponding codebook is shown in Figure 5.1.
Chen et al. present two methods for embedding hidden messages using modified
Huffman trees, in which the message is hidden in a Huffman-encoded object by pre-
fixing [76] or suffixing [77] the the codewords with bits of the secret message. These
methods achieve greater capacity than the scheme presented in this chapter, but are
easily detectable. In order for a third-party to correctly decode the object, they
must possess the Huffman tree. However, examining the Huffman tree will immedi-
ately give away that an information hiding scheme is being used. In the first case
(prepending the secret message bits to codewords), the left and right subtrees of the
root node both contain the same set of symbols. In the second case (appending the
secret message bits to codewords), in order for the tree to allow correct decoding,
every sibling of a leaf node shares the same symbol as that node, which means that
each symbol appears in the tree twice. In both cases, testing whether or not the
Huffman tree contains duplicate symbols will reveal whether or not the compressed
object could be hiding a secret message. The Huffman trees end up being twice as
big as they should be.
The information hiding scheme presented here hides information in the structure
of the Huffman tree as opposed to the content. Thus, the tree does not contain
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Figure 5.1. Example of a Huffman tree and the corresponding code-
book. The probabilities are shown for demonstration purposes and
would not be explicitly included in the codebook or Huffman tree.
duplicate symbols which would immediately betray it’s true nature. It will be shown
that, under the right circumstances, the stego-tree is indistinguishable from a clean
tree for the same content. Since the first priority of a covert channel is to remain
hidden, the scheme presented here does not hesitate to trade capacity for increased
security.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 defines the
information hiding scheme and presents algorithms for implementing it. Section 5.2
presents analytical results on the capacity and robustness of the scheme as well as
experimental results for the security of the scheme and Section 5.3 concludes the
chapter. The contents of this chapter were presented and published in the Proceed-
ings of the Eighth International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and
Multimedia Signal Processing in 2012 [78].
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5.1 Hiding in Huffman Trees
Hiding information in Huffman trees exploits the property of such trees that any
other tree that assigns the same codeword lengths to the symbols will also be optimal.
Thus, there is redundancy in the structure of a Huffman tree which can be exploited
for information hiding. Since the choice of how to order the children of a node is
arbitrary, the specific choice made can encode a number of bits. Algorithm 3 presents
a modified Huffman tree-building algorithm which allows information to be hidden
in the tree’s structure through the ordering of the children.
When building the Huffman tree, the algorithm recursively removes and merges
the least probable symbols into super-symbols, whose probability is the sum of the
symbols which make it up, and then adds the new super-symbol to the list until there
is just one super-symbol remaining. The final super-symbol contains all the original
symbols and has probability 1. After the tree is built, the children of each internal
node of the tree are reordered to embed the secret information according to Algorithm
4. An example of a steganographic Huffman tree and the corresponding codebook is
shown in Figure 5.1.
To extract the hidden information embedded in the Huffman tree, start at the root
node and visit each internal node in breadth-first order from left to right. At each
node which has all D children, convert the index of the permutation of the children to
a n-bit binary number, where n = ⌊log2(D!)⌋, and append the bit string to an initially
empty output string. For the internal node which has (D − B) children (there is at
most one node that does not have D children), use n = ⌊log2(
D!
B!
)⌋ instead. Once all
internal nodes have been visited, the output string contains the bits that were hidden
in the structure of the tree. The extraction algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.
Even for non-steganographic purposes, the Huffman tree or the codebook must
be sent before it can be used to decode messages. If a method for encoding and
decoding the Huffman tree is publicly available, then that method can be used to
encode the Huffmann tree or codebook before sending it. However, if such a method
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Algorithm 3: Steganographic Huffman Tree Constructor.
Input: A set of symbols S = {s ∈ A | P (s) ≥ 0} with associated probabilities
P (s), the degree D ≥ 2 of the tree, a secret message M
Output: Steganographic Huffman tree T
T = ∅, the empty set;
for s ∈ S do
T = T ∪ ({s}, P (s), ∅);
Sort T in increasing order by prob, then by symbol;
B = (D − 2)− ((|S| − 2) mod (D − 1));
R = {T1, . . . , T(D−B)};
T = T \R;
t = new node;
t.symbol = R1.symbol ∪ · · · ∪RD−B.symbol;
t.prob = R1.prob+ · · ·+RD−B.prob;
Append B NULL nodes to the end of R;
t.children = R;
Add t to T ;
repeat
Sort T in increasing order by prob, then by symbol;
R = {T1, . . . , TD};
T = T \R;









until |T | = 1;
Embed M into T using Algorithm 4;
return T ;
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Algorithm 4: Huffman Tree Information Hiding.
Input: Huffman tree T , a secret message M of sufficient length
Output: Steganographic Huffman tree T
Q = ∅;
Add T to Q repeat
t = Q1;
Q = Q \ t;
if t is a leaf then
Continue













Convert the bitstring m to an integer w;
Sort t.children lexicographically by symbol;
Permute t.children according to w;
for each c ∈ t.children do
Add c to Q;
until |Q| == 0;
return T ;
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Algorithm 5: Huffman Tree Information Extraction.
Input: A Steganographic Huffman tree T
Output: A secret message M
D = |T.children| is the degree of T ;
nS is the number of symbols at leaf nodes of T ;
B = (D − 2)− ((|S| − 2)mod(D − 1));
M = ǫ, the empty string;
Q = ∅;
Add T to Q repeat
t = Q1;
Q = Q \ t;
if t is a leaf then
Continue;







Convert the ordering of t.children to an integer w;
Convert w to a n-bit binary string m;
Append m to M ;
for each c ∈ t.children do
Add c to Q;
until |Q| == 0;
return M ;
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Figure 5.2. Example of a steganographic Huffman tree and the corre-
sponding codebook for M = 0100101.
is not available, one possible method for encoding the tree and one for encoding
the codebook are briefly presented here. To encode the tree, start at the root and
traverse the tree in breadth-first search order from left to right, writing a ’1’ if the
node has children and a ’0’ if the node is a leaf. Then, append the plaintext for each
symbol in the tree in depth-first search order from left to right. The tree is recovered
by first building the tree skeleton (the tree structure without any symbols) and then
assigning the symbols to the leafs in depth-first search order. To encode the codebook
directly, prefix each codeword with the length of the codeword and then concatenate
the (length,codeword) pairs in lexicographical order by symbol. If a symbol is not
used, the length of the codeword is zero. To recover the tree, the codewords are used
to construct the tree on a pathwise basis and the symbol is assigned to the leaf node
which is eventually created by following the path specified by the codeword.
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5.2 Capacity, Robustness and Security
Three key properties of covert channels are capacity, robustness and security. The
capacity of the channel is the number of bits that can be sent per transmission, usu-
ally measured in bits per object or bits per symbol. The robustness of the channel
is the amount of noise, or tampering, that the channel can endure without prevent-
ing covert communication from occurring. Robustness may also refer to the types of
noise and tampering that the channel can resist; for example, some image watermark-
ing techniques are robust against resizing and compression [79] and some linguistic
watermarking techniques are robust against summarization and rephrasing [80]. Ro-
bustness is only a concern in communication systems in which the adversary is active.
An active adversary is one that can intercept and modify communications between
Alice and Bob. If the adversary, call her Wendy, is a passive adversary, limited to
observation only, there is nothing she can do to prevent the covert communication
except to detect it and use that information as evidence against Alice and Bob. The
steganographic security of the channel is a measure of the indistinguishability of the
steganographic usages of the channel from the non-steganographic usages. Stegano-
graphic security differs from cryptographic security in that cryptography is concerned
with preventing the content of messages from being read by anyone other than the
intended recipient, while steganography is concerned with preventing the existence of
the message from being discovered by anyone other than the intended recipient.
5.2.1 Capacity
Theorem 5.2.1 (Capacity of an Ordering of N elements) Let L be a list of N unique
elements. The number of bits of secret information that can be encoded by a permu-
tation of L is given by
n ≥ ⌊log2(N !)⌋ (5.1)
Proof Enumerate the N ! permutations and assign the number 0 to the first permu-
tation, the number 1 to the second, and so on. Partition the permutations into 2 sets
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with the first set containing the permutations labeled 0 through 2⌊log2(N !)⌋ − 1 and
the other set containing the rest. Express each label in the first set in n-bit binary
notation, where
n = log2(2
⌊log2(N !)⌋) = ⌊log2(N !)⌋. (5.2)
Thus, since the permutations in the first set are indexed by all possible n-bit binary
numbers, any n-bit secret message can be sent by sending the permutation whose
index is the bits of the message.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Capacity of a D-ary Huffman Tree) The number of bits that a D-








where m is the number of symbols, D ≥ 2 is the degree of the tree and B = (D− 2)−
((m− 2)mod(D− 1)) so that (D−B) is the number of symbols merged at the deepest
level of the tree.
Proof In the first merge step of the D-ary Huffman algorithm, (D − B) symbols
are merged so that D symbols can be merged during every subsequent step. But,
these (D − B) symbols can be spread out over D children nodes. The number of

















In every subsequent step, D symbols are merged and
⌊log2(D!)⌋ (5.6)
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bits can be encoded in each of those steps. The number of merge steps after the first
that are carried out is
m− (D − B)
(D − 1)
(5.7)
since (D − B) of the m symbols are merged in the first step and the degree of the





Therefore, the number of bits that a D-ary Huffman tree can encode in it’s structure
is the sum of Equation 5.5 and Equation 5.8, which is equal to Equation 5.3, .
5.2.2 Robustness
The channel is said to be robust against that which Wendy can do that does not
disrupt the channel or cause information losses. Everything else, i.e. that which
Wendy can do to disrupt the channel and cause information loss, is called a counter-
measure.
Anything that Wendy does to the stego-object that does not change the tree
structure or codebook will not affect the hidden message. Thus, the covert channel is
robust against modifications to the content of the cover-object, such as addition and
deletion. As an extreme example, suppose that Wendy intercepts a Huffman coded
text document from Alice to Bob and, supposing that the secret is embedded in the
text of the document, decodes the document and replaces the text with entirely new
text before recoding the document and sending it on to Bob. Since Wendy did not
modify the Huffman tree section of the object, the hidden message, which resides in
the structure of the tree, remains intact.
On the other hand, there are a number of countermeasures that Wendy can em-
ploy to annihilate the hidden message from the stego-object without degrading the
object. If Wendy correctly guesses that the covert channel is contained in the Huff-
man tree structure, she can change that structure and erase the secret data. For
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example, Wendy can convert all Huffman trees and codebooks she observes to canon-
ical Huffman codes, which are a type of Huffman code which allows for the codebook
to be concisely encoded as the lengths of the codewords in lexicographical order, and
recode the message according to the new codebook. If Wendy guesses correctly that
the secret is embedded in the ordering of the children, then she can clear the message
from the tree by returning the tree structure to the state in which all children are
ordered lexicographically or by probability (which she can estimate from the decoded
message body). She could also corrupt the message by randomly permuting the chil-
dren, or she can change the message by clearing it and embedding her own (perhaps
a warning for Alice and Bob to behave). To protect against an active adversary, Alice
and Bob should uses digital signatures.
5.2.3 Security
Wendy may or may not know the system that Alice and Bob are using. Indeed,
she must assume that they will attempt to use some system and she might as well
initially suspect every one of Alice and Bob’s messages as being a cover for covert
communication. The security that Alice and Bob enjoy against a Wendy who does
not know their system is security through obscurity. The security that Alice and Bob
have against a Wendy who does know their system is the traditional cryptographic
notion of security, where the security of the system rests on the strength and secrecy
of a key [73].
Only the informed adversary needs to be considered, since security through ob-
scurity is no security at all. Assume that Wendy knows that Alice and Bob are using
Huffman trees in their covert communication. To detect the usage of the channel,
Wendy must devise a steganalysis system which can determine if a given Huffman
tree is hiding information. The most straightforward method of accomplishing this is
to hypothesize that clean Huffman trees have a certain property that trees modified
to hide information do not have and to decide whether or not a given tree contains
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hidden information by testing whether or not the property holds. Three such prop-
erties might be (1) that the children of every node are in lexicographical order, (2)
that the children of every node are in order by likelihood of symbol and (3) that the
tree is in the canonical form. With these three properties, Wendy can construct a
decision rule which classifies an object as clean if any of the three properties hold and
as a stego-object otherwise. Wendy can use the content of the message to estimate
the distribution of the symbol alphabet to use in testing the ordering of nodes by
probability.
This decision rule was tested against a set of 1000 stego-objects and 1000 clean
objects, using binary trees. The accuracy of the classification was recorded for dif-
ferent alphabet sizes and lengths of content. The stego-objects were generated by
picking a random distribution for the symbol alphabet, building the binary Huffman
tree given that probability distribution, embedding a random secret message into the
tree and then generating content according to the distribution of the alphabet. The
results of this security test are shown in Figure 5.3.
Another test was conducted which changed how the objects in the test set were
generated to simulate a common method of compressing objects, which is to generate
the Huffman tree based on the empirical distribution of the content. For this test,
the stego-objects were generated by picking a random distribution for the symbol
alphabet, generating content according to the distribution of the alphabet, building
the binary Huffman tree given the empirical probability distribution of the generated
content, and then embedding a random secret message into the tree. The results of
this test are shown in Figure 5.4
Figure 5.3 shows that Wendy’s detection accuracy goes to 50%, equivalent to
guessing, as the size of the alphabet increases. The peak in accuracy centered around
alphabets of size 6 is due to the fact that clean trees are much more likely than dirty
trees to be in probabilistic order, which increases Wendy’s accuracy in distinguishing
between the two as the content length increases so that Wendy has a better estimate
of the true symbol distribution. As the number of symbols increases, Wendy’s ability
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to distinguish between clean objects and stego-objects diminishes because clean trees
turn out to be no more likely than stego-trees to be in lexicographical or probabilistic
order nor are they more likely to happen to be in canonical form.
In Figure 5.4 it is shown that Wendy’s detection accuracy is significantly improved
in the case where the Huffman tree is generated based on the empirical distribution of
the content. In this case, Wendy’s estimate of the symbol distribution is identical to
the symbol distribution used to generate the Huffman tree. The increased accuracy
of her estimate increases the power of the probabilistic ordering test to distinguish
between clean trees and stego-trees. When only one symbol of content is transmit-
ted, Wendy’s accuracy is equivalent to guesswork because she does not have a good
estimate of the symbol distribution. The slow drop-off of accuracy as the size of the
symbol alphabet increases is due to stego-trees which happen to be in order, caus-
ing false-negative errors. Wendy’s detection accuracy increases for larger alphabet
sizes as the length of the content increases because the increased content length gives
a more fine-grained symbol distribution, which in turn reduces the likelihood of a
stego-tree being mistaken for a clean tree.
A new decision rule is devised which seeks to improve upon the results of the
earlier decision rule by testing whether or not the transmitted Huffman tree matches
the clean Huffman tree that would have been generated given the symbol distribution.
That is, Wendy knows the Huffman tree-building algorithm that Alice and Bob are
supposed to be using and she tests for stego by comparing the actual Huffman tree
that Alice sends to the Huffman tree that was supposed to have been generated.
Wendy finds that any difference between the two is grounds for marking the object
as stego. This new decision rule was also tested against a set of 1000 stego-objects
and 1000 clean objects. As before, the accuracy of the classification was recorded for
different alphabet sizes and lengths of content. Again, both preparations of the test
set were used. The results of the security tests are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
The results shown in Figure 5.5 are very similar to the results shown in Figure 5.3
for the previous decision rule. Wendy’s accuracy is a flat 50% for large alphabets and
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there is a peak in accuracy for small alphabets. The peak can be attributed to Wendy
obtaining an accurate estimate of the symbol distribution for small alphabets and
large contents. As the size of the alphabet increases, the content length is insufficient
to obtain a good estimate of the symbol distribution. This causes Wendy to classify
every object as stego because the tree she builds using the standard algorithm is
built using a symbol distribution which is sufficiently different from the true symbol
distribution as to cause the trees to differ regardless of being clean or stego. That
is, Wendy’s error in estimating the symbol distribution shows up as a false-positive
error in distinguishing between clean and stego-trees.
In Figure 5.6, however, Wendy’s accuracy is perfect, or nearly so, for alphabets
larger than 8 symbols. Her accuracy for smaller alphabets is diminished because
the small secret messages that those trees can hide occasionally do not require any
reordering of the tree, and thus cause Wendy to make a false-negative error. The
perfect accuracy demonstrated by this decision rule is attributable to Wendy having
access to the initial state of the tree before any embedding takes place because the
Huffman tree is built from the empirical symbol distribution of the content to which
Wendy has access. If Alice changes the structure of the tree to embed a secret message
to Bob, the difference is easily discovered by Wendy and the object is marked as stego
with perfect accuracy because only those trees which have been modified will differ
from the standard tree that Wendy will build based on the content.
5.3 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a novel information hiding scheme which uses the
structure of Huffman trees to encode secret data. The capacity, robustness, and
security of the resultant covert channel were analyzed and discussed. It was shown
that the capacity of the channel is related to the degree of the tree and the size of
the symbol alphabet through Equation 5.3. Thus, the number of bits that a tree
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Figure 5.3. The accuracy of the detection rule that a tree which is
not in some order is marked as stego. This data is from a simulation
which assumes that the distribution that generated the Huffman tree
is the same as that from which the content is constructed.
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Figure 5.4. The accuracy of the detection rule that a tree which is
not in some order is marked as stego. This data is from a simulation
which assumes that the Huffman tree is generated using the empirical
symbol distribution of the content.
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Figure 5.5. The accuracy of the detection rule that a tree which does
not match the tree corresponding to the distribution of the content
using the standard Huffman algorithm is marked as stego. This data
is from a simulation which assumes that the distribution that gener-
ated the Huffman tree is the same as that from which the content is
constructed.
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Figure 5.6. The accuracy of the detection rule that a tree which does
not match the tree corresponding to the distribution of the content
using the standard Huffman algorithm is marked as stego. This data
is from a simulation which assumes that the Huffman tree is generated
using the empirical symbol distribution of the content.
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with degree D = 2 can embed is given by n = m− 1 bits, where m is the number of
symbols in the alphabet.
The robustness analysis argued that the covert channel is robust against any and
all modifications to the content of the cover-object. However, an active adversary with
knowledge of the stego-system can employ countermeasures that reduce or eliminate
the capacity of the channel, such as recoding the object using a different but equivalent
tree. Since robustness is only a concern against an active adversary, the usage of a
digital signature scheme would suffice to prevent Wendy from tampering with the
objects in the channel.
Finally, the security analysis showed that a passive adversary with knowledge
of the stego-system can achieve perfect accuracy of detection in the case where the
Huffman tree is generated using the empirical symbol distribution of the content.
On the other hand, if the tree is built using an a priori distribution that Wendy
must estimate using the content, her accuracy is no better than pure guesswork. The
results obtained suggest that, if the two are willing to put up with slightly sub-optimal
compression, then Alice and Bob can trade a lower compression ratio for dramatically
increased security, e.g. they can reduce Wendy’s accuracy from 100% as shown in
Figure 5.6, to 50%, equivalent to pure guesswork as shown in Figure 5.5.
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6 STEGODOKU: DATA HIDING IN SUDOKU PUZZLES
Sudoku puzzles are 9×9 grids subdivided into nine 3×3 subgrids. Once solved, each
row, column, and subgrid of the board will contain the numbers 1 to 9 exactly once
each. When initially presented for solving, a Sudoku puzzle will have several cells
already filled in which should provide sufficient information for the player to fill in
the remaining cells using logical reasoning. The number of clues given is always at
least 17 and usually no more than 32. A valid Sudoku puzzle allows only one solution,
thus it is important that the provided clues do not permit more than one solution to
the puzzle to be found. Sudoku puzzles have been popular for many years and are
commonly found in print magazines and newspapers, as well as online and in apps
for smartphones and other devices. An example Sudoku puzzle is shown in Figure
6.1. A StegoDoku puzzle is a steganographic Sudoku puzzle which hides information
in the arrangement of numbers on the solved board as well as in the configuration of
the clues provided.
Figure 6.1. This example Sudoku puzzle has 26 clues. When solved,
each row, column, and 3x3 subgrid will have the numbers 1 - 9 each
exactly once.
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StegoDoku is an instance of steganography by cover synthesis. As outlined by
Fridrich in [81], steganography by cover synthesis describes information hiding meth-
ods which generate novel objects in such a way that the object itself encodes the
hidden data. A StegoDoku puzzle can therefore be thought of as an encoding of
the secret bitstring. However, unlike a typical cryptographic encoding, which would
generate a bitstring which appears to be random, a StegoDoku encoding generates
a bitstring which can be interpreted as a valid Sudoku puzzle. Other instances of
steganography by cover synthesis include mimic functions [28, 82], such as Spam-
mimic by McKellar (www.spammimic.com), and the NICETEXT system by Chapman
and Davida [30]. Both Spammimic and NICETEXT convert ciphertext, or any other
kind of data, to natural language text in order to hide the fact that cryptography is
in use. The text generated by Spammimic attempts to mimic the qualities of spam
email. NICETEXT employs the use of style and context templates to generate text
which mimics the style of a particular author or genre. StegoDoku can be used for
the same purpose, turning ciphertext into something which appears innocuous. In
this case, the ciphertext becomes a Sudoku puzzle.
In [36], Shirali-Shareza present a method for hiding approximately 18 bits of data
in a single row or column of a Sudoku board. This is accomplished by converting the
secret bits to a permutation of the digits 1 through 9. The solution to a previously
solved puzzle is then transformed so that the chosen row or column matches the
stego-permutation by replacing each instance on the board of the original digit with
the new digit from the stego-permutation. After transformation, the numbers in the
original clue locations are retained while the rest of the board is erased. The resulting
puzzle, with the same number and location of clues as the original puzzle, can be sent
via SMS text message to the recipient for decoding, which is accomplished by solving
the puzzle and converting whichever row or column contains the data to a bitstring
to recover the hidden bits. In order to know which row or column has the hidden
data, each cover message must also include a 2-digit “Sudoku board identifier” which
encodes the location of the hidden data: R0 means that the data is in row R, and 0C
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means the data is in column C. The first or last digit of the identifier must always
be zero since the method can only hide data in a single row or column, but not both.
This means that only 18 boards can be sent before an identifier has to be reused, and
only approximately 22 bits of information can be encoded by each message (18 bits
comes from the permutation and 4 bits come from the choice of row or column). We
now present a method which aims to utilize the entire capacity of a Sudoku puzzle,
and in doing so, eliminates the need for sending auxiliary information with every
puzzle while allowing an average of more than 100 bits to be encoded by each puzzle.
The contents of this chapter have been submitted for publication in 2015 as an article
in Designs, Codes and Cryptography [83].
6.1 Generating and Decoding StegoDoku Boards
The conceptually simplest approach to encoding secret data as a Sudoku board is
to map directly from the bits to the board. That is, to enumerate all Sudoku boards
and use the secret bits as the index into the list. There are 6670903752021072936960 ≈
272.5 valid Sudoku boards [84], of which 5472730538 ≈ 232.3496 are unique (not mu-
tations of other boards) [85]. Transforming one of the more than 5 billion unique
Sudoku boards into one of the more than 6 sextillion valid Sudoku boards can be
done efficiently, encoding approximately 40 bits in the specific combination of rota-
tion, mirroring, and permutation used. However, the time required to stream through
a list of 5 billion boards , or the memory required to index into such a list , makes
this approach impractical.
The above approach is impractical for steganography because it is impractical
for board generation in general. Yet, Sudoku puzzles are published constantly in
countless media all over the world, implying that Sudoku boards are generated with
similar frequency. In fact, generating a Sudoku board is simple. The standard method
for generating a Sudoku board is to start with a blank board and repeatedly select an
empty cell (at random, or in some predefined order) and set it to a random value until
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the board is uniquely solvable. If, by accident, the board ends up being unsolvable,
then the previous choice is thrown out and a new choice made. Bad choices are
backtracked until, eventually, the board is solvable.
To generate a StegoDoku board, we modify the standard random board generation
process so that we can control which numbers are chosen while creating the solved
board. Instead of choosing a number randomly, we use a secret bitstring to make the
choice. If a cell has n possible numbers from which to choose, or simply candidates,
we can hide ⌊log2(n)⌋ bits of information in the choice of which candidate is placed in
that cell. For example, if a cell has six candidates {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}, it can hide two bits.
If the next two bits of secret are 10, then we would set that cell to 5. The choice of 5
for this cell encodes the bitstring 10. The cells are filled in order of most-constrained
to least-constrained, from bottom-right to top-left. The procedure for encoding data
as a StegoDoku board is described in Algorithm 6. Once the solved StegoDoku board
has been found, it can be passed along to the puzzle-maker which removes clues in
order to create the final puzzle. The example Sudoku in Figure 6.1, once solved, is
actually a StegoDoku board.
If, while generating the StegoDoku board, the algorithm must backtrack because
previous choices caused the board to be unsolvable, some cells will have their capacity
reduced and their bitstring-to-candidate mapping changed. The algorithm handles
these cases by keeping track of previously set bits and backtracking the embedding
appropriately. Backtracking, because it changes the bitstring-to-candidate mapping
and reduces the capacity of a cell, will cause errors to appear in the extracted bits dur-
ing decoding. However, we show in Section 6.3 that using a good Sudoku solver and
proceeding in order of decreasing constraint on cells results in very few occurrences
of backtracking.
Decoding a StegoDoku board requires first solving the puzzle to obtain the solved
board. After the solved board is obtained, the process of generating the StegoDoku
board is reenacted. However, instead of looking to a secret bitstring to determine
which choice to make, we can look at the board itself to see which choice was actually
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made and, from that information, extract the bits which were hidden in that cell by
that choice. For example, if we see a cell has six candidates {2,4,5,6,7,9} and that the
cell contains the number 5, we know that the bitstring hidden there is 10. We know
this because there are six candidates, meaning there are two hidden bits, and the
choice from amongst those candidates was the third candidate, meaning the hidden
bits are the third choice from the set {00,01,10,11}. So, if a cell had eight candidates
and the second candidate was chosen, we know the hidden bits are 001. Proceeding
in the same order as is used for generating the board, all the steps taken to generate
the board can be reenacted and all the hidden bits extracted. The procedure for
decoding StegoDoku boards is shown in Algorithm 7.
6.1.1 Enhancements to StegoDoku Boards
We now propose and discuss two enhancements to the basic StegoDoku method
to increase both the capacity and security of steganographic Sudoku boards. As
presented above, the algorithm only makes use of a subset of candidates when hiding
bits. For example, a cell which has six candidates can hide two bits, which means
four candidates are available for embedding, but the other two will never be chosen.
This has implications for the detectability of the stego-boards, but it also means
that there is some capacity remaining in the selection which can be squeezed out
to increase the number of bits which can be hidden in a StegoDoku board. One
way of accessing this extra capacity, inspired by the ideas to use compression for
steganography proposed by Anderson in [86] and Sallee in [21], is to assign a code
to every candidate, e.g. by using a Huffman code. Then, the next several bits of
the secret can be “decoded” into a candidate. For example, with six candidates, the
codes could be {00,01,100,101,110,111}. If the next three bits of the message are
111, the last candidate will be chosen. This allows three bits to be sent in a situation
where only two bits would have been sent without using coding. We shall call the
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Algorithm 6: CreateStegoDokuBoard.
Input: Sudoku board board, bitstring mssg
Data: global Sudoku board thisBoard
Output: True if a solved board is found
if board is solved then
return True;
cell ← the next cell in board;
c← list of candidates for cell;
b← False;
repeat
if c is empty then
return False;
cap← ⌊log2(c.length)⌋;
if cap > 0 then
n← decimal value of mssg[0..cap− 1];
else
n← 0;
num← the n-th element of c, which is then removed;
boardCopy ← copy of board;
set cell in boardCopy to num;
solve boardCopy as much as possible without guessing;
b← CreateStegoDoku(boardCopy,mssg[cap..end]);
if b is True then
set cell in thisBoard to num;




Input: A solved Sudoku board solvedBoard
Output: The bitstring extracted from solvedBoard
board← a blank Sudoku board;
mssg ← empty string;
while board is not completely solved do
cell ← the next cell in board;
c← list of candidates for cell;
cap← ⌊log2(c.length)⌋;
if cap > 0 then
num← value of cell in solvedBoard;
n← index of num in c;
m← n converted to a cap-bit binary string;
append m to end of mssg;
solve board as much as possible without guessing;
return mssg;
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version of StegoDoku that uses Huffman coding StegoDoku-H, to differentiate it from
the basic StegoDoku algorithm.
The basic StegoDoku algorithm will not choose uniformly from all candidates for
each cell. Some candidates will never be chosen: the 9 in the first cell, the last
three candidates in the third cell, and so on. This not only limits the capacity
of the StegoDoku board, but also presents a way for an adversary to distinguish
between authentic Sudoku boards and StegoDoku boards. Authentic Sudoku boards
will have a 9 in the first cell with probability
1
9
. StegoDoku boards will never have
a 9 in the first cell. In the third cell, authentic boards with have one of the last
three candidates with probability
3
7
. A StegoDoku board will never have any of
the last three candidates in the third cell. Thus, a simple technique for detecting
StegoDoku would be as follows: while reenacting the construction of the board, count
the number of times that an “out-of-bounds” candidate is chosen. An “out-of-bounds”
candidate is one which StegoDoku could not have chosen because its index is equal
to or greater than 2⌊log2(ncandidates)⌋, the largest power of two less than the number of
candidates. If the number of these out-of-bounds choices is greater than zero, the
board could not have been generated by StegoDoku, and is therefore clean. There
will be no false negatives. On the other hand, if there are no such choices, the board is
much more likely to have been generated by StegoDoku than by an authentic Sudoku
board generator. The probability that an authentic board contains zero out-of-bounds
choices is 2−10.1852±0.0248 with 99.999% confidence, so the probability of a false positive
is very near to
1
1131
. Taking the detection accuracy to be the 1 minus the average of
type-1 and type-2 error rates, this detection technique has an expected accuracy of
over 99.9%.
This simple detection technique can be defeated by permuting the candidate set
before choosing which candidate to place in each cell. If Alice and Bob share a
secret random number generator seed, then they can synchronize their permutations
so that the permutation Alice used for each cell during embedding can be reproduced
exactly by Bob during decoding. By using permutations in this way, Alice and Bob
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can prevent the adversary from being able to distinguish between StegoDoku boards
and authentic Sudoku boards. We shall call the version of StegoDoku that uses
permutations StegoDoku-P.
These two enhanced versions of StegoDoku, StegoDoku-H and StegoDoku-P, can
be combined to make a StegoDoku generator, which we shall call StegoDoku-HP, that,
for each cell, permutes the candidate set before using Huffman coding to decode the
secret bits into the choice for that cell. This StegoDoku-HP should have the increased
capacity of StegoDoku-H and the increased security of StegoDoku-P.
6.2 Generating and Decoding StegoDoku Puzzles
An additional source of capacity that has not been utilized anywhere else in the
literature is the configuration of clues that make up the Sudoku puzzle. In this section
we present methods for exploiting the steganographic capacity of the configuration of
clues that make up a Sudoku puzzle.
Perhaps the most straightforward method to make a Sudoku puzzle is to start
with a solved board and remove clues at random until it is not possible to remove
another clue without making the puzzle non-uniquely solvable. This method results
in puzzles with an average of 25.38 clues, which is solidly within the standard range
of 17 to 32 clues. However, this method is not adaptable to work as a steganographic
encoder by simply replacing the random numbers by secret bits. Given a puzzle,
Bob cannot determine the order in which Alice removed numbers to make the puzzle.
That is, the process is not reversible and so Bob cannot extract bits hidden in this
way.
What is needed is for the order in which clues are removed to be made irrelevant.
To do this, Alice can map her secret bits to a number and then map that number to a
combination of clues. However, there is no guarantee that the set of clues generated
will result in a solvable puzzle. Thus, while this method would correct the decoding
problem for the clue configuration, it would also make the puzzle potentially non-
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uniquely solvable. The additional solutions to the puzzle, potentially very many of
them, would result in damage to the bitstring hidden in the board since Bob has no
a priori method for distinguishing between the solutions.
The middle ground, where Alice can generate a clue configuration which maintains
the correct unique solution to the puzzle and Bob can correctly decode the clue
configuration, can be achieved in several ways. One way is for Alice to enumerate
valid puzzles, starting with 17-clue puzzles and stopping after 32-clue puzzles, and
to each puzzle assign an increasing index, 0 for the first valid puzzle and some n
for the last puzzle. Then, to encode her secret bits as a clue configuration she need
only convert her secret bits to a number between 0 and n and select the puzzle at
the corresponding index. Bob can decode the puzzle by re-enumerating the puzzles,
determining the index of the puzzle chosen by Alice and converting that number
to its corresponding bitstring (e.g. an ⌊log2 n⌋-bit string, or the Huffman code for
the index). However, this method is very expensive in terms of computation time
since there are an exponential number of candidate puzzles that must be checked for
validity. To get an idea of how long such an enumeration would take, consider that
in January of 2012 it was announced by Gary McGuire that an exhaustive search
of all 16-clue Sudoku puzzle had been completed, finding that no 16-clue puzzle was
uniquely solvable, therefore proving that 17 clues is the minimum number of clues
required to solve a Sudoku board. This exhaustive search took 7.1 million core hours,
from January to December of 2011, to complete [85]. To date, only 49151 17-clue
puzzles are known, curated by Gordon Royle at The University of Western Australia.
But, this number is the total over all boards. The record for a single board is 29
17-clue puzzles. Verifying this count for that one board took nearly a week with
McGuire’s state-of-the-art software running on a supercomputer.
Since the enumeration approach is so computationally expensive, an alternative
technique is required in order for exploitation of the clue configuration to be feasible.
We now propose a method for encoding bits in the clue configuration of a Sudoku
puzzle which is much faster than the enumeration approach outlined above.
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We start by constructing a valid puzzle quickly using a deterministic greedy heuris-
tic approach. We then encode secret bits as a combination of extra clues. Since these
clues are not necessary for solving the puzzle, they are redundant information. To
offset this addition of unnecessary clues (at least from the perspective of solving the
puzzle), we remove as many of the initial clues as possible. Since the information is
hidden by the extra clues, removing initial clues does not affect the secret bits. At the
receiver’s end of the channel, recovering the secret bits from the puzzle starts with
solving the puzzle. From a solved board, the same initial clue set can be computed.
The extra clues are then identified and decoded to a numerical value representing the
combination of extra clues added to the puzzle. This number is then converted to a
bitstring, which completes the extraction of the secret from the puzzle. The board
can be processed independently to extract the bits hidden in the board itself.
6.2.1 Deterministic Greedy Heuristic Puzzle Making
In making the initial clue set, Alice’s goal is to find the smallest set of clues that
makes the puzzle solvable. This is because the capacity of the puzzle comes from
the choice of combination of clues from those not included in the initial clue set.
The more clues there are to choose from, the higher the capacity. Finding an exact
minimal initial clue set requires enumeration of hitting sets, which we have ruled
out as being too computationally expensive for practical use in a stego-system. The
straightforward puzzle-making algorithm described above, where clues are removed
until no more can be safely removed, is one method to find an approximate minimal
initial clue set efficiently. However, we have found that the following approach results
in a smaller initial clue set.
Our method for constructing the initial clue set uses a heuristic greedy approach.
Starting from a blank puzzle, each candidate clue receives a score which is computed
as the sum of the number of candidates for each cell of the board given that the








The cell which minimizes the number of candidates remaining on the board is
selected as the next clue to add to the puzzle. Ties between candidates which have the
same score are broken in a deterministic manner so that the receiver can reconstruct
perfectly the exact initial clue set that the sender created. This process is repeated,
adding a single clue to the puzzle each time, until the puzzle is uniquely solvable.
This method generates puzzles with an average of 23.55 clues.
Once the puzzle is uniquely solvable, the secret bits are added by mapping them
to a number and then mapping that number to a combination of the cells which were
not selected for the initial clue set. For example, if 24 clues were chosen for the
initial clue set, there are 57 clues remaining which can be added to the puzzle. The
particular combination of which clues are added will encode the secret bits. Let M
be the maximum number of clues that the final puzzle is allowed to have and N be
the number of clues in the initial clue set. Then, the total number of combinations
from which the extra clue set can be chosen is given by the sum shown in Equation











Mapping a number to a configuration of clues is accomplished by using the set of
combinatorial number systems of degree less than or equal to M −N . The reason we
can uniquely map numbers to combinations, and back again, is that every number
can be expressed uniquely as the sum of k combinations [87]. That is, every number






















corresponds to all k-combinations of the numbers
{0, 1, . . . n − 1}. Since the correspondence does not depend on the size of n, the
mapping is a bijection from N to the k-combinations from N and is therefore invertible.
To map a number to its corresponding k-combination, we use the algorithm shown
in Algorithm 8. For each element of the combination, ck is chosen to be the max-










, the number of
k-combinations of ck objects, and k is decremented by one. This process is repeated
until k = 0, at which time the values ck which have been computed are returned as
the desired combination: {ck, ck−1, . . . , c1}.
Algorithm 8: MapNumberToCombination.
Input: natural numbers n and k
Output: k-combination corresponding to n








ck ← ck + 1;







k ← k − 1;
return {ck, . . . , c2, c1};
As an example, take the value 12 and convert it to its corresponding 4-combination.






the table below, we can see that this value is c4 = 5.












and k by 1 to get n = 12−5 = 7 and k = 4−1 = 3. Then





≤ 7. We can see from the table below that this
value is c3 = 4.











and k by 1 to get n = 7− 4 = 3 and k = 3− 1 = 2. Then





≤ 3. We can see from the table below that this
value is c2 = 3.











and k by 1 to get n = 3− 3 = 0 and k = 2− 1 = 1. Since
n = 0, we know that c1 must be c1 = 1− 1 = 0.
Thus, the 4-combination at index 12 is {5, 4, 3, 0}. Indeed, this can be verified by
enumerating the 4-combinations up to index 12, starting at index 0.
The above process applies once we know a specific k to use. The value to use is
the largest value of k such that the inequality in Equation 6.3 holds. This allows us
to use not only the capacity of the k-combinations, but also that of all combinations









Mapping from a particular k-combination back to the corresponding number n
is even simpler than mapping from n to the corresponding k-combination. Given a
particular k-combination c, we can recompute n by using Equation 6.4. The final value
for n is just the index of the k-combination as computed directly from the elements



















6.3 Analysis and Discussion
In this section, we conduct experiments to analyze and discuss the proposed Ste-
goDoku system in terms of the decoding error caused by backtracking, embedding
capacity, and security against a passive adversary. Two-tailed p-values are reported
for comparisons between results obtained from different algorithms and parameters.
A p-value of less than 0.005 is required in order for the difference to be considered
statistically significant. The p-value indicates the probability, under the null hypoth-
esis that the means are equal, of observing a larger difference than the one actually
observed.
6.3.1 Backtracking Error
To determine which ordering cells results in the fewest occurrences of backtracking,
we present the results of an experiment which measured the number of times the
generation process backtracked when using each of several possible cell orderings.
For each cell ordering scheme, a sample set of 10000 boards was generated and the
total number of times the generator backtracked for each board was recorded. The
observed means and standard deviations of the backtracking count for each scheme
are shown in Table 6.1. The schemes with an asterisk (∗) denote that at least one of
the trials for that scheme had a board which backtracked more than 100 times, an
upper limit set so that trials would terminate after not too long. The difference in
the resulting amount of backtracking between “first”, meaning the first satisfying cell
found in top-left to bottom-right order, and “last”, meaning the last satisfying cell
found in top-left to bottom-right order (equivalently: the first satisfying cell found
in bottom-right to top-left order), is statistically significant only in the case where
the amount of constraint is ignored. The difference between “inner”, meaning the
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Table 6.1.
Number of backtracks during generation (N = 10000).
Ordering µ σ p-value
First (Top-Left to Bottom-Right) 0.7563 2.5168
7.4896× 10−12
Last (Bottom-Right to Top-Left) 0.5562 1.4803
First Most Constrained 0.0055 0.0740
0.7772
Last Most Constrained 0.0058 0.0759
First Least Constrained∗ 49.6141 48.1968
0.2124
Last Least Constrained∗ 50.4647 48.2672
Inner (Outward Spiral from Center)∗ 7.1325 22.8575
≈ 0
Outer (Inward Spiral from Bottom-Right) 0.0842 0.3486
Inner Most Constrained 0.0142 0.1470
≈ 0
Outer Most Constrained 0.0373 0.2152
Inner Least Constrained∗ 46.9062 47.9748
0.2496
Outer Least Constrained∗ 46.1262 47.8396
Random∗ 12.9683 31.6098 –
first satisfying cell found in an anticlockwise spiral originating in the center of the
board, and “outer”, meaning the last satisfying cell found in an anticlockwise spiral
originating in the center of the board (equivalently: the first satisfying cell found in
a clockwise spiral originating in the bottom-right corner), is statistically significant
except in the case of least constrained. It is clear from the table that proceeding in
order of decreasing constraint results in the least amount of backtracking, the best
results being obtained by proceeding in order of last most constrained.
The motivation behind minimizing the amount of backtracking is to minimize the
decoding error caused by backtracking. To determine the impact of backtracking
on decoding accuracy, a sample set of 10000 StegoDoku boards was generated and
the decoding error measured for each board. The decoding error is computed as the
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Table 6.2.
Backtracking error (N = 10000).
Algorithm n µn (%) µ10000 (%) σ10000 (%)
Random 39 – – –
StegoDoku 42 6.2398 0.0262 0.4376
StegoDoku-H 44 5.8010 0.0255 0.4118
StegoDoku-P 43 6.5435 0.0281 0.4736
StegoDoku-HP 39 6.3569 0.0245 0.4477
Hamming distance between the original secret bitstring and the extracted bitstring,
trimming the longer of the two so that both have equal length. The results of this
experiment are shown in Table 6.2. The “n” column shows how many boards, out
of the 10000, had an error during decoding (for “Random”, the authentic Sudoku
generator, this is just the number of boards which required backtracking). The “µn”
column shows the mean decoding error for the n boards which had errors during
decoding, as a percentage of the length of the bitstring. The “µ10000” column shows
the mean decoding error, as a percentage of the length of the bitstring, over all 10000
boards, and the “σ10000” column shows the standard deviation of the decoding error.
Because these error levels correspond to less than a single incorrect bit out of 3559
bits, we claim that these levels of error are all acceptable. There is no statistically
significant difference between any of the error rates (p > 0.5806).
6.3.2 Puzzle Generation
Since the StegoDoku system proposes to hide secret data in Sudoku puzzles, it
is reasonable to find out how long it takes StegoDoku to generate a puzzle which
encodes some arbitrary secret bitstring. Making a StegoDoku is a 2-step process:
generate a board, then generate a clue configuration. The total time required to
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Table 6.3.
Sudoku board generation time (N = 10000).






make a StegoDoku puzzle is therefore equal to the time required to generate the
board plus the time required to generate the clue configuration.
To determine the time required to generate a board, 10000 boards were generated
by each algorithm using random secret bits and the elapsed time to generate each
board was recorded. The results are shown in Table 6.3. The difference in genera-
tion time between the authentic generator and all four StegoDoku algorithms is not
statistically significant (p ≈ 0.43).
To determine the time required to generate a clue configuration, 10000 random
boards were generated and the elapsed time to generate a clue configuration, which
encoded some random secret bits, was recorded. Each generated clue configuration
may have between 17 and 32 clues, and so, in addition to data about the time required
to generate clue configurations, data about the final number of clues provided was
also collected. The results are shown in Figure 6.2, where the mean observed puzzle
generation time has been plotted as a function of the number of clues provided in
the final puzzle. Puzzles that end up with more than 25 clues are generated quickly.
Puzzles that end up with fewer clues, on the other hand, take much more time to
generate because the puzzle maker must search a very large space of sets of clues that
can be removed to find the largest set. A 99.999% confidence interval for the mean
puzzle generation time overall is 30.7368± 0.065 seconds.
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Figure 6.2. The mean observed puzzle generation time as a function
of the number of clues provided in the final puzzle. No puzzles with
fewer than 21 clues were found.
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6.3.3 Capacity
Since boards and puzzles are treated independently in StegoDoku, the total capac-
ity of StegoDoku is the sum of the capacity of the board and the capacity of the puzzle.
There are 6670903752021072936960 ≈ 6.6710 × 1021 valid Sudoku boards [84]. As-
suming all boards are equally likely, the theoretical expected embedding capacity for
a Sudoku board is therefore log2(6670903752021072936960)≈ 72.5 bits. To estimate
the actual embedding capacity of StegoDoku boards, 10000 boards were generated,
using random bitstrings as the secret data, and the number of bits hidden in each
board was recorded. Generating 104 boards, while only a small fraction of the more
than 1021 possible boards, is nonetheless sufficient to provide an extremely tight con-
fidence interval for the embedding capacity. Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of the
observed embedding capacities. It can be seen in the figure that using permutations
has a negligible effect on embedding capacity, but using Huffman coding results in a
significant increase in embedding capacity. The mean and standard deviation of the
embedding capacity for each algorithm is reported in Table 6.4. There is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the two versions which use permutations and the
two which do not. However, the difference when using Huffman coding, an increase
of 8.722 and 8.69 bits for StegoDoku and StegoDoku-P, respectively, is statistically
significant (p ≈ 0). StegoDoku and StegoDoku-P both have an average embedding
capacity of slightly more than 61 bits, which is approximately 85.6% of the theoret-
ical expected embedding capacity. StegoDoku-H and StegoDoku-HP both have an
average embedding capacity of just over 70 bits, which is approximately 96.7% of the
theoretical expected embedding capacity.
To estimate the actual embedding capacity of StegoDoku clue configurations,
10000 clue configurations were generated for random Sudoku boards, using random
bitstrings as the secret data, and the number of bits hidden in each clue configu-
ration was recorded. The observed mean and standard deviation of the embedding
capacity of the clue configurations generated by the puzzle maker are shown in Table
103
Table 6.4.
StegoDoku embedding capacity (N = 10000).
Algorithm µ (bits) σ (bits) 99.999% CI
StegoDoku 61.3034 1.6856 µ± 0.0745
StegoDoku-H 70.0254 2.7015 µ± 0.1193
StegoDoku-P 61.4029 1.6774 µ± 0.0741
StegoDoku-HP 70.0929 2.6539 µ± 0.1172
PuzzleMaker 32.4327 3.0920 µ± 0.1366
6.4. From these results, we can see that the expected capacity of a StegoDoku puzzle
(board plus clue configuration) will be approximately 92.7 bits, and for StegoDoku-H
the expected capacity will be approximately 102.5 bits. Permutations do not effect
the capacity so StegoDoku-P and StegoDoku-HP will have the same total capacities
as StegoDoku and StegoDoku-H, respectively. To verify these expectations, 10000
StegoDoku-H boards were generated and a clue configuration was generated for each.
The observed total capacacity of the puzzle was recorded. The observed distribution
of total embedding capacities is shown in Figure 6.4.
6.3.4 Security
It must be assumed, by Kerckhoffs’s principle, that the adversary knows the sys-
tem. Therefore, hiding plaintext with a known structure will be detectable since the
adversary can decode each Sudoku board and test whether the result contains data
with the known structure. Authentic Sudoku boards, which are not hiding data,
should produce random bits, which can be distinguished from plaintext data.
An experiment was conducted to test whether Sudoku boards which are hiding
structured data can be distinguished from clean Sudoku boards by looking at the
decoded message. A test set was generated containing 500 random clean Sudoku
boards and 500 random stego-boards, each hiding a random printable ASCII encoded
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Figure 6.3. The distribution of embedding capacities for the four pro-
posed StegoDoku board generators. The effect on embedding capacity
of using permutations during embedding is negligible. The effect of
using Huffman coding with StegoDoku and StegoDoku-P, however,
is a statistically significant (p ≈ 0) increase of 8.722 and 8.69 bits,
respectively.
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Figure 6.4. The distribution of embedding capacities for the Ste-
goDoku puzzle maker, using the StegoDoku-H board generator. A
99.999% confidence interval for the mean embedding capacity is
105.5425± 0.0016 bits. The minimum observed capacity was 93 bits,
the maximum was 118 bits.
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message. Then, each board was passed through the decoder and the result analyzed
to determine if all the output bytes fell into the range of printable ASCII characters,
between 32 and 126, inclusive. If more than some threshold number were found to
be outside that range, the board was classified as clean, otherwise it was classified
as StegoDoku. For StegoDoku and StegoDoku-H, the results show that the detector,
using a threshold of zero, can distinguish between authentic Sudoku boards and stego-
boards with 100% accuracy, where accuracy is computed as 1 minus the average of
type-1 and type-2 error rates.
Encrypting the secret bits, or otherwise obfuscating them, before hiding should
preclude this attack since ciphertext should generally be indistinguishable from ran-
dom bits. We demonstrate this by conducting the above experiment using StegoDoku-
P and StegoDoku-HP, both of which use permutations to shuffle the candidate sets
during embedding. The permutations act as a cipher and scramble the data as it
is being hidden. The results of the experiment show that the detector has 50% ac-
curacy against both StegoDoku-P and StegoDoku-HP. The decoder requires a secret
key, which is used as the seed for the random number generator which controls the
permutations. Without this secret key, the decoder can only extract garbage. Thus,
this detector is unable to distinguish between a StegoDoku-P or StegoDoku-HP board
and an authentic Sudoku board. Similarly, when random bits, representing cipher-
text, are hidden in a Sudoku board using StegoDoku or StegoDoku-H, the detector
can only achieve 50% accuracy using the test for structured data. This is because
random bits are very unlikely to appear to be structured data, so the detector will
classify all boards as clean when only 50% of them are actually clean, resulting in
50% accuracy.
As mentioned previously in the motivation for enhancements to StegoDoku, the
basic StegoDoku algorithm cannot use all candidates to hide data. By observing the
choices made during the generation process, a detector could determine if the source
is likely to be authentic (truly random boards) or steganographic (the StegoDoku
generator). Because both Huffman coding and permutations make it so that any
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candidate is able to be selected, this approach will not work when Huffman coding
or permutations are being used. An experiment was conducted to test whether Ste-
goDoku boards which are hiding random bits, as an analogue for ciphertext, can be
distinguished from clean Sudoku boards by looking at the choices made when mak-
ing the board. If the detector finds that no out-of-bounds candidates were selected
for the board, then it will be classified as dirty. A board with at least one out-of-
bounds candidate will be classified as clean. The test set consisted of 500 clean boards
and 500 stego-boards. The detector was 99.9% accurate at distinguishing between
authentic boards and dirty boards generated by StegoDoku. However, because Huff-
man coding and permutations both allow all candidates to be potentially chosen, the
detector’s accuracy on StegoDoku-H, StegoDoku-P, and StegoDoku-HP was 50%, or
pure guesswork.
While Huffman coding does allow for all candidates to be potentially chosen, thus
defeating the out-of-bounds candidate-counter detector, it does so with predictable
probabilities for each candidate. For example, in a cell with nine candidates, such as
the first cell, all nine candidates are possible, but, due to the Huffman coding, the
1 and the 2 will only be chosen with probability 1/16. The other seven candidates
will each be chosen with probability 1/8. On the other hand, in an authentic Sudoku
board, a cell with all nine candidates will have each candidate in equal proportion,
each will be chosen with probability 1/9. A similar analysis for cells with other
numbers of candidates shows that Huffman coding results in some candidates being
chosen less, or more, often in a stego-board than they would be in an authentic
board. By comparing the likelihood that a given board was generated by the authentic
generator to the likelihood that the same board was generated by the StegoDoku-H
generator, a detector can determine whether the board is more or less likely to be
authentic, and therefore clean, than to have been generated by StegoDoku-H, and
therefore dirty. The likelihood P (board | A) that an observed board was generated
by the authentic generator A is computed as
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where C(c) is the set of candidates for cell c at the time when that cell was set.
Likewise, the likelihood P (Board | S) of the observed board having been generated
by the StegoDoku-H algorithm is:






where lc is the length of the Huffman code for the value chosen at cell c, given the
candidate set C(c). Taking the ratio of the log-likelihoods yields
ρ =
log(P (board | S))









Because P (board | S) and P (board | A) are always less than 1, when ρ < 1,
P (board | A) < P (board | S) and thus it is more likely that the board was generated
by the StegoDoku-H generator. If ρ > 1, P (board | A) > P (board | S) and thus the
board is more likely to have been generated by the authentic generator. When ρ = 1,
the two generators are equally likely, but the detector will classify the board as dirty,
opting to err on the side of over-detection.
A test set of 500 authentic Sudoku boards and 500 stego-boards was generated
and used to measure the detection accuracy of the detector. For each board, if
ρ ≤ 1, the board is classified as dirty, otherwise the board is classified as clean.
This detector achieves accuracies of 39.3% on StegoDoku, 78% on StegoDoku-H,
51.5% on StegoDoku-P, and 52.5% on StegoDoku-HP. The accuracy against basic
StegoDoku is due to the fact the basic StegoDoku does not use Huffman coding, and
so the likelihood P (Board | S) is low, causing an increase of false negatives and a
decrease of true positives (the false positives and true negatives are unchanged). If
the adversary knows for a fact that Alice and Bob are using plain StegoDoku, she
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can flip her decision to obtain an accuracy of 60.7%. Stego-boards generated using
permutations remain indistinguishable from authentic boards.
By increasing the number of boards seen by the detector before making a de-
cision, the detection accuracy of the detector is improved for both StegoDoku and
StegoDoku-H. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 6.5. As the num-
ber of boards increases, the accuracy against StegoDoku improves to 50%, while the
accuracy against StegoDoku-H improves to greater than 99%. However, stego-boards
generated using permutations still remain indistinguishable from authentic boards
regardless of the number of boards observed.
If the secret data is too short to generate an entire Sudoku board, then the Ste-
goDoku algorithms will pad the secret with 0 bits until it is long enough. For short
secrets, less than 50-60 bits or approximately 15% of board capacity, the message
extracted from the board will have several padding bits. These bits can be used to
distinguish between stego-boards and authentic Sudoku boards, which will very likely
not have several identical bits at the end of the garbage extracted from them. By
looking at the last ten bits of the extracted message and classifying the board as dirty
if they are all the same and clean otherwise, a detection accuracy of more than 99%
is achieved against both StegoDoku and StegoDoku-H. However, when the hidden
data is long enough to take up the full capacity of the board, this method achieves
an accuracy of approximately 50% against all four StegoDoku variants. Padding with
random bits will also decrease this method’s detection accuracy to 50%.
The detection accuracy results for all the board-based detectors described in this
section are shown in Table 6.5. From the table, it can be seen clearly that StegoDoku
and StegoDoku-H are distinguishable from authentic Sudoku boards with very high
accuracy. It can also be seen that StegoDoku-P and StegoDoku-HP, because they
use a secret key, are indistinguishable from authentic Sudoku boards. If the key
used for doing the permutations and padding is known by the adversary, then she
can distinguish authentic boards from boards generated by both StegoDoku-P and
StegoDoku-HP with that same accuracy as if permutations had not been used.
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Figure 6.5. The detection accuracy of the Huffman-likelihood detec-
tor. As the number of boards per example increases, the accuracy
against the systems which do not use permutations increases. Near





Detector SD SD-H SD-P SD-HP
Structure 100.0% 100.0% 50.0% 50.0%
encrypted 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
OoB Candidates 99.9% 49.9% 50.0% 49.9%
Huffman (n = 1) 38.9% 78.0% 50.9% 50.7%
(n = 2) 41.8% 85.4% 50.1% 50.8%
(n = 5) 46.7% 93.4% 49.6% 49.4%
(n = 7) 48.6% 97.5% 51.3% 50.6%
(n = 10) 49.0% 98.3% 49.5% 49.7%
Padding (short) 99.9% 99.7% 49.9% 50.1%
(long) 50.1% 50.0% 50.2% 49.9%
(random) 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
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The clue configurations may also give information that can be used to distinguish
authentic Sudoku puzzles from steganographic stego-puzzles. For example, authentic
puzzles are very likely symmetric in their clue configuration while stego-puzzles are
very likely not. Therefore, if a detector were to classify symmetric puzzles as clean
and asymmetric puzzles as dirty, it would have near perfect accuracy. That is, until
the stego-puzzle maker was modified to generate symmetric puzzles. This modifica-
tion would reduce the capacity of the puzzles somewhat, but would completely defeat
the symmetry-based detector. Another potential avenue for detection based on clue
configuration is to use the number of clues provided. The stego-puzzle maker adds
more clues than are necessary for the puzzle to be solvable and therefore stego-puzzles
may have a greater expected number of clues than an authentic puzzle, even though
effort is made to reduce the number of clues actually provided. The detection utility
of this feature can be reduced by modifying the stego-puzzle maker to generate puz-
zles with fewer clues. In the extreme, any clue configuration-based detector will be
defeated by a stego-puzzle which is not actually hiding any data in the clue config-
uration, but only in the board. Finally, given that the StegoDoku system is known
to the adversary, it is possible for the adversary to learn a signature for its generated
clue configurations, both clean and dirty, if the clue configurations are generated de-
terministically. Therefore, if the clue configuration will not be used for data hiding,
then it should be randomly generated. The efficacy of these approaches and the effect
on the embedding capacity of the countermeasures designed to defeat them require
further study that we propose to conduct in future work.
6.4 Conclusion
StegoDoku, a method for steganography by cover synthesis which uses Sudoku
puzzles, has been presented and empirically analyzed. Recognizing that the basic
algorithm did not fully exploit the capacity of Sudoku boards and that it resulted
in a detectable signature, two enhancements to the basic StegoDoku algorithm were
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proposed to improve both capacity and security: a Huffman code to map secret bits to
candidates and a secret key to control permutations of candidates during embedding.
The StegoDoku system was analyzed in terms of the decoding error caused by
backtracking, efficiency of generation, embedding capacity, and security against a
passive adversary. In the analysis, it was shown that using Huffman coding during
embedding increases capacity by an average of 8.722 bits over the average capacity
obtained when not using Huffman coding, and does so without increasing the back-
tracking error. It was also shown that permuting the candidate set has a negligible
effect on both capacity and backtracking error. Four steganalytic methods were pro-
posed and analyzed. In accordance with Kerckhoffs’s principle, it was assumed that
the adversary knows the StegoDoku system, including the Huffman codes and per-
mutation method. However, the adversary does not know the key. The use of the
secret key to permute the candidate sets during the embedding process renders the
resulting stego-boards indistinguishable from randomly generated authentic Sudoku
boards. If the key value ever becomes known to the adversary, then she can achieve
the same level of accuracy as if permutations had not been used.
For the methods without a secret key, StegoDoku and StegoDoku-H, testing the
extracted message for a known encoding scheme, such as ASCII, resulted in 100%
classification accuracy. When the secret was encrypted before being hidden, this
detection method fails and can do no better than 50% accuracy, equivalent to guessing.
By taking advantage of the way the basic StegoDoku algorithm selects candidates
for cells, it was shown that boards generated by the StegoDoku algorithm can be
distinguished from authentic Sudoku boards with 99.9% accuracy by checking for the
use of out-of-bounds candidates during generation. However, the same method is
unable to distinguish between authentic boards and boards generated by StegoDoku-
H. Accurate detection of boards generated by StegoDoku-H was achieved by a method
which compared the likelihood that a set of boards were all generated by StegoDoku-
H with the likelihood that they were all generated by an authentic generator and
classified the set based on which likelihood was greater. For a single board, this
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technique achieves 78% accuracy. As the number of boards observed before making
a decision increases, so too does the classification accuracy, becoming nearly perfect
after observing 8 or 9 boards. Finally, stego-boards which are hiding messages which
take up less than 85% of the available capacity can be detected with greater than 99%
accuracy by checking for padding at the end of the extracted message. This detector
is defeated, however, by using random padding or by sending a long enough message
to take up the full capacity of the board so that padding is not required.
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7 TIC-TAC-STEGO: COVERT CHANNELS IN COMBINATORIAL GAMES
A combinatorial game is a two-player game with perfect information and no chance
moves [88]. Chess and Go are two examples of combinatorial games which have al-
ready been identified by other authors as being capable of supporting covert channels.
Desoky and Younis [27] and Lange [26] present schemes for covert communcation via
chess. Hernandez-Castro et al. present a general methodology for steganography in
games and apply it to the game of Go [41]. However, these papers do not address
the possibility that the games can be played naturally (as if by a human) and still
transmit information.
The motivation for researching covert channels in games comes not only from
the possibility of such channels, but also from the advantages which can be gained by
exploiting them. For instance, Murdoch and Zielinski conducted a study which proved
that a covert channel in the game of Connect Four could be used to collude with other
players for the purposes of winning a league-style tournament [40]. However, there is
no reason to believe that the aim of colluding through a game should be limited to
winning a tournament of that game.
In this chapter, the general task of exploiting covert channels in combinatorial
games is approached by examining the game of Tic-tac-toe. For ease of exposition,
a standard framework for studying covert channels, known as the Prisoners’ Prob-
lem [89] is drawn upon. In Section 7.1, the initial conditions of Alice, Bob, and
Wendy’s situations are presented along with Tic-Tac-Stego, a general methodology
of exploiting covert channels in combinatorial games. The methodology is demon-
strated in Section 7.2 by applying it to the game of Tic-tac-toe. Experimental results
on the capacity and security of the Tic-tac-toe stego-system are presented in Section
7.4. Section 7.5 mentions other games which have not been covered in the existing
literature to which the general theory can be easily applied. Section 7.6 concludes the
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chapter with a summary. A portion of this chapter was presented and published in
the Proceedings of the International Workshop on Distributed Simulation and Online
Gaming in 2012 [90].
7.1 Tic-Tac-Stego Methodology
Alice and Bob are engaged in a series of communications in which they are playing
a two-player game, likely more than once. The channel is public but trusted. Wendy
is a passive adversary who observes all communication between Alice and Bob looking
for messages which contain secret information. Alice and Bob do not want Wendy
to learn their secret, but messages which appear to be encrypted are prohibited on
public channels. So, Alice and Bob decide to use steganography to hide their en-
crypted communication. Messages containing the game data may not be the only
communication they send and receive, but such messages are sufficient for Alice and
Bob to exchange information covertly. Wendy’s task is to distinguish between when
Alice or Bob are hiding information (covert channel usages) and when they are not
(authentic channel usages).
In [41], Hernandez-Castro et al. describe an approach to hiding data in games
which is built upon in this work. Each player has a set of strategies which specify the
move that player should make, given the action sequence leading up to that player’s
turn. There may be multiple strategies defined for any given action sequence, allowing
a player to choose between a set of moves. The set of moves is assumed to be ordered
according to the expected payoff of the move.
Under typical playing conditions, each player is expected to respond to the given
action sequence with the best move from their set of strategies. However, the selection
of a specific move from the set of all possible moves can be used to send information
to the other player or an observer. Assuming candidate moves are equally likely, a
player could send log2(N) bits of data per move, where N is the number of options
available to the player for that move.
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Tic-Tac-Stego is a general methodology for covert communication in games and
is a special case of a more general technique for generating steganographic objects,
which Fridrich calls steganography by cover synthesis in [81, section 4.2]. The idea
behind it is actually very simple: whenever there is a choice between two or more
options, there is capacity to send information using that decision. In Tic-Tac-Stego,
the cover being generated is a sequence of moves in a combinatorial game. The
maximum capacity for each turn is achieved when every legal move is included in the
set of candidate moves. However, not every legal move is a good move, and some
legal moves are positively bad. The distinction between good moves and bad moves
is made using a strategy. Formally, a strategy is a mapping from board states (or
histories) to a subset of the legal moves for that board state. This subset is the
candidate move set, but might also be referred to as the set of good moves. Figure
7.1 depicts the Tic-Tac-Stego encoding and decoding methodologies.
Encoding bits of secret information works as follows. Alice starts with some board
state and uses her strategy to determine the set of good moves. To each of these
moves she assigns a bit sequence. She uses some bits of her secret information to
select a move from the candidate move set. Specifically, she selects the move whose
bit sequence matches the bits she took from her secret. She applies the move to
the board and sends the updated board to Bob, her opponent and communication
partner. At the receiving end, Bob can decode the bits as follows: Bob receives a
board from Alice and can determine which move Alice made by comparing it to the
board state before Alice made her move. Bob also knows the strategy that Alice is
using, so Bob can also compute the set of candidate moves from which Alice chose her
move. Bob assigns to each candidate move the same bit strings as Alice did. Because
Bob knows not only which move Alice made but also the bit sequence for that move,
Bob therefore knows some bits of Alice’s secret. Bob can then make his move, either
sending some secret bits of his own or just playing to allow Alice to continue sending
her secret, and send the updated board back to Alice. If Alice expects Bob to also
send information to her, she can extract the secret bits using the same method as
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Figure 7.1. The Tic-Tac-Stego methodology’s processes for embed-
ding and extracting hidden data. In order to be able to extract the
correct bits, the receiver must know the sender’s strategy.
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Bob. Alice sends the next few bits the same way as before. This process continues
until all of Alice’s and Bob’s secret bits have been sent.
There are several techniques that Alice and Bob could use to protect their hidden
data and help the cover generation process to hide the data. One such technique
is to compress and encrypt the data, making it smaller and more random. We can
view the cover generation process, as Sallee does in [21], as being a mapping from
random bit sequences to valid elements of some cover-space. The hypothesis is that
the more random the message appears, the more convincingly diverse the generated
objects will be. A second technique is to use a shared random number generator and
a seed to randomly permute the move labels at each step. This provides an additional
layer of security by acting as a variable length substitution cipher so that any given
move does not always encode the same data. Another technique is to use the channel
only occasionally, either on a game-by-game or move-by-move basis, which can be
accomplished by the usage of the same or another shared RNG and seed. This forces
Wendy to decide when individual games or moves are part of the covert channel and
when they are not and is similar to the technique of Chaffing and Winnowing [91].
7.2 Tic-tac-toe
Tic-tac-toe is a two-player turn-based pencil-and-paper game played on a 3x3 grid,
wherein players attempt to place three marks in a row in order to win. Each player
uses marks of a single kind, player-1 uses X and player-2 uses O, and player-1 usually
goes first.
If Alice and Bob wanted to play Tic-tac-toe, they could do so by sending a piece
of paper back and forth (always through Wendy) and take turns making their marks.
They could also use computers and play the game through a digital medium, such as
images or text. The specific communication medium is inconsequential, as Alice and
Bob can use the game of Tic-tac-toe to communicate covertly in any medium. This
section will detail how the game of Tic-tac-toe can be used as a covert channel and
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will explore ways in which Wendy can attempt to detect and neutralize the usage of
the channel.
7.2.1 Tic-tac-toe as a Covert Channel
The essence of a covert channel in a combinatorial game is that Alice must make
a choice of which move she will make during her turn and that her choices can be
used to embed hidden information in her gameplay. When using Tic-tac-toe, Alice
will encode her secret information as mark locations in the Tic-tac-toe grid.
Assume that Alice goes first and that her strategy simply tells her that all moves
are equally good so that, during her turn, she can choose to place her mark at any
open location. On her first turn, Alice has nine choices of where to place her mark,
thus her placement encodes three bits. Bob then makes his move, leaving Alice with
seven locations for her second mark. So, with her second move, Alice can send two
bits . Again, Bob makes his move and Alice is left with five locations for her mark,
allowing her to send two more bits. At this point, Alice has sent seven bits. If she did
not win with this move, it is possible that Bob will win with the next move. However,
if Bob does not make a winning move during his turn, Alice gets to place another
mark in one of the three places Bob has left for her and she can encode one more bit
with her final choice. This is the last bit Alice can send since, even if Bob cannot win
during his turn and she gets to place her last mark, there will only be one location
in which she can place it and thus she cannot encode any additional information.
Alice is guaranteed to be able to send seven bits under this strategy, since neither
Alice nor Bob can win the game until Alice has placed her third mark. Furthermore,
the exchange between Alice and Bob can be used to simultaneously transfer informa-
tion in both directions. Assuming that Bob’s strategy also lets him play anywhere
that is open, his first move has eight choices and thus encodes three bits. His second
choice is from six options, encoding two bits. If he gets a third turn, he will choose
from four options and encode another two bits. If he gets yet another turn, his fi-
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nal choice between the two remaining spaces will encode one additional bit. Bob is
guaranteed to be able to send five bits, with high likelihood of being able to send
seven or eight bits. When not using his channel capacity, Bob can allow Alice to send
an eighth bit by forcing a draw since it is always possible for either player, playing
perfectly, to force a draw in Tic-tac-toe [92].
7.2.2 Properties of the Channel
The most important properties of an information hiding system are steganographic
security, robustness and capacity. The security of an information hiding system is a
measure of the indistinguishability of its stego-objects from clean cover-objects. The
robustness of the system is a measure of the stego-objects’ resistance to tampering.
And the capacity of the system is a measure of the amount of secret information the
stego-objects can hold.
Three strategies of play are identified and their capacity and security against
Wendy, a passive adversary, is analyzed. The first strategy is Random, which allows
the player to place their mark in any open grid cell. The next is Greedy, which
limits the player to winning or blocking when possible, but is otherwise equivalent to
Random. The last is Optimal, which limits the player to those moves which lead to
the best outcomes, winning, if possible, or else drawing.
Since the public channel is trusted andWendy is a passive adversary, Alice and Bob
know that what they send to the other arrives unchanged. Therefore, the possibility
of Wendy tampering with the stego-objects directly and dropping or forging messages
can be ruled out. Thus, the issue of robustness can be safely skipped, for now.
Security
For Tic-tac-toe, steganographic security means that Alice and Bob want Wendy
to have as much difficulty as possible distinguishing between games of Tic-tac-toe
which are hiding information and games which are not. Since, by Shannon’s maxim,
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the enemy knows the system, one way for Wendy to test for hidden information is to
assume that all games contain stego and attempt to extract the hidden data. If the
extracted data is not garbage, Wendy will mark the games as stego, otherwise, they
will be marked as clean. However, if Alice and Bob have compressed or encrypted their
data, Wendy will have difficulty determining whether the data she extracted is truly
garbage without secret key information (e.g. the encryption key and RNG seeds).
Additionally, Wendy may also need to determine which games or moves she should
use when extracting data, which would again require knowing secret key information.
If Alice and Bob can keep their keys secret, then Wendy has no hope of using this
method for detection.
Another way Wendy can test for hidden information is to assume that the presence
of hidden information will cause the game or move to differ from the expectation for
that move or game. That is, Wendy will test whether the moves Alice and Bob make
agree with her model of how the game should be played. In this case, Wendy’s model
is a set of strategies for playing the game which dictate which moves are expected
and which are not. If Wendy sees a move which she did not expect she will classify
the game as stego. The simplest such model for Wendy is to check for obviously
bad moves. To avoid this, Alice and Bob can update their strategy from Random to
Greedy, so that they no longer make any obviously bad moves. In response, Wendy
can update her model to reflect an expectation of perfect gameplay, possibly on the
assumption that perfect gameplay does not leave room for covert communication.
Under Greedy, Alice and Bob will occasionally be forced to make a suboptimal move
in order to send some data, which Wendy will catch and use as evidence of the
existence of a covert channel. As with Random, Greedy will occasionally cause Alice
and Bob to play sub-optimally even when not sending data. However, Alice and Bob
can further upgrade their strategy to Optimal in order to avoid making the mistakes
for which Wendy is looking. Additionally, it turns out that Wendy’s assumption that
perfect play precludes covert communication is false; Alice and Bob can play perfectly
and still have covert channel capacity available.
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Table 7.1.
Analytical Tic-tac-toe channel capacity.
Capacity
Total (bits) Mean (bits) Mean Game
Strategy Min Max Alice Bob Length (moves)
Random 12 16 7.974 7.774 8.255
Greedy 8 16 7.455 6.650 8.7398
Optimal 6 15 7.489 4.326 9
Capacity
The capacity of the covert channel depends on the play-strategy that Alice and
Bob use. Their play-strategy, as shown in the experimental results of Section 7.4
affects the security that Alice and Bob have against Wendy’s analysis. Analytical
results on the channel capacity and game length under different strategies are given
in Table 7.1. The means are taken over all possible action sequences (game paths, or
histories) for games played under each strategy.
7.3 Algorithms
There are two general functions, Embed and Extract, which are necessary to
carry out communication over covert channels in combinatorial games. Algorithm
9 contains the embedding process which is carried out on each turn to send data
through the channel and Algorithm 10 shows the extraction process which is carried
out on each turn to receive data from the channel.
To embed data in a game, the set of best moves are computed for the given board.
The size of the returned set is used to compute the number of bits of information
which will be consumed in this turn. The set of best moves is randomly permuted
using a shared random number generator and seed. The embedding is accomplished
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by extracting and consuming the correct number of bits from the secret and using
them as the index value into the permuted set of best moves. The chosen move is
made and a new updated board is returned, along with the updated seed and message.
The first several steps of the extraction process are identical to those of the em-
bedding process: determining the best moves given the board your opponent saw,
permuting the set of best moves and determining the number of bits to expect. Com-
paring the old board to the new reveals which move the opponent selected, the index
of which is converted to a binary number containing the correct number of bits. The
result is returned as the next fragment of the message being received.
In practice, each turn would consist of an attempt to read data from the channel
followed by an attempt to write data to the channel. The determination of when reads
and writes contain data or garbage is made external to the algorithms presented here.
Algorithm 9: Embedding process for combinatorial games.
Input: Board B, Message M, Seed S
Output: Board newB, Message newM, Seed newS
bm = GetBestMoves(B)
n = ⌊log2(|bm|)⌋
bm = RandomPermute(bm, S)
newS = RNG(S)
m = M [1 : n]
newM = M [n + 1 : end]
md = toDecimal(m)
move = bm[md]
newB = applyMove(move, B)
return newB, newM , newS
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Algorithm 10: Extraction process for combinatorial games.
Input: Board oldB, Board newB, Seed S
Output: Output: MessageFragment m
bm = GetBestMoves(oldB)
n = ⌊log2(|bm|)⌋
bm = RandomPermute(bm, S)
newS = RNG(S)
move = extractMove(oldB, newB)





Nine parameter sets for Alice and Bob are made up of a choice between three
game-playing strategies and a choice between three embedding techniques. The three
game-playing strategies Alice and Bob can use are Random, Greedy and Optimal.
Under the Greedy strategy, it is still possible for Alice or Bob to send data when
forced to play “smart”, such as in the case of Tic-tac-toe when a player can win
or block in more than one location, providing a choice and thus capacity for covert
communication. The Optimal strategy uses the Negamax algorithm [93] to compute
the set of best moves as those which maximize the current players pay-off, which is
the negation of the opposing players pay-off since Negamax assumes that the game is
zero-sum. Whenever there is more than one best move, a player has the opportunity
to send hidden information through the channel. The three embedding techniques
that Alice and Bob use are Every Game, Random Games and Random Moves. The
Every Game technique causes Alice and Bob to attempt to send data on every move
of every game, in order to maximize the utilization of the channel. Using the Random
Games technique, Alice and Bob will only send (and expect to receive) data during
games chosen at random by a random number generator and seed shared by both
Alice and Bob. Every move of a chosen game is used for data transfer. When using
the Random Moves technique, Alice and Bob only send and receive data on moves
chosen at random by their shared random number generator.
7.4.1 Capacity Results
Figure 7.2 contains the mean embedding capacity results for different values of
P (embed), the likelihood that a game or move is chosen to be used for transmitting
data, for each of the different embedding techniques when applied to Tic-tac-toe.
Only the Random Games and Random Moves techniques are shown because the
Every Game technique does not depend on P (embed) and is equivalent to the capacity
measured when P (embed) = 1, which is shown on both plots.
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Figure 7.2. Experimental results for the embedding capacity of Tic-tac-toe.
In the results for the Random Games technique we can see that Alice, playing
randomly for full utilization of the channel, has the highest capacity followed by
Bob playing randomly, both being between seven and eight bits per game when
P (emebed) = 1. Next, Alice playing Greedy and Alice playing Optimal have very
similar capacities, just above six bits per game at most. Greedy Bob sends just under
five bits per game while Optimal Bob sends just under three bits per game. The
embedding capacity for each player increases linearly with the value of P (embed).
The results for the Random Moves technique, which are very similar to those of the
Random Games technique, shows that the embedding capacity is not much affected
by the choice between Random Games and Random Moves. One reason for the lack
of effect is that embedding in p% of games is, on average, equivalent to embedding
in p% of moves.
7.4.2 Security Results
Figure 7.3 displays the results of the security tests for the two embedding tech-
niques, Random Games and Random Moves. In these tests, the different parameter
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sets for Alice and Bob’s stego-system are pitted against two Wendys, each with a
strategy for determining which games are suspected of containing hidden informa-
tion, and Wendy’s mean error rate is recorded. Wendy makes an error whenever she
classifies a clean game as dirty (false positive) or a dirty game as clean (false negative).
Alice and Bob’s security is inversely related to Wendy’s error rate; the more errors
Wendy makes, the more secure Alice and Bob’s covert channel is because Wendy has
more difficulty distinguishing clean exchanges from those containing hidden informa-
tion. The Greedy Wendy makes her decision by checking for moves in which Alice
or Bob failed to make an obviously good move when they had the chance. If a game
contains such a move, it is classified as suspicious. The Optimal Wendy makes her
decision by checking for non-optimal play, that is any move which is not in the set of
best moves given the state of the game.
The cases of Greedy Wendy against Random Alice and Bob, Optimal Wendy
against Random Alice and Bob and Optimal Wendy against Greedy Alice and Bob
all have error rates which decrease linearly with P (embed). When no embedding is
taking place, at P (embed) = 0, Wendy has a high error rate because she is mistaking
Alice and Bob’s poor play for covert communication, resulting in mostly false positives
with a few true negatives whenever Alice and Bob get lucky to stumble into what
appears to be a clean game. When P (embed) is near 1, Wendy has a low error rate
because her propensity for classifying games as dirty is matched by the proportion of
games which actually contain hidden information. The opposite trend occurs for the
cases of Greedy Wendy against Greedy Alice and Bob, Greedy Wendy against Optimal
Alice and Bob and Optimal Wendy against Optimal Alice and Bob. In these cases,
a low value of P (embed) results in Wendy having a low error rate because Alice and
Bob’s games are well-played and do not confuse Wendy. As the embedding frequency
increases, so too does Wendy’s error rate. This is because the games are not looking
any less well-played despite the increasing frequency of covert transmission. When
Alice and Bob are sending bits on every move of every game, Wendy’s error rate
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Figure 7.3. Experimental results for the detection error rate of Tic-Tac-Stego.
is 100% because the games still look well-played according to her decision making
process.
In Figure 7.3, the Random Moves technique has interesting results for security. We
see the same general trend of Wendy’s error rate decreasing as the rate of transmission
increases when Wendy has the better model and increasing when Alice and Bob have
an equivalent or better model. However, the relationship is no longer linear. This is
because Wendy is making her classification based on games and not on a move-by-
move basis. At P (embed) = 0.5, only half of the moves are used to send data but they
occur in almost every game, which is equivalent to every game being used to send
data at a lower rate by half. This means that when Wendy classifies a game as being
suspected of transmitting data, she does not know which or how many moves were
used to transmit data. Thus, Wendy’s correct classifications are useful for detecting
that covert communication has occurred, but not what was sent since Wendy cannot
extract the hidden message.
The security tests were revised to allow Wendy to make her classification on a
move-by-move basis and the results are shown in Figure 7.4. The results for both
the Random Games technique and the Random Moves technique are very similar to
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Figure 7.4. Experimental results for the move-by-move detection error
rate of Tic-Tac-Stego.
each other but differ greatly from the game-by-game analysis in the three cases where
Wendy has a better model of gameplay than do Alice and Bob. The other three cases,
where Alice and Bob have a model which is at least as good as Wendy’s, produce
much the same results as they did in game-by-game analysis. Under move-by-move
analysis, Wendy’s error rate increases with P (embed), except in the case of Optimal
Wendy against Random Alice and Bob which is just about 50% regardless of the
value of P (embed). This is because most of the moves Alice and Bob make seem
completely normal to Wendy, except when Alice and Bob are playing Random, in
which case half of their moves are inadvertently played perfectly.
The likelihood that Wendy considers a given move to be suspicious depends only
on the two models of gameplay being pitted against each other. From the plots,
we can see that Greedy considers about 30% of Random’s moves to be suspicious
and Optimal considers nearly 50% of Random’s moves, and approximately 20% of
Greedy’s moves, to be suspicious. Greedy does not consider its own or Optimal’s
moves to be suspicious, and similarly neither does Optimal consider its own moves to
be suspicious.
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These results show that Wendy’s advantage over Alice and Bob is dependent
entirely on the relative quality of her model of the cover-object space compared to
that of her opponents. When Alice and Bob have a model of the cover-object space
which is as good as or better than Wendy’s model, then they can sneak hidden
information past her without any problems. When Wendy has the better model,
Alice and Bob are easily defeated.
7.5 Other Games
The framework presented in this paper is applicable to other games as well and
supports schemes which are substantially similar to those presented in the previous
work on this topic. The framework can also be generalized to be applicable to multi-
player games and games without perfect information. This section will briefly explain
the exploitation of covert channels in two other games which are popular games to
play online.
The first game is Dots and Boxes, which, like Tic-tac-toe, is a turn-based pencil-
and-paper game played on a grid. However, it can be played by more than 2 players
and the grid for Dots and Boxes is very much larger than the grid for Tic-tac-toe. A
typical Dots and Boxes grid may be larger than 9x9, where Tic-tac-toe is only 3x3.
Also, instead of making moves in the cells, moves are made at cell boundaries, the
goal being to completely surround a grid cell in order to claim it for oneself. The
winner of the game is the player with the most boxes of their own at the end of
the game. The large board size results in a much larger state-space for this game,
which makes computation of globally optimal choices expensive in terms of time and
memory. Such a large initial state-space also means that seemingly random play early
in the game is not out of the ordinary and a good-enough endgame strategy is often
enough to secure a win against one’s opponent or opponents. The large board coupled
with the nearly complete freedom of the first several turns means that the capacity
of the covert channel is much larger than for Tic-tac-toe. For instance, an n× n grid
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for a game of Dots and Boxes contains (n+1)2 dots and 2n(n−1) borders linking the
dots. Thus, under the null strategy, Alice can send approximately 1
N
log2(2n(n− 1)!)
bits of information per game, as can each of the other N−1 players. Using a strategy
which aims to win, or, equivalently, to not lose, will reduce this capacity but will
allow the bits to be sent less detectably.
The second game to mention is Battleship. While still a 2-player turn-based
pencil-and-paper game, Battleship is not actually a combinatorial games since the
players do not enjoy full information while the game is being played. Before the first
move is made, players hide a set of ships of varying length in a 10x10 grid with the
hopes of having their well-placed fleet survive bombardment by the opposing player.
The players take turns bombing a grid location belonging to their opponent and are
told only if they hit or missed. The player who sinks all of their opponent’s ships
first wins. There are actually two independent covert channels in the game, one using
ship placement and one using bombing locations. Using ship locations, the hidden
message is encoded as a permutation of ship orientation and location. Once a player
has won, she will know the location and orientation of all her opponent’s ships, from
which she can extract the hidden message. Using bombing targets to implement the
covert channel is very much similar to the process used in Tic-tac-toe and Dots and
Boxes: each choice encodes a bit sequence and the choices are driven by the bits of the
secret information being transmitted. Since a player’s ship placement and choice of
targets are independent, the total capacity of the covert channel in Battleship is the
sum of the capacities of using each individually. The capacity of the ship-placement
channel is approximately 34 bits and that of the bombing target channel is 21 bits,
thus the capacity of both used together is 55 bits per game.
7.6 Conclusion
The Tic-Tac-Stego methodology is applicable to any combinatorial game and only
requires that the communication endpoints know each other’s strategy and move-
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labeling scheme. The security of the channel against a passive adversary (one which
can observe but not modify the contents of the channel) relies upon the secrecy of
the move labeling scheme and the characteristics of play produced by the strategies.
The move labeling scheme (actually, just the seed that controls it) must be secret
because, if Wendy knows how moves are labeled, then she can extract the secret bits
that Alice sends just as easily as Bob can. If the strategies the players use produce
play which is distinguishable from normal play, then Wendy can detect the usage
of the channel (prompting her to disconnect Alice from Bob permanently, per the
rules of Simmons’ Prisoners’ Problem). Therefore, it is important to Alice and Bob
that they have access to strategies that produce gameplaying behavior which appears
to be human-generated. In general, Wendy can only detect the usage of the covert
channel when she has a model which is better, or more accurate at predicting or
describing authentic behavior, than Alice and Bob’s (c.f. [11,21,86]). Therefore, it is
also important to Wendy that she has access to a model of gameplay which is better
than that of Alice and Bob.
The application of this framework to the game of Tic-tac-toe was demonstrated
and it was shown that, even in the case of such a simple game, Wendy cannot accu-
rately distinguish stego-games from clean games and nor can she, through application
of the strict requirement of forcing perfect play, reduce the capacity of the channel to
zero and thereby prevent covert communication. Experimental and analytical results
on the capacity of the channel showed that playing optimally reduces, but does not
eliminate the capacity of the channel. Experimental results on the steganographic
security of the channel showed that Wendy’s ability to accurately detect usage of the
covert channel comes down to whether or not her model of play is better than Alice
and Bob’s. We also described how to exploit covert channels in multiplayer games and
games without perfect information, such as Dots and Boxes and Battleship, which
are more complex and have much larger covert channel capacity than Tic-tac-toe.
Multiplayer games are abundant on the Internet and websites exist which provide
the means for users to play these anonymously games with others. The difficulty
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that Wendy has in detecting and preventing covert communication between Alice
and Bob in isolation is compounded many times when Alice and Bob have access to
anonymizing services which they alone can circumvent using covert authentication
and communication through online games.
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8 ANOMALY DETECTION FOR STEGANALYSIS OF GAMES
As the Warden in Simmons’ Prisoner’s Problem, Wendy must suspect that Alice and
Bob will attempt to use a stego-system to establish a covert channel, and so will
be on the lookout for suspicious messages that might indicate the usage of such a
channel. In this regard, Wendy’s job is very much like that of an anomaly detector
which attempts to identify activity which is out of the ordinary, and therefore possibly
indicative of “bad things” happening. On the other hand, Alice and Bob’s goal is to
generate stego-objects that will not seem anomalous.
In this chapter experiments will be conducted to determine how well, if at all,
Wendy can distinguish between games played by humans and games played by not-
humans (i.e. computer agents). The implication made by using this distinction for
steganalysis is that human-played games do not contain hidden information but that
games which are not played by humans could contain hidden information. Also,
simply by virtue of having not been played by a human, such computer-generated
games are suspicious. Therefore, the task of detecting the usage of a covert channel
in a game is equivalent to determining whether or not the agent playing the game is
a human. If a human is playing the game, the game is clean. But, if a computer is
playing the game, it can be assumed to be dirty. In the experiments which follow,
all dirty examples have been generated by the Tic-Tac-Stego system using the three
rules-based strategies: Random, Greedy, or Optimal.
8.1 Human Gameplay Data Collection
Human gameplay data for Tic-tac-toe is collected through 2 web applications
which differ in the manner in which they collect the data. The first web application
shows the user a randomly selected board state from the set of all games still in
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progress (i.e. those games which have not yet ended, either by one player winning or
the game ending in a tie) and asks the user to select the next move in the game. If the
{game, move} pair already exists in the database, the count of the number of times
that move has been made in that game is incremented. Otherwise, the new {game,
move} pair is added to the database and its count initialized to one. Each entry in
the database also records the parent game from which it was generated. Figure 8.1
shows an example of the online interface through which gameplay data is collected.
The other web application engages the user in complete games of Tic-tac-toe.
This second data collection system more closely simulates the usual experience that
humans have with games, which is to play them from start to finish rather than in a
random order. The user is first shown either a blank board or a board with a single
move already made. The user’s response to this board is recorded in the database. In
order to continue playing the game the human started, the application must select a
move of its own. To retain some of the flavor of the first data collection application,
which only shows the user boards generated by humans, the application attempts
to make a move which it has seen a human make in the past. If it cannot find
such a move, it plays at random. If more than one human move has been observed
for the current board state, the application will select one of the candidate moves
with probability proportional to its frequency. We refer to this second type of data
collection as sequential, indicating that gamplay examples are collected in sequence,
in order from the start of the game to the end of the game.
For both applications, the database initially contains only the game which has
no moves and is represented by an empty game history. In total, the two web ap-
plications collected 18990 examples of human Tic-tac-toe gameplay, 10011 from the
non-sequential collector and 8979 from the sequential collector. The exact number of
human contributors to the dataset is unknown, since data collection was completely
anonymous, but the authors know of six subjects who chose to notify us of their
participation.
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Figure 8.1. The user interface of the online Tic-tac-toe data collection
application. To avoid confusion over which player (X, or O) the human
player is playing, the symbols are color-coded. The user is always red,
and the opponent is always green.
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Human gameplay data for the game of Connect4 was collected through a web
application very much like that used for data collection for Tic-tac-toe. Figure 8.2
shows an example of the online interface through which gameplay data was collected.
For Connect4, only sequential data is collected. That is, the user plays as either
first or second player for an entire game, from start to finish. The computer plays
using moves that it has observed a human make previously. Once the game goes
“off book”, meaning that the board state is completely new, the computer will play
using a greedy strategy, attempting to win if it can, or blocking the human’s win if it
can, or otherwise playing at random. Initially, the computer’s database of observed
gameplay contains only the game which has no moves and is represented by an empty
game history. So far, 1172 examples of Connect4 gameplay have been collected.
After collection, the moves are processed to obtain a weighted directed acyclic
graph of boards starting from the root empty board to terminal end-of-game boards,
where the weight of each edge e from node u to node v is proportional to the number
of times a human shown the board at node u chose the move corresponding to edge e
resulting in the board at node v. Random walks of this graph generate samples from
the observed set of human-played games.
8.2 Experimental Results
Three kinds of detectors were implemented and tested. The first type of detec-
tor was a rule-based detector, which classifies gameplay using a set of simple rules.
The second type is a feature-based detector which uses machine learning on a set of
computable features to classify gameplay. The third is a probabilistic model-based
detector which uses Bayesian hypothesis testing to classify gameplay. The metric
used to assess the performance of each detector is the classification accuracy on a test
set containing an equal number of clean and dirty examples. Accuracy is defined as
the proportion of correct classifications:
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Figure 8.2. The user interface of the online Connect4 data collection








1{ci = ti} (8.1)
where ci is the detector’s classification of example i, ti is the true class of example
i, and 1{ci = ti} = 1 only when ci = ti and is 0 otherwise.
8.2.1 Rules-Based Detection
The first type of detector evaluated was a rules-based detector. Rules-based de-
tectors classify objects based on a static set of rules which the cover media is assumed
to obey. Two rules-based detectors were tested. One used a rule set which defines
greedy play. Greedy play means that the player must win if they can, and must
prevent the other player from winning if they can. If the player can neither win nor
block their opponent from winning this round, then they are free to make any legal
move. The other rules-based detector used a rule set which defines optimal play. Op-
timal play means that the player must always make a globally optimal move which
will guarantee the player the best possible outcome reachable from the current board
state.
Using a rules-based detector a threshold value on the allowed deviation from the
rule set can be defined. A threshold value of t means that no more than t moves which
violate the rule set are allowed without triggering an automatic positive classification
as suspicious. A threshold value of t = 0 means that no deviation is allowed. So
long as the number of rule violations stays beneath the threshold, the play will be
considered innocuous. However, in the cases where Detector ⊆ Computer, that is
where the detector uses a rule set which is a subset or equal to the rule-set used by
the computer agent, the decision must be flipped. In such cases, deviation from the
detector’s rule set is actually evidence of human gameplay and so conformance to the
detector’s rule set is actually evidence of computer-generated gameplay. The cases
where this occurs are the Greedy detector against the Greedy and Optimal agents,
since Greedy = Greedy ⊂ Optimal, and the Optimal detector against the Optimal
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Best Results for Rules−Based Detector (Non−Seq. Data)
 
 
Greedy Detector on Random/Human Data,   t=1.5xN
Greedy Detector on Greedy/Human Data,     t=0
Greedy Detector on Optimal/Human Data,    t=0
Optimal Detector on Random/Human Data,  t=2.5xN  .
Optimal Detector on Greedy/Human Data,    t=0
Optimal Detector on Optimal/Human Data,   t=0
Figure 8.3. Detection accuracy results for Greedy rule-based detector
using the best threshold for each case on test sets containing 100
examples of computer-generated gameplay and 100 examples of non-
sequential human gameplay.
agent, since Optimal = Optimal. In the experiments, the threshold value is varied
from a value of t = 0 to a value of t = 4 × N , where N is the number of games per
example. Because the gameplay under consideration happens to be from Tic-tac-toe,
the value t = 4×N indicates that the decision threshold is placed at the point where
half the chosen moves in the example violate the rule set.
Figure 8.3 shows the detection accuracy results of the experiment using the Greedy
rules-based and Optimal rules-based detectors using the best threshold for each case.
Each test set contains 100 examples of human play and 100 examples of computer
play, where each example contains 1 ≤ N ≤ 10 games. The human-generated games
are sampled from the database containing non-sequential human games. From the fig-
142
ure, it can be seen that the Greedy rules-based detector can achieve greater than 95%
accuracy in all three cases. The Optimal rules-based detector can also achieve greater
than 95% accuracy in distinguishing between Human and Random, and between Hu-
man and Optimal. However, it can do no better than guessing at distinguishing
between Human and Greedy. The poor performance of the Optimal rules-based de-
tector against the Greedy agent indicates that non-sequential human gameplay is
very close to Greedy, but not close to Optimal. The perfect overlap of the Greedy
detector’s results against Greedy and Optimal agents is a consequence of the fact that
Optimal ⊂ Greedy, and so the Greedy detector cannot distinguish Optimal gameplay
from Greedy gameplay because both always make a greedy move.
Figure 8.4 shows the detection accuracy results of the experiment using the Greedy
rules-based and Optimal rules-based detectors using the best threshold for each case
on the same three test sets as above, except that now the human data is from the
database of human games played sequentially. From the figure, it can be seen that the
Greedy rules-based detector can achieve greater than 95% accuracy in distinguishing
between human and computer in all three cases, just as with the non-sequential
human data. However, unlike with the non-sequential data, the Optimal rules-based
detector can now achieve greater than 95% accuracy in distinguishing between human
and computer in all three cases.
The improvement in detector performance between non-sequential data and se-
quential data suggests that humans play more optimally, but not perfectly optimal,
when they have seen the gameplay history leading to the current board state. Lucky
for Wendy, then, since sequentially is the most natural way to play a game, and so
sequential gameplay data should be easy to collect and will, at the same time, allow
Wendy to achieve high accuracy against all three computer agents. One important
point to note, however, is that no one threshold value is able to accurately distinguish
between human gameplay and all three computer agents. This is nothing to worry
about if Wendy knows what computer agent Alice and Bob are using when they use
the covert channel. If Wendy does not initially know which agent they are using, she
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Best Results for Rules−Based Detector (Seq. Data)
 
 
Greedy Detector on Random/Human Data,   t=1xN
Greedy Detector on Greedy/Human Data,     t=0
Greedy Detector on Optimal/Human Data,    t=0
Optimal Detector on Random/Human Data,  t=1.5xN  .
Optimal Detector on Greedy/Human Data,    t=1xN
Optimal Detector on Optimal/Human Data,   t=0
Figure 8.4. Detection accuracy results for Greedy rule-based detec-
tor using the best threshold for each case on test sets containing 100
examples of computer-generated gameplay and 100 examples of se-
quential human gameplay.
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may be able to determine this by observing their play for a while. However, during
this time, they could be using the channel, or they could be purposefully playing a
certain way in order to sabotage Wendy’s surveillance data, e.g. they could play with
a Random strategy initially to convince Wendy that their computer agent is Random,
and then switch to Greedy after a while.
8.2.2 Feature-Based Detection
The next detector evaluated was a feature-based detector. Feature-based detec-
tors utilize attributes of the cover-media objects and machine learning algorithms to
classify objects as clean or dirty. In these tests, two classifiers are analyzed. Both
classifiers use two features: the Greedyness and the Optimalness of the play. Greedy-
ness measures the proportion of observed moves that abide by the Greedy strategy.
Optimalness is the same idea, but for the Optimal strategy. The general notion of








where G is the sequence of {move, board} pairs that make up the gameplay ex-
ample, and {m, b} ∈ S means that the move m is in the set of good moves on board
b identified by the strategy S. The choice of these two features, Greedyness and Op-
timalness, stems from our review of the cognitive psychology of human gameplaying.
There, it was learned that humans do not play optimally, but rather with maximizing,
or greedy, strategies. By measuring these two features of gameplay, it is hoped that
human gameplay will be found to exhibit a unique balance between the two which can
be distinguished from gameplay generated by pure Greedy or pure Optimal strategies.
The first classifier tested was a 1-nearest neighbor classifier. During training,
the algorithm learns a representative for each of the four agents (Human, Random,
Greedy, and Optimal) by finding the mean Greedyness and mean Optimalness of
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Figure 8.5. Learned decision boundaries for {Greedyness, Optimal-
ness} feature-based 1-NN classifier using ten games per example. Ex-
ample data points of gameplay from humans and computer agents are
shown. The human data is from the non-sequential human dataset.
their play. Classification is carried out by finding the nearest representative to a
given example. If the nearest representative is Human, then the example is classified
as clean, otherwise it is classified as dirty. The learned classifier is tested using data
which was held out from the training set. Ten-fold cross validation is used to obtain
a more smooth result curve.
Figure 8.5 shows example learned decision boundaries for the 1-NN classifier when
using ten games per example. Human gameplay is approximately 87% Greedy and
77% Optimal. Random gameplay is approximately 72% Greedy and 52% Optimal.
Greedy gameplay is 100% Greedy and 80% Optimal. Optimal gameplay is 100%
Greedy and 100% Optimal. The accuracy of the feature-based 1-NN detector on the
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Figure 8.6. Detection accuracy results for {Greedyness, Optimalness}
feature-based 1-NN detector on test sets containing an equal number
of examples of human and computer gameplay.
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task of distinguishing between human-generated gameplay and computer-generated
gameplay for both non-sequential and sequential gameplay is shown in Figure 8.6. As
the number of games per example increases, the accuracy of the detector increases
for all cases. Once there are ten games per example, the detector’s accuracy is
approximately 95% on the non-sequential gameplay data, and close to 90% on the
sequential gameplay data.
The second classifier tested was a binary decision tree classifier. During training,
the algorithm learns a set of decision nodes, arranged in a tree structure. Beginning
with a single node which contains all the training data, nodes are split in such a way
that the Gini’s Diversity Index (gdi) of the children is minimal. Nodes are split until





where the sum is over the classes c at the node and p(c) is the observed fraction
of examples with class c present at that node. When all the examples at a node have
the same class, gdi will be 0, otherwise, gdi > 0. Nodes with gdi = 0 are called pure
nodes. Thus, gdi is a measure of impurity.
To classify an example, the algorithm follows the branches of the tree until a leaf
node is reached. The label of that leaf node is selected as the predicted label of the
example. The learned decision tree is tested using data which was held out from the
training set. As before, ten-fold cross validation is used to obtain a more smooth
result curve.
Figure 8.7 shows example learned decision boundaries for the binary decision tree
classifier when using ten games per example. The first split is on the Greedyness
value, greater than 98% is classified as dirty, less than 98% goes to the second decision
node. The second decision node splits on the Optimalness value, less than 61% is
classified as dirty, greater than 61% goes to the third decision node. The third, and
final, decision node splits on the Greedyness value, greater than 77% is classified as
clean, less than 77% is classified as dirty. The accuracy of the feature-based decision
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Figure 8.7. Learned decision boundaries for {Greedyness, Optimal-
ness} feature-based tree classifier using ten games per example. Ex-
ample data points of gameplay from humans and computer agents are
shown. The human data is from the non-sequential human dataset.
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Figure 8.8. Detection accuracy results for {Greedyness, Optimalness}
feature-based detector on test sets containing an equal number of
examples of human and computer gameplay.
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tree detector on the task of distinguishing between human-generated gameplay and
computer-generated gameplay for both non-sequential and sequential gameplay is
shown in Figure 8.8. As the number of games per example increases, the accuracy
of the detector increases for all cases. Once there are ten games per example, the
detector’s accuracy is greater than 97% on both the non-sequential and sequential
gameplay data.
Using the feature-based detector, Wendy does not need to know which computer
agent Alice and Bob are using for their covert communication in order to achieve
high accuracy in detecting their channel usage. This is an improvement over the
rules-based detector which required Wendy to know which computer agent is being
used in order to achieve high accuracy. However, if Wendy does know which agent
they are using, then the rules-based approach can achieve higher accuracy than the
feature-based approach with fewer games per example. This means Wendy can make
her decision sooner and therefore limits the size of the secrets that Alice and Bob can
communicate.
8.2.3 Probabilistic Model-Based Detection
The third detector evaluated was a probabilistic model-based detector. A prob-
abilistic model-based detector uses probability distributions to do classification. To
classify an example, the detector uses the observed gameplay in the example to com-
pute the likelihood of the generator being human and the likelihood of the generator
being a computer agent. The detector classifies each example based on the more
likely generator, gameplay which is more likely to be human-generated is clean while




P (Human | Datai)












P (Datai | Human)
P (Datai | Computer)
(8.6)
where the P (Datai) values cancel each other out and P (Human) = P (Computer) =
0.5 also cancel each other out. The reason P (Human) = P (Computer) = 0.5 is that
the test set contains half human-generated examples and half computer-generated






0 : ρi ≥ τ
1 : ρi < τ
(8.7)
where τ is the learned decision threshold, ci = 0 indicates that the example is
classified as clean and ci = 1 indicates the example is classified as dirty.
The likelihood P (Datai | Source) that an example of gameplay Datai was gener-
ated by a source Source is computed as the product over all moves in the example of
the relative frequency of the move chosen by the source, given the current boardstate.
For a human source, this relative frequency is the number of times a human, when
presented with the current boardstate, selected that particular move divided by the
total number of times that boardstate was presented:






where Nm,b is the number of times a human selected move m when presented with
the board b and Nb is the total number of times board b was presented.
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Probabilistic Detector on Computer and Human Gameplay
 
 
Human and Random (Non−Seq. Data)
Human and Greedy (Non−Seq. Data)
Human and Optimal (Non−Seq. Data)  .
Human and Random (Seq. Data)
Human and Greedy (Seq. Data)
Human and Optimal (Seq. Data)
Figure 8.9. Detection accuracy results for probabilistic model-based
detector on test sets containing an equal number of examples of human
and computer gameplay.
For a computer agent, the required relative frequency is just the reciprocal of the
size of the set of good moves for the current boardstate because each good move is
equally likely to be chosen:




|{x : {x, b} ∈ Computer}|
(8.9)
where {x, b} ∈ Comp. means that move x is in the set of good moves on board b
identified by the computer agent, Computer ∈ {Random,Greedy, Optimal}.
Figure 8.9 shows the results of the experiment using the probabilistic model-based
detector to distinguish between human-generated gameplay and computer-generated
gameplay for both sources of human data. Ten-fold cross validation is used to smooth
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the result curve. The decision threshold τ is learned during the training phase on
the nine folds of data set aside for training. The learned value for τ is the threshold
which maximizes the classification accuracy on the training data. The classifier is
then tested on the fold which was not used during training using the learned decision
threshold τ . The results from the ten folds are averaged together to obtain the data
shown in the figure. As was seen in the analysis of the rules-based detector, the use
of sequentially-collected gameplay data improves Wendy’s decision accuracy over the
use of non-sequential data. Wendy’s highest accuracy is achieved when distinguishing
between Random and sequential Human data, which is greater than 95% for two
games per example and nearly 100% for at lest four games per example. She also
achieves high accuracy when distinguishing between Greedy and sequential Human
data, as well as between Random and non-sequential Human data. In both cases, her
accuracy is greater than 95% when she observes at least 6 games per example.
The probabilistic-based detector is not as accurate as the feature-based detec-
tor. In addition to decreased accuracy against Greedy and Optimal agents and a
larger disparity in accuracy between sequential and non-sequential Human data, the
probabilistic-based detector requires Wendy to make an assumption about which
computer agent Alice and Bob are using. If Wendy guesses wrong, or Alice and Bob
manage to trick her, Wendy will not be able to accurately detect the usage of the
covert channel. On the other hand, if Wendy does know which computer agent Alice
and Bob are using, she can achieve the same or better accuracy, with fewer games
per example, by using the rules-based detector. Overall, of the three detectors tested,
the probabilistic detector performed the worst against the rules-based stego-agents.
8.3 Conclusion
Experiments were conducted to analyze three types of detectors: rules-based,
feature-based, and probabilistic-based. The probabilistic-based detector performed
the worst. In order to use it, Wendy must know which computer agent Alice and
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Bob will use to covertly communicate. However, if she knows this, then she can
use the rules-based detector to achieve the same or higher accuracy. The rules-based
detector was accurate in specific cases, but was not able to distinguish between human
gameplay and computer gameplay using any single set of parameters. If Wendy does
not know which computer agent Alice and Bob are using, then the feature-based
detector performs best. Using the Greedyness and Optimalness features, it was able
to take advantage of both dimensions to distinguish between human and computer
gameplay with greater than 95% accuracy when shown at least six games per example,
and greater than 97% accuracy when shown ten games per example, regardless of
the computer agent or data collection style. However, if Wendy does know which
computer agent Alice and Bob are using, then she can achieve the highest accuracy,
using the fewest games per example, by using the rules-based detector. Requiring
fewer games to make an accurate decision allows Wendy to limit the amount of secret
data that Alice and Bob can share.
The analysis of the feature-based detector suggests that some improvements could
be made to the steganographic method so that the computer agents produce play
which more closely mimics that of humans along the given dimensions. For example, a
mostly-optimal agent which makes a non-optimal move 30% of the time might be able
to generate gameplay which is inseparable from authentic human gameplay. Also, the
analysis used rules-based agents, against which the rules-based detector was the best.
It is possible the probabilistic-based detector will perform better against probabilistic-
based agents, which might use a Markov chain to mimic a specific player’s style. The
question is then whether Wendy’s Markov chain can be more accurate than Alice’s.
The effect of the data collection method on detection accuracy suggests that there
is a difference is gameplay between the two methods. Lucky for Wendy, the most
natural way to collect data, sequentially, is also the method which yields the best
accuracy results. While non-sequential gameplay data collection may not be as useful
for detection, it may still be useful for understanding how humans play games. It
is our hope that future work in the area of steganography in games will take into
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account the cognitive psychology of human gameplaying when designing techniques
for generating and detecting steganography in games. This back and forth progress
(steganalysts achieve better detection, steganographers use the advance to defeat the
steganalysis) is ultimately good for the field as it continually pushes both sides to
develop better techniques.
156
9 STASI: A SOFTWARE TESTBED FOR ANALYZING STEGANOGRAPHIC
INTERACTIONS
While cryptography and steganography are both broadly applicable to security and
privacy, the field of steganography is not nearly as well studied as cryptography.
This is due, in part, to the mathematical foundations of cryptography which allow
researchers to analyze cryptographic algorithms in vitro, or on paper, as it were. In
the case of steganography, because the goal is to conceal the existence of the message,
rather than the contents, analysis can not generally be done on paper but must be
done in vivo. That is, the analysis depends on factors external to the algorithm, such
as properties of the communication medium and the cover-objects. For this reason,
the study of steganography is more experimental in nature than that of cryptography.
While there are many pieces of software that implement steganographic methods,
there are very few software systems for doing experiments with steganographic and
steganalytic methods. Despite the enormous amount of work on image steganography,
the authors are aware of only one software system for testing image steganography
and steganalysis techniques: Virtual Steganographic Laboratory developed by Forcz-
manski and Wegrzyn. Virtual Steganographic Laboratory (VSL) is a graphical block
diagramming tool that provides a framework for using and testing methods for image
steganography and steganalysis. VSL utilizes a graphical user interface and a modu-
lar, plug-in architecture [67,94]. Aside from VSL, researchers working on information
hiding in images do not have a standardized framework in which to conduct their
research into new steganographic methods or techniques for analysis and detection.
Moreover, information hiding in images is only a small glimpse of what is possible
with steganography.
In this chapter, we present STASI, the Software Testbed for Analyzing Stegano-
graphic Interactions. STASI provides a framework for implementing and analyzing
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steganographic systems that exploit structured interactions for covert communication.
In Section 9.1, we discuss the design specifications for STASI. In Section architecture,
we present the software architecture of STASI and discuss the implementation of the
testbed. Section 9.3 presents the results of some experimental analysis of STASI,
along with example results of analyses conducted using STASI. Finally, we conclude
in Section 9.4 with a summary of STASI.
9.1 Design Specifications for STASI
STASI is built to meet the following design specifications for a steganographic
testbed:
Extensible. Users should be able to add new interactions and new agents for
interactions without needing to see or touch the core code, but they should be able
to do so if they want, see open source.
Easy to use. The user experience should be simple and clean. Menus should be
clear, documentation should be extensive but concise. Tools and operations should
work as expected, without strange methods that are peculiar to this particular piece
of software. Errors should be handled gracefully and informatively, prescribing the
solution whenever possible.
Customizable. The testbed should be able to take advantage of local preferences
and data to provide the user with a custom experience. Data, agents, and rules for
interactions can be stored and accessed both locally and remotely, as files or as records
in a database.
Efficient. Testbed operations should be time and space efficient. If the operation
will take much time or space, the user should be warned, given an estimate of the
runtime of the operation, and provided the opportunity to cancel or augment the
operation. Operations should be multi-threaded whenever possible.
Open Source. The testbed source code should be open and free. However,
a canonical public repository should be maintained that includes significant useful
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additions to the core functionality. Repositories of data, agents, and interactions
should be maintained and made freely available to all users of the testbed.
9.2 Architecture
The software architecture of STASI provides a highly flexible, customizable, and
extensible framework for studying steganography in interactions through a modular
interface with a central core of functionality. In addition to the core, the testbed
consists of three types of components, each of which can be extended and adapted to
suit user needs: interaction specifications, data-generating agents, and analysis tools.
All of these components are brought together into one, easy-to-use, graphical user
interface. In this section, we discuss the design and implementation of each of these
components.
9.2.1 Core Functions
In the testbed, structured interactions use a metaphor of turn-based multiplayer
online gaming. An interaction is modeled as a game between one or more player
agents, which is managed by a mediator between the agents. The mediator, or game
manager, maintains and provides to the players information about the state of the
interaction. The game manager also logs gameplay data to be used later for analysis.
The game manager is one of the many core functions the testbed provides. The
testbed also provides MySQL database connectivity, game configuration management,
gameplay data logging and parsing, and a machine learning library as part of the core
functionality of the testbed.
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9.2.2 Interaction Specifications
An interaction specification formally defines the rules and environment of the
game. It may also, optionally, provide a graphical interface to display the state of the
game to the testbed user and enable human-in-the-loop agents to receive input.
The rules and environment of the game are codified by a game board which main-
tains the current state of the game, handles updates to the state of the game from
moves made by players, provides information to the players about legal next moves,
and detects when some agent has met the win condition of the game or when the
game has ended in a draw or loss for all agents. The game manager maintains the
game board for each game and makes it available to the agents playing the game.
As an example of an interaction specification, take a simple paper-and-pencil game
such as Tic-tac-toe. Tic-tac-toe is a two-player game played on a three-by-three grid
onto which the players take turns placing a mark, usually ’X’ for the first player and
’O’ for the second player, until a player succeeds in placing three of their marks in a
row, column, or diagonal. The first player to do so is the winner. If, after the ninth
move, neither player has succeeded in getting three of their marks in a line, the game
ends in a draw since there are no more available moves.
In STASI, the interaction specification for Tic-tac-toe consists of a game board
which stores the location of each mark on three-by-three grid of cells as well as the
last move made. The game board can compute, for the current state of the grid, the
set of all legal next moves. A legal move in Tic-tac-toe is the location of an empty grid
cell. Given a legal move, the game board can update the state of the grid to include
the player’s mark (’X’ or ’O’) in the cell chosen by the player. The game board can
check the win condition for the current state of the board by looking for three of the
same symbol in a row column or diagonal. Using the game board for Tic-tac-toe, the
game manager can step two agents through the game until it ends. The agents can
get the list of all legal moves from the board and choose one to make. The game
manager will apply the chosen move to the board, which will update the state of the
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game. If the board is a win condition, then the game manager can communicate to
the agents that the game has ended and which agent was the winner.
Consider another example of an interaction which can be represented in STASI
as a game: the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) handshake. Before data can
be sent over the network, the endpoints must establish a connection so that the data
can be reliably transmitted. The TCP handshake is a 3-step protocol that establishes
a network connection between two programs. In the TCP handshake game, the
players represent programs connected to a network. The game board is a finite state
diagram which maintains the current state of the connection. Initially, the connection
is closed and both players are listening for incoming SYN packets. At some point, one
of them will choose the move which corresponds to sending a SYN packet and start
the handshake. Upon receiving the SYN packet (learning from the game manager
or game board that the last move was a SYN move), the other player should select
the move which corresponds to sending back a SYN-ACK, acknowledging the SYN
from the other player and setting up a connection in the other direction. When the
SYN-ACK is received, an ACK should be sent back to finalize the establishment of
the connection. On any of their turns in the game, each player must choose to take
any legal action. The rules of the game can be relaxed to allow players to choose do-
nothing operations, simulating transmission delays. Also, players may be allowed to
resend packets, or send packets out of order. The game ends after a correct sequence
of SYN / SYN-ACK / ACK messages are sent. The game manager alternates between
players, updating each in turn about the state of the game and asking for their next
move. When the game board enters a winning state (the connection established state),
the game manager communicates to the agents that the game has ended (perhaps in
a draw, or with both agents winning).
By implementing interaction specifications as game boards and providing a general
game manager, STASI can be used to study any interaction which can be effectively
described as a game between one or more players. The game manager is agnostic to
the rules of the game and needs only to maintain the game board and communicate
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with the agents to get each agent’s next move. The game board can make games
which are not turn-based seem to the game manager as if they were by not updating
the state of the game (except the current player) until all players have selected a move.
This mechanism can also handle skipping players, or letting players move more than
once.
9.2.3 Data Generating Agents
One of the main applications of STASI is to generate synthetic gameplay data
to use for analysis. Gameplay data is generated by players in a game. Starting
from the initial state of the board, each move made by the players is recorded. The
sequence of moves made by the players in the game is called the game’s history.
Given a game’s history, the entire game can be replayed and the moves of each player
analyzed individually or as a whole.
In STASI, the players in a game are modeled as decision-making agents. An agent
receives from the game manager a copy of the game board and is asked to respond
with the agent’s next move in the game. Aside from physical constraints (such as
memory or time), there is no restriction on the method by which an agent may make
its decision. The simplest agent is one which makes a uniformly random selection of
next move from the list of all legal next moves. A more complex agent may attempt to
find a set of best moves from which to make its choice, such as by executing a minimax
search of the game tree rooted at the current game state. Each move generated by
an agent is recorded in the history of the game. The histories are stored in memory
and can be used for analysis immediately or can be written to a file or database to
be reloaded and analyzed later.
When generating data with STASI, the user first loads the game specification,
then loads and selects the agents which will play the game, and then specifies the
number of times the agents will play the game. The testbed will automatically divide
that number of games into several smaller sets and have multiple threads simulate
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the games in parallel. After the games have completed, the results are combined and
the gameplay data added to the existing set of data already loaded in memory, all of
which is made immediately available for analysis. When written to a file, the data
is stored in CSV format. The data can also be written to a remote or local MySQL
database.
9.2.4 Adding New Interactions to STASI
Due to STASI’s modular design, it is easy to add new specifications for structured
interactions without needing to change any of the testbed core code. As mentioned
above, an interaction specification is a game board and an optional user interface.
In STASI, game boards for interactions are subclasses of an abstract GameBoard
class. The abstract GameBoard class defines a set of methods that every game board
must implement. These methods are described below.
Game Board Methods
• availableMoves() returns an array of available next moves for the current
player given the current state of the interaction. The array should never be
empty. If the game should continue even if a player has no available moves,
that player should actually have only the single move NOP, signifying that the
agent does nothing except wait until its next turn.
• getMoveHistory() returns the list of moves made so far in the interaction.
Moves made in interactions are visible to all agents, so this method allows
agents to access that history without needing to explicitly store it themselves.
• lastMove() returns the last move made on the board. This information is also
available as the last element of the move history, however providing direct access
to the last move allows agents to see it without having to get the entire move
history, which may be large.
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• moveToString(Object move) converts a move object into a String so that the
move can be logged easily. This method, in part, allows users to define the
specific encoding to use when representing moves as Strings.
• playMove(Object move, int player) applies the specified move object to the
game board on behalf of the specified player. Specifying the player allows agents
to more easily use game boards to explore the space of potential future states.
Only the game manager will have direct access to the actual game board, the
agents should will only have access to copies.
• playMoveAsString(String move, int player) applies the specified move,
given as a String, to the game board on behalf on the specified player. This
method should behave exactly as playMove. Typically, a game board will im-
plement this method so that it parses the String into a valid move object and
then calls the playMove method on that object.
• queryBoard(Object location) returns the contents of the specified location
on the game board. Locations are not necessarily spatial locations, but rather
some coordinates that signify a particular area in which play is possible. For
example, an interaction may have a common area where moves may be made
(such as paying money to a central bank) but which has no spatial location.
• reset() resets the board to the initial state, before any moves have been made,
ready for the first player to make their first move.
• win() determines whether the board is in a winning state and returns the
identity of the winner, if any. The return value 0 is used to signify that a game
is incomplete, having not yet reached wither a win or draw condition. The
return values 1 through n are used to indicate that player i, for i ∈ [1, n], is the
winner. The return value n + 1 indicates that the game has ended in a draw.
Since games are user-definable, the particular meanings of return values will be
specified by the author of the game board.
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The optional user interface for an interaction is a subclass of an abstract GamePanel
class, which defines a set of methods that a user interface for an interaction must im-
plement. These methods are described below.
Game Panel Methods
• getButtonID(JComponent button) determines which button in the game panel
was clicked. When an agent is using a human as part of it’s decision-making
process, this method allows the testbed to translate the user’s action of clicking
a button into a move selected for the interaction.
• has(JComponent comp) determines whether this game panel has the specified
component. While the user is interacting with the testbed, any events generated
must be traced to determine from which particular componenent the event
was generated. This method allows the testbed to determine if the event was
generated by the game panel. Such events can then be directed to the game
panel for further handling.
• refresh(GameBoard gameBoard) updates the graphical representation of the
game state using the provided game board. After a move is made, the panel can
display this, and other effects of the move, by using the updated game board to
redraw the game panel. It is also possible that components of the game panel
may be added, removed, or modified as part of that update.
• setEnable(boolean state) is used to enable an disable the game panel. An
enabled game panel is one which the user can interact with, such as by clicking
buttons or entering text into fields. A disabled game panel does not permit
user interaction. A game panel may be disabled during the opponent’s turns or
when the game ends.
If a user interface is not provided, the testbed will not attempt to render it and
will instead display a blank panel where there user interface would have been. Game
panels, as these user interfaces for interactions are called in STASI, allow game state
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information to be displayed as well as providing a way to receive information from
the user (e.g. a human-in-the-loop agent would need input from a human in order
to play the game, the game panel could provide the human player with information
about the board and supply a convenient and intuitive way to choose a next move).
Since the game panel is graphical, rendering it takes time, and for that reason it is
optional. The testbed even includes an option to disable rendering of the game panel.
Without the game panel to render, the testbed can run experiments much faster.
The first time a new interaction is loaded in STASI, in addition to the game board
and the game panel, the testbed will need to know where the gameplay data for the
interaction is to be stored. The data can be stored in a file or in a MySQL database,
hosted locally or remotely. All of this information will be saved in a configuration
file, which the user can name. The configuration will be available the next time an
interaction is loaded, so the user need only provide this information once. Multiple
configurations can be created, allowing the user to have flexibility in how they use
the testbed. For example, a user may wish to have data for the same game stored in
two places, one for each of two different game panels. The configurations make this
possible by allowing the user to define two configuration which both use the same
game board class, but have two different game panel classes and store data in two
different places. As another example, the user may wish to have one configuration
which stores data locally, and one which stores data remotely, so that the testbed
can be used even when a network connection is not available. The testbed’s core
functionality provides a tool for loading data so that the user can load data from
local storage and save it to a remote database, or vice versa.
This framework was designed to achieve maximum compatibility and flexibility
without the need to change the testbed itself. An interaction’s game board is used to
retain the state of the game board and to communicate between game panel and the
game-playing agents. The Testbed itself does not need to know what kind of game
board it is and expects that the game panel and the agents can correctly handle that
kind of game board. This is a reasonable assumption, because when the user adds
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a new game, the implementation of the game components should be consistent with
each other. Such consistency provides the benefit that should the game panel or
agents need a specific feature which is not provided through the methods prescribed
by the abstract game board class, the game board can be downcasted to that specific
type of game board. In other words, agents are only expected to know how to use the
methods defined in the abstract game board class, but may optionally use methods
provided by the specific implementation of the game board for the interaction in which
they will participate. The Testbed does not use any of these specific features which
are defined by specific game boards and is able to handle all game boards as if they
were all the same. In this way, the testbed achieves both good compatibility, allowing
a single game manager to handle any properly implemented interaction, and good
flexibility, allowing users to define and implement extra functions for game boards to
provide to agents.
9.2.5 Adding New Agents to STASI
As with adding new interactions to STASI, adding new agents for interactions
does not require any code to be changed in the testbed core. Once the game board
for the interaction has been defined, implementing an agent is very simple. Following
the game metaphor, an agent for an interaction is called a game agent. Similar to
game boards, game agents are subclasses of an abstract GameAgent class which defines
the methods which every game agent must implement. These methods are described
below.
• finalize() is called when a game ends and the game manager is about to
dispose of the agent. This method will be the last one called on an agent
externally. Any operations that an agent needs to do before the interaction
completely ends can be completed in the finalize method. For example, an
agent which uses a database to record information about the games it plays
should do any final updates to the database and close the database connection
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in the finalize method. Any initialization operations should be done in the
class constructor.
• nextStep(GameBoard gameBoard, int player) is called by the game man-
ager when it is the agent’s turn to select a move. The game manager gives to
the agent a copy of the game board and an integer representing the player order
for this agent (usually this number is constant, however in some games it may
change). The agent is expected to an array of two objects: the move selected
and the set of moves from which the agent chose its move. The first element,
the selected move, allows the game manager to update the game board using
the agent’s chosen move. The second element, the candidate set, is logged by
the game manager for analysis.
• toString() returns the name of the agent as a String. It is used by the game
manager to record the names of the agents playing the game. The agent’s name
is expected to be globally unique. For this reason, the canonical name is the
suggested return value, however the user may assign any name to the agent
class.
Internally, a game agent may have any other methods it needs in order to make
its decision. Game agents may keep state, or they may be stateless. The particular
design of an agent is immaterial to the game manager, which only uses the above
three methods, plus the constructor, to interact with the agent. Since every agent
has an identical interface, as does every game board, the game manager never needs
to know which interaction is it managing and can use a standard algorithm to run
every interaction.
Game agents can be loaded dynamically in STASI. One agent may be loaded to
generate some data, and then a second agent can be loaded to generate even more,
including data generated one one type of agent playing against another. Agents are
also used for steganalysis, and can be loaded for that purpose at anytime. When an
agent is loaded in a configured interaction, that agent is added to the configuration
168
file and will be preloaded the next time the configuration is used, saving the user time
in the future.
9.2.6 Analysis Tools
In addition to generating data, another of STASI’s main applications is analyzing
gameplay data to measure the properties of steganography and steganalysis techniques
for structured interactions. One of the most important properties of a steganographic
system is the capacity.
The capacity of a stego-system is the number of bits of secret data that it can
hide in a stego-object. For structured interactions, secret data is hidden in the choice
of move at each step of the interaction so, the stego-objects are the histories of the
interactions. Since every agent can see the actions of all other agents at every step,
the covert channel created in the interaction by encoding bits as moves transmits
bits in two directions for every agent: every move an agent, say Alice, makes can
send bits to all the other agents, and the other agents can send bits to Alice through
their choice of move. Since one agent’s capacity is dependent on the types of agents
against which she is playing, as well as on player order, the capacity is measured for
all observed combinations of agents. For example, the capacity of a two-player game
played by an agent of type A as first player and an agent of type B as second player
will be computed separately from the capacity of the same game with a type B first
player and a type A second player.
Definition 9.2.1 The capacity Cp(g) for a player p in a game g is the amount of
information, measured in bits, that the player was able to transmit in the game.
Let g be a game played by n agents and mpi ∈ N be the i-th move of player p in
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be the candidate function, which maps a sequence of moves to a list of available next
moves.





The testbed computes the mean and standard deviation of the capacity of the
observed gameplay for each player type on both a per-game and per-move basis.
On a per-game basis, the statistics are computed over a given set G of games (see
Equation 9.2). On a per-move basis, the statistics are computed over all moves in the
















The security of a stego-system is the error rate that a passive adversary has when
attempting to distinguish between authentic objects which are not hiding data (e.g.
games played by humans) and objects which have been modified or synthesized to
hide data (e.g. games played by computer agents). The success of a stego-system
to evade detection is the failure of steganalysis techniques to detect the stego-system
in use. Many steganalysis techniques may be brought to bear on the problem of
detecting stego-objects. In order to be secure, a stego-system’s stego-objects must be
able to evade all the steganalysis techniques that may be used against them. On the
other hand, in order to be useful, a steganalysis technique need only have a low error
rate against some stego-system.
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The testbed will use an agent-based system to classify observed gameplay, or more
generally the history of any given interaction, as either authentic or generated. The
same agents which may be used for generating data may also be used to analyze data.
Given a history of an interaction, each agent type can be queried to discover for each
move whether that agent could have made that move. The ratio of the number of
moves in the interaction which could have been made by agent A to the total number
of moves made in the interaction is the score assigned to the history by agent A. The
higher the score, the more likely it is that agent A was the one which generated the
data. These scores may also be computed for each player, giving an indication of the
likelihood that a particular player is agent A. Depending on the set of agents chosen
to be used for classification, the scores will have different meanings. An agent which
is a model of human gameplay will score highly those games which are likely to have
been played by a human (or good model of a human), whereas an agent which takes
a purely computational approach to gameplay (such as attempting to play optimally)
will score highly those games which are likely to have been generated by software
agent and thus not by a human.
To evaluate the security of a stego-system, the testbed will take two equally sized
sets of games: one which has been played by actual humans and one which has been
generated by software agents. The human-played games are clean games, since they
cannot have any secret information hidden in them. The computer-generated games
are dirty, since they could have been generated in such a way as to encode secret
information. The equal number of games in both sets will mean that an accuracy of
near 50% is equivalent to guesswork and an accuracy near 100% will be indicative of
the detector having a true advantage over the stego-system. In addition to specifying
the number of games in the sets, the testbed user may also specify the number of
games per example. Grouping games together into examples, sets of games played by
the same agents, allows the detector to get more fine grained scores for classification.
However, it also means that the detector will need to let a certain number of games
complete before it can make its decision. Since each move can be encoding data, the
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delay in decision making will potentially allow many bits to be transferred before
the channel can even be detected. Once the dataset is compiled and grouped into
examples, the scores are computed, one for each agent type loaded for this purpose.
Thus, each example will make up a single row in a table where the columns are the
class label and the attribute values, each attribute being the score assigned to the
gameplay in that example by the corresponding agent. For example, if an agent of
type G and an agent of type O are loaded for analysis, the table will have three
columns: class label (0 for clean, 1 for dirty), G score (x ∈ [0, 1] for the proportion
of moves which could have been made by a G-type agent), and O score (x ∈ [0, 1]
for the proportion of moves which could have been made by an O-type agent). This
table may then be used as input for any standard machine learning algorithm.
The testbed will use JavaML to provide basic machine learning tools for classifying
data. The standard algorithm used by STASI for this purpose will be decision trees
with 10-fold cross validation. The data set is shuffled and divided into 10 smaller
sets. Over the course of 10 folds, one subset is held out as the test set and the other
nine sets are combined and used as the training set for the algorithm to learn the
parameters of the model (for decision tree, these are the decisions at each node of the
tree which iteratively split the data until the examples at each leaf node are all of the
same class). Once the model is learned, it is applied to the test set and the accuracy
achieved is recorded. The accuracies from each of the 10 folds are average together
to give an estimate of the accuracy of the detector.
The agents used for detection need not be intended for use as agents for generating
data. That is, when used for detection, an agent is just a model of some behavioral
feature of gameplay. For example, a Tic-tac-toe agent may have a simple rule of
always selecting the middle cell if it is available and playing randomly otherwise.
This agent would be very bad at playing Tic-tac-toe and would not be a good model
of human gameplay in general. However, it may capture a particular aspect of human
gameplay, which is that humans may prefer the middle cell over other cells. Together
with other agents that model particular aspects of human gameplaying behavior, such
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agents can form part of a group of agents that, as a whole, are useful for distinguishing
authentic gameplay from synthetic gameplay.
9.2.7 User Interface
The testbed has four information panels on a tabbed pane: a gameplay data panel,
an agent list panel, a game panel and an output panel. The gameplay data panel
displays the list of gameplay data records being processed in the current session. This
includes games which have been loaded as well as games which have been generated.
The agent list panel displays the name of every agent which has been loaded and
is available for use in the currently loaded interaction. The game panel displays a
graphical representation of the game board, according the the user-implemented game
panel class for the interaction. The output panel displays messages to the user about
the progress of various operations and is used to present the results of data analysis.
The testbed supports multiple tabs so that the user can load data separately into
different tabs, analyze them independently and compare them easily.
9.3 Experimental Results
Since STASI is the first of its kind, there are no other systems with which it can
be compared to determine the level of improvement STASI provides. Therefore, in
this section, some basic results about STASI’s efficiency are presented to provide a
benchmark against which to measure future advances, either by future versions of
STASI or by other implementations of testbeds for structured interactions. Also pre-
sented here are some example analyses of the steganographic properties of structured
interactions conducted using STASI. The experiments in this section were conducted
on a machine with an Intel Core i7-2630QM processor running at 2.00 GHz with 6.00
GB of RAM.
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9.3.1 Basic Timing Results
The first experiment measured the time it takes STASI to generate gameplay data.
For each agent, the time in seconds spent simulating 10000 games was recorded and
is shown in Table 9.1. The amount of time required to simulate a single game is
affected by the complexity of the agent, as well as the complexity of the game board.
For example, the complexity of a random agent is constant for all agents, since it
does exactly the same thing for any game: get the list of available moves and pick
one at random. The games of Chess and Go are of similar complexity in terms of
state space, however random Chess games take longer to simulate than random Go
games. This is due in part to the greater complexity of the Chess game board which
must do a great deal more move validation than the Go game board. Other factors
affecting the simulation time are the complexity of the moves and the length of the
games. The DB agent for Tic-tac-toe is so slow because it is querying a database
for every move and the time required for the round trips to and from the database
dominate the time required to make and validate the moves.
The next experiment measured the time it takes STASI to analyze the stegano-
graphic capacity of a game. For each agent, the time in milliseconds spent estimating
the capacity from an observed set of 10000 games was recorded and is shown in Table
9.2. STASI uses a time-memory trade-off to speed up analysis preferentially to gener-
ating data. When data is generated, STASI records the number of available moves at
each step of the interaction. This extra information is stored along with the gameplay
histories and can be used during analysis to directly compute the capacity of each
move without having to query the agent. The time required to analyze the capacity
of an interaction depends mainly on the length of the interaction. Chess and Go are
long games and so take a few hundred milliseconds more to add up all the per-move
capacities compared to short games like Tic-tac-toe and Sim.
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9.3.2 Example of Analysis Using STASI
The first experiment conducted was to measure the steganographic capacity of
several structured interactions for various agent types. When measuring the maxi-
mum expected capacity, the agent type should be Random. Random agents are free
to choose any available move at each step and so have access to the maximum capac-
ity for each move. Agents which limit the number of moves available at each step,
such as those trying to produce better play by only selecting from moves which meet
a certain quality requirement, will result in reduced capacity. Greedy agents try to
win with their next move, or block their opponent’s win, in that order. If they cannot
win and their opponent is not about to win, they are free to move randomly. Optimal
agents always make a globally optimal move.
In this experiment, each agent played 10000 games and the observed capacity
per game was recorded. Table 9.3 gives a 99.999% confidence interval around the
observed mean for each agent. Long and complex games, like Chess and Go, have
very large capacity because each move is taken from a large candidate set and many
moves are made over the course of a single game. Short and simple games, like Rock-
Paper-Scissors and Tic-tac-toe, have small capacity because the number of available
moves at each step is small and the game ends after only a few moves. It is interesting
to note that optimal play (such as in Tic-tac-toe) does not eliminate steganographic
capacity.
Another experiment was conducted to measure the steganographic security Tic-
tac-toe by determining how well a feature-based detector can distinguish between
authentic human-generated data and synthetic computer agent-generated data. In
this experiment, 5000 examples of authentic human data and 5000 examples of agent-
generated data are used as input to STASI’s feature-based decision tree classifier and
the accuracy achieved is reported in Table 9.4. The features used were the Greedy-
ness and Optimalness of the observed gameplay. In agreement with our results from
Chapter 8, the decision tree classifier is able to detect with high accuracy the differ-
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Table 9.3.
Steganographic capacity of interactions.
Game Capacity (bits per game)
Chess (Random) 869.7631± 5.0687
Connect4 (Random) 58.3141± 0.5939
Connect4 (Greedy) 56.3826± 0.7859
Go (Random) 817.8934± 11.7460
Quarto (Random) 81.5978± 0.3347
Rock-Paper-Scissors 4.7542± 0.0863
Sim (Random) 31.4589± 0.1780
Sim (Greedy) 34.9976± 0.0571
Tic-tac-toe (Random) 17.5516± 0.0473
Tic-tac-toe (Greedy) 12.5691± 0.0958
Tic-tac-toe (Optimal) 9.047± 0.0715
Tic-tac-toe (DB) 9.2395± 0.2127
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Table 9.4.







ence between human and computer-generated gameplay for the Random, Greedy, and
Optimal agents. The 70pOptimal agent plays optimally only 70% of the time and, as
predicted, is much more difficult to detect than the pure strategies. The DB agent
uses a database of authentic human data to generate synthetic gameplay. The de-
tector is only able to achieve moderate accuracy against synthetic data generated by
this agent due to the close statistical similarity between the synthetic and authentic
data.
9.4 Conclusion
Out of the box, STASI includes a number of common structured interactions and
can generate example data and run basic analyses on that data. Basic analysis tasks
include measuring covert channel capacity and measuring steganographic security. In
STASI, stego-systems are implemented using software agents. An agent is a partici-
pant in a structured interaction and behaves according to a set of rules for deciding
which action the agent should take for any given state of the interaction. For each
defined interaction, STASI provides a basic agent which acts randomly. Advanced
agents can be designed and implemented by users. STASI can load agents from local
storage, or from a remote server. Example data can be loaded from local or remote
data repositories, such as a MySQL database. Even definitions for structured inter-
179
actions can be loaded from local or remote storage. This gives STASI a high level of
extensibility, since data, agents, and interactions can be sourced from remote stor-
age, opening the door for users to share their work with others. STASI can generate
example data using the agents and interaction definitions, but this data will all be
synthetic. However, since STASI can load data from a file or a database, data col-
lected from authentic interactions can be loaded in STASI for analysis. Having access
to both authentic and synthetic data allows STASI to conduct experiments that de-
termine whether, and how well, analysis techniques are able to distinguish between
synthetic and authentic interactions. The basic analyses that STASI conducts are
behavioral agent-based. So, writing a new analysis technique is as simple as writing
a new agent. Of course, since STASI is open source, users can also add to STASI core
functionality to include analysis techniques that are not behavioral-based.
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10 SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we have considered the problem of synthetic steganography: gen-
erating and detecting covert channels in generated media. We developed, imple-
mented, and analyzed several novel techniques for hiding data in generated media
such as time series, binary trees, tiled images, Sudoku puzzles, as well as games and
other structured interactions. We also designed and tested steganalysis techniques to
detect the differences between authentic objects and synthetic objects, which could
be hiding data. Recognizing that structured interactions represent a vast field of
novel media for steganography, we designed and implemented a software testbed for
analyzing steganographic interactions. We used the testbed to measure the covert
channel capacity of several interactions as well as to study certain behavioral prop-
erties of human-generated gameplay. In this chapter, we summarize our conclusions
and provide suggestions for future work.
10.1 Conclusions
In our work on synthetic steganography in time series, we showed that we could
develop relatively sophisticated and practical secret-key stego-systems in a variety
of applications including the kinds seen in financial markets. The stego-system’s
layers of complexity enabled us to hide information in an arbitrary series of values
with independent control over information density, location and size of perturbation.
The information density and size of perturbation both affect the final time series
directly. However, the main effect of the choice of embedding location showed up
in the complexity of the key required to recover the information hidden in the time
series.
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We presented a novel information hiding scheme which uses the structure of Huff-
man trees to encode secret data. We showed that the capacity c of the channel is





m− (D − B)
(D − 1)
, where m is the number of symbols, D ≥ 2
is the degree of the tree and B = (D − 2) − ((m − 2)mod(D − 1)) so that (D − B)
is the number of symbols merged at the deepest level of the tree. A binary Huffman
tree has embedding capacity m − 1 bits, where m is the number of symbols in the
alphabet. The covert channel in the tree structure is robust against any and all modi-
fications to the content of the cover-object. An active warden can reduce or eliminate
the capacity of the channel by recoding the object using a different but equivalent
tree. A passive warden can achieve perfect accuracy of detection in the case where
the Huffman tree is generated using the empirical symbol distribution of the content.
The use of a private a priori distribution to build the tree requires the warden to
compare the tree to one built using the empirical symbol distribution and reduces her
detection accuracy to guesswork. The cost to the steganographers for this increased
security is not in capacity, but rather in compression ratio.
Our work on steganography with context-sensitive tiling systems showed that it
is not generally possible to distinguish between synthetic objects which are hiding
data and synthetic objects which are not hiding data. Standard image-steganalysis
methods fail to detect the existence of hidden information in tiled images. A directed
steganalysis technique designed specifically for the tiling system is able to distinguish
clean images from dirty images with high accuracy only in certain cases where a weak
parameter set is used. Several strong parameter sets were found against which the
warden is not able to achieve better accuracy than guesswork. The commonality
among these was the use of a shared secret key.
Our stego-system for hiding data in Sudoku puzzles exploits 105.5425±0.0016 bits
of capacity in Sudoku puzzles, five times as much capacity as the only other method
known for hiding data in Sudoku puzzles. The theoretical embedding capacity of a
Sudoku board is 72.5 bits. StegoDoku is able to hide an average of 70.0929± 0.1172
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bits, or 96.7% of expected maximum capacity, by using Huffman coding to decode
secret bits into the choice of number to place in the next cell. The best order to visit
cells when constructing a StegoDoku board is in order of most-constrained first. This
ordering results in the least backtracks, and therefore also the lowest decoding error
rate. StegoDoku can hide an additional 32.4327± 0.1366 bits in the configuration of
clues provided to solve the puzzle. Boards can be generated in 9.0560± 0.02970 mil-
liseconds. Generating a complete StegoDoku puzzle requires 30.7368±0.065 seconds,
indicating that it is much more computationally difficult to generate a solvable clue
configuration which encodes secret bits than it is to generate a solved board which
encodes secret bits. Without the use of a secret key, StegoDoku boards can be dis-
tinguished from authentic boards with near perfect accuracy, although it may require
seeing several, as many as ten or more, before making a decision. When a shared
secret key is used, the Sudoku boards generated by StegoDoku are indistinguishable
from authentic Sudoku boards. In addition to the secret key controlling the board
and puzzle generation processed, secrets should be encrypted before hiding and short
secrets should be padded with random bits.
The result that it is generally not possible to determine whether a synthetic object
is hiding data was confirmed by our work on covert channels in combinatorial games.
In that work, we demonstrated a general methodology for exploiting covert channels
in games and showed that detection of the usage of the covert channel depended on the
warden having a correct and accurate model of clean gameplay. When all gameplay
was synthetic, but only a portion contained hidden data, the warden’s accuracy was
no better than guesswork. We also showed that enforcing a perfect play requirement
was not sufficient to eliminate the covert channel capacity.
Our follow-up work on covert channels in games utilized gameplay data collected
from humans to develop an accurate anomaly detector that could distinguish be-
tween authentic human-generated gameplay and synthetic computer-generated game-
play. We trained a decision tree using multiple behavioral features of both human-
generated and computer-generated gameplay. The resulting tree was able to correctly
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classify more than 97% of the test set examples. However, the results suggest that
a gameplaying-agent could be designed that would generate gameplay which is suffi-
ciently statistically similar to authentic human gameplay that the detector would be
fooled and reduce its accuracy to guesswork. The only way for the warden to regain
the advantage is to develop a more accurate model of authentic gameplay. This is
equally true for the steganographers. We also found that the method of collecting
gameplay data influenced the accuracy of the detector which uses it. Sequential game-
play data collection, recording games played from start to finish, yielded higher ac-
curacy than non-sequential collection (recording data as game state and move pairs).
In response to the lack of a framework for studying steganography in games, we
designed and implemented the first software testbed for analyzing steganographic
interactions. The testbed is open source, extensible, customizable, efficient, and easy
to use. The testbed provides basic functionality which enables users to analyze the
steganographic properties of any structured interaction. Data can be generated by
the testbed and stored for later use. Data can also be loaded from local or remote
storage. We used the testbed to generate and analyze gameplay data for several
games. For most agents, the testbed requires only a few seconds to generate 10000
examples of gameplay and can measure the average capacity of those examples in less
than 1 second. Observed capacities for the games studied range from 4.7542±0.0863
bits per game of Rock-Paper-Scissors to 869.7631 ± 5.0687 bits per game of Chess.
The embedding capacity of a game decreases as the space of possible next moves
becomes smaller. Agents which seek to mimic the play of humans will choose from a
smaller set of potential next moves and therefore exploit less of than the maximum
capacity that the game can support. A good estimate of Tic-tac-toe’s maximum
embedding capacity is 17.5516 ± 0.0473 bits per game. However, the agent which
only selects moves that it has observed a human make has an embedding capacity of
9.2395± 0.2127 bits per game because humans rule out certain moves, such as those
which would allow their opponent to win.
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10.2 Suggestions for Future Work
There are several directions in which to continue the work described in this dis-
sertation. Some of these directions are included here:
1. Economic analysis of the cost of using covert channels in financial data. Given
sufficient resources it is unquestionably possible to temporarily control the price
of a stock. Or, as a market maker, to control the listing of orders for stock. In
both cases, there is some capacity for covert communication. But there is also
cost and risk. It costs money to buy enough stock to control the price. And it
entails risk to hold the stock and control the price longer enough to transmit
the secret message. If the secret has a certain value to the sender and receiver,
then an equilibrium can be found to determine the cost and level of activity
required to safely transmit it through a covert channel in financial data.
2. Extend the context-sensitive tiling stego-system to higher dimensions and ap-
ply it to other media. Our work demonstrated the feasibility of tiling systems
for steganography using 2 dimensional images. Our work is also applicable
to higher dimensional space, such as spatial images, and other media, such
as audio and video. One particularly interesting direction this work could go
is into watermarking of source code, which is context-free and therefore triv-
ially context-sensitive. Another direction could be an application to natural
language generation, utilizing the context of previous statements to guide the
construction of the next statement.
3. Develop extensions to the Huffman tree stego-system to cover canonical trees
and dynamic Huffman codes. One of the ways in which our stego-system for
Huffman trees can be defeated is to convert the tree to its canonical form. Since
there is only one canonical tree for a given symbol distribution, this countermea-
sure completely eliminates the capacity of the channel as presented. However,
the number of canonical trees for all distributions over n symbols is greater
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than 1, thus there is capacity in the choice of distribution. Minor changes to
the symbol distribution may be able to provide a choice of canonical tree, and
thus covert channel capacity in that choice. A similar idea should work for using
dynamic Huffman codes as a covert channel.
4. Deeper analysis of the steganographic capacity of Sudoku clue configurations.
Our work presented a method capable of exploiting 32.4327 ± 0.1366 bits of
capacity in the placement of clues. However, there is very likely more capacity
that can be exploited. By taking the log of the sum over the number of clue
configurations with between 17 and 32 clues, we can say that the maximum
capacity of a clue configuration for a Sudoku puzzle is 76.259 bits. A more
accurate value can be obtained by counting only those clue configurations which
are solvable.
5. Build stego-system that incorporates a model of human interaction which uses
a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R. Rule-based models for describing the
behavior of gameplaying agents are sufficient for conducting covert communica-
tion through the game or interaction. However, a warden with access to actual
human data will eventually be able to detect a difference between the observed
and expected gameplay behavior. To further delay this detection, a stego-agent
should learn while playing the game, and that learning should proceed in a
manner which appears similar to a human’s learning. This is not possible with
a rules-based model, but is possible with a cognitive architecture.
6. Further and advanced development of the software testbed for analyzing stegano-
graphic interactions. There are several avenues for future work in this direction:
(1) Rewrite the GUI using JavaFX and include functionality for plotting graphs
of results; (2) Expand the library of interactions in which covert channels can be
studied by including a parser for games written in a game description language;
(3) Extending and strengthening the library of methods for steganalysis would
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